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Abstract 
This thesis presents a comparative analysis of the relationship between party political 
ideology and changing family policies during the 1980s and 1990s in France, the UK 
and Spain. It explores theoretical perspectives on political ideology, policy analysis 
and policy change. Different disciplinary approaches to the analysis of public policy 
are reviewed in relation to policy change and ideologies. The thesis tests theories of 
ideology by applying them in three substantive case studies of family policy change in 
France, the UK and Spain. Each case study analyses the manifestos of the major 
political parties in rdation to eight family policy instruments, pro-family statements 
and their position in relation to the opposing state intervention dimensions of 
public/private and family/individual. The policy measures are further considered 
within two dimensions: regulatory and support. Family policies in the three study 
countries are examined from their origins to the late 1970s. The study continues with 
a parallel thematic analysis of changing family policies and political ideologies as 
expressed in party electoral manifestos. Sixty-one manifestos from the main parties of 
each country are compared cross-nationally and in relation to changing family 
policies. The findings are then studied with reference to the theoretical framework. 
The thesis concludes that family policies have evolved in line with changing political 
ideologies and that there is some evidence to support cross-national convergence in 
these areas. It remains difficult, however, to establish a strong causal link between the 
two dimensions. In addition, the conclusions consider the review of scientific research 
into family policies and make some observations relating to the distinct development 
of research in each national context. 
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Chapter 1 - INTRODUCTION 
Political interest and state intervention in the family sphere are themes that have been 
addressed since the time of Plato or Aristotle (Barker, 1962). The inseparable link 
between the family and its foundational role in society has also provided a central 
theme in political thought, as demonstrated by Jean-Jaques Rousseau's affirmation, 
'la plus ancienne de toutes les societes et la seule naturelle est celle de la famille' 
(The oldest of all societies, and the only natural one, is the family) (I 966: 41). 
In twentieth century Europe, this political concern with the family became a policy 
reality through the introduction and development of a number of instruments by 
political parties and governments aimed at regulating families, for example through 
measures relating to marriage and divorce, birth control, relations between parents 
and children. Families have also been targeted by governments as primary groups 
through measures such as child benefits, tax relief and service provision, thus placing 
family policy within the wider question of the relationship between the state and 
citizens. Whereas some states pursued highly visible and institutionalised family 
policy strategies, others developed welfare policies which were not, in name, specific 
to families. The thesis examines three European Union (EU) member states that are 
representatives of the above categories: France, the United Kingdom (UK) and Spain .. 
France is an example of a country with a statist tradition and consequently a long 
history of state intervention in the family sphere. Although financial support for 
families originated in the private sector (in the form of family wage schemes), French 
political parties, notably of the right, progressively developed family policy measures 
during the 1920s and 1930s. These initiatives led to the introduction of the legislative 
9 
foundation of subsequent French family policy, the Code de la famille (Family Code) 
in 1939. In the following decades, through the Vichy regime and into the Fourth 
Republic, the Code de la famille was built upon, and the period to 1958 became 
known as the 'Golden Age' of French family policy (Lenoir, 1985). During this 
period state support for the family', also included pro-natalist objectives, reflecting 
the political ideology of the right, which characterised family policy in France at that 
time. 
From the 1960s, transformations in family sociology and population in Europe began 
to be reflected in the concerns of policy makers. The 'baby boom' of the 1950s and 
1960s initially allayed the fears of pro-natalists. Later, changing patterns of family 
life, resulting from an increase in women's paid work and changing social mores, 
presented new challenges to party political conceptions of the family as well as family 
policies. In addition, the economic impact of the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 led 
governments to re-evaluate public spending. By the beginning of the 1980s the effects 
of socio-demographic transformations (resulting from divorce law reforms, equality 
of parental authority and a growth in diversity of family forms) challenged the 
ideological foundations of the 'Golden Age' system offamily support. In addition, the 
growing influence of monetarism brought state intervention into question. Thus 
during the 1980s and 1990s, this package of family policies became increasingly 
threatened. Because of these pressures, family policy remained a key aspect of French 
social policy and party. political debate into the second half of the 1990s. 
I The tenn 'the family' is used intentionally to reflect the nonnative objectives of family policy at the 
time. 
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The origins of the modem welfare state in the UK date back to the second world war 
and the, so-called, Beveridge Report2 which was, in pari, based upon assumptions 
about family life and the division of labour between the sexes. While measures to 
support families have been present in UK social policy, there has never been a 
coherent set of family policies, as in France, largely due to the fact that the UK has 
had a tradition of suspicion in matters of state intervention in the private sphere. The 
lack of what some authors (notably Kamerrnan and Kahn, 1978: 3) have called 
'explicit' family policies in the UK has not, however, resulted in the absence of the 
family as a theme of party political ideologies. Indeed one of the most striking 
features of social debate amongst UK political parties was the increase in family 
themes from the late 1970s, to the point where, by the mid-1990s, both right and left 
wing parties were openly claiming to represent the interests of the family. 
The case of family policy in Spain is intrinsically linked with the fundamental 
political and institutional changes which have taken place since the 1930s. The radical 
social policies of the Spanish Second Republic (1932-36) were brought to a dramatic 
end by the Civil War (1936-38) and the subsequent victory of the reactionary forces 
under the command of General Francisco Franco. The ensuing authoritarian regime 
introduced strict control of family life in the Penal and Civil Codes which were 
enforced for over forty years. The family under Franco's ideology was firmly based 
upon the principles of patriarchal authority, religious (Roman Catholic) marriage and 
pro-natalism. After Franco's death in 1975, however, Spain entered a new democratic 
era in which similar, but less marked, social and demographic changes to those that 
were taking place in France and the UK were faced by policy makers. In addition, this 
2 Social Insurance and Allied Services (Beveridge, 1942). 
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radical break saw the emergence of new parties of left and right, each of which had 
their own conceptions of the relationship between the state and citizens and the role of 
the family in society. Since the late 1970s, a number of sweeping reforms, introduced 
largely by left wing parties, have impacted upon family life in Spain, notably in 
relation to gender equality, divorce and abortion. However, as in the UK, explicit 
family policies have not been developed. 
In addition to wide-ranging socio-demographic transformations, family policies in 
France, the UK and Spain have evolved within changing political climates. The 
number of studies examining the impact of socio-demographic trends on family 
policies has been growing in parallel with them. Equally, research activity in the three 
countries in this area has reflected trends and the concerns of policy makers. 
The visibility of the family in party political debate has been accompanied by a 
growing body of literature. In France, authors including Jaques Commaille (199Ia, 
1991 b) and Remi Lenoir (1987, 1991) have addressed questions relating to the 
relationship between family policies and politics and political ideas. While this work 
represents only a small proportion of the vast body of family policy literature in 
France, interest in the theme continued to develop during the 1990s (Commaille and 
Claude Martin, 1998). In contrast to France, the Spanish literature on family policy 
and party political ideologies appears limited, although growth in the study of Spanish 
family policies gained impetus in the 1990s. The study of the impact of party politics 
on families and family policies has, however, become a significant focus within this 
developing literature, notably in Spain, where political scientists have sought to 
redress the imbalance (see Valiente, 1995c, 1997; Madruga, 1996). 
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In the UK, authors began examining the relationship between politics and the family 
from the 1980s. Some, notably Diana Gittins (1985), looked at the family as a means 
of social control and investigated how it affected the behaviour of individuals. While 
others (such as Muncie and Whetherell, 1995; Lister, 1996), particularly from the 
mid-1990s, began to examine the family as a theme in politics with special reference 
to the Conservative party and Thatcherism. This growing research interest in the 
family as an element of party political thought and discourse can be tracked through 
the increasing use of the terms 'ideology' or 'ideological' in the literature. Indeed, it 
has become relatively common for authors to refer to ideology in the context of 
family policy (Barrett and Mclntosh, 1991; Harding, 1996; Jones and Millar, 1996) or 
to speak of 'family ideology' (the central theme in Gittins, 1985), 'ideological 
positioning' (Lister, 1996: 11) and 'ideological assumptions' (Reynolds, 1996: 189). 
This increase in the number of references to ideology in relation to family policy in 
the UK is highly significant, given that the term 'family policy' has not been used by 
British governments, and that numerous authors (Land and Parker, 1978; Abbot and 
Wallace, 1992: 117; Ringen, 1997) have commented on the fact that family policy has 
been largely implicit in the UK. 
The growing focus on politics and, in particular, party political ideology in the context 
of changing family policies has, however, neglected two key considerations. First, it 
is unclear from the family policy literature what exactly is understood by ideology. 
Second, there has been no substantive examination of what, if any, relationship exists 
between political ideology and changing family policies. This thesis is therefore an 
exploratory study that attempts to contribute to the existing literature and to unravel 
the relationship between party political ideology and changing family policies through 
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the comparative analysis of France, the UK and Spain up to the late 1990s. The 
following sections define the key terms and introduce the hypotheses, research 
questions and methods employed in the thesis. The chapter concludes with the 
presentation of the structure and content of the thesis. 
Defining terms 
Since both ideology and family policy are disputed concepts, it is important to clarifY 
how these two key terms as used in the thesis. 
Ideology 
The focus of the literature on ideology has largely been divided between two 
approaches. This distinction is made in the present study by refening to 'ideology' 
and 'ideologies' (for example, party political ideology, family ideology, right or left 
wing ideology and so on). 
First, 'ideology' has been studied as a process or structure which seeks to explain the 
role of ideas and beliefs in social and political change, especially by Karl Marx and 
Freidrich Engels (1975) and by Marxists and neo-Marxists such as Vladimir Lenin 
(1960, 1971), Georg Lukacs (1923), Louis Althusser (1965, 1971a, 1971b) and 
Antonio Gramsci (1971). These authors have addressed key issues such as the nature 
of ideology, its role in the power struggle between classes and, ofparlicularrelevance 
to the thesis, the relationship between state and citizen (Marx and Engels, 1986). 
Second, the term 'ideologies' has been developed as a label for the classification of 
largely coherent systems of political thought, such as Fascism, Communism, 
Nationalism, Feminism, Environmentalism or that of political parties (Eagleton, 1994; 
Funderburk and Thoebaben, 1994; Vincent, 1995). 
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. According to Marx, the ruling class not only controls the means of material 
production, but also the means of intellectual production. When combined, these two 
elements, he argues, serve to maintain the dominance of the ruling class. The control 
of the means of intellectual production is the focus of Marx' s theory of ideology. In 
this context, ideology is the process and structure which determines society's system 
of norms, beliefs or ideas, in particular those relating to the legitimacy of the political 
and economic systems. In this way ideology serves to maintain the interests of the 
ruling class. Ideology is thus fundamental to political stability and is intrinsically 
conservative. Following from this, if any fundamental change in the political system 
is to take place, such as that which occurred in Spain during the late 1970s, then a 
different political ideology must displace that of the ruling class. By so doing, a new 
ruling ideology serves to legitimise a new set of political norms. This concept of 
ideology can be adapted to the study of changing family policy in the following 
illustration: the basic ideological premise that state intervention in the family sphere is 
necessary or desirable determines the nature of any policies which seek to achieve 
objectives therein, such as regulation of relationships and material support. Thus, in 
states in which an ideology serves to legitimise state intervention, it is probable that 
family policies are more visible and have a greater impact than in states which do not. 
The term 'ideologies' also has its roots In Marxist thought (Fiske, 1991) and is 
complimentary to the concept of ideology as a process insofar as it identifies those 
sets of beliefs intrinsic to stability or change in political and social terms. In the case 
of family policy change, political ideologies can be seen in shifts in the nature of 
policies, for examples in the debate surrounding the payment of child benefits to the 
first child in France (see Chapter 6). While this debate centred on opposing party 
political ideologies, the fundamental principle of child benefits was not questioned, 
solely details relating to the type, value and means of payment. Thus party political 
ideologies may be in conflict but remain within the limits of an ideology, represented 
in this example as the level of state intervention in the family sphere. Changes in 
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family policies may, therefore, occur as a result of conflict between party political 
ideologies (for example shifts between right and left at elections). Central elements of 
the present study are thus continuity and change in both party political ideologies and 
family policies. 
In the context of the family policy literature. examined in Chapter 2 of this thesis, 
ideologies, as a set of beliefs, are referred to in references to 'family ideology' or 
'family ideologies'. In this sense, family ideology is specifically a set of beliefs that 
makes assumptions about the legitimacy of state intervention in the family sphere, the 
role of the family in society, relationships between family members and the definition 
of what does or does not constitute a family. 
While ideology thus defined is valuable as a descriptive tool and serves to classify 
different beliefs about the family, it has been criticised as having limited analytical 
value3• However, the identification of political ideologies and their position in relation 
to the family, the relationship between the family and the state and the nature of any 
political intervention in the family sphere is a necessary exercise if the role of 
ideology and its function in changing family policies is to be examined. This thesis 
argues that, if party political ideologies are not first identified and defined, then it may 
not be possible to examine the nature and extent of change therein. 
In the family policy literature outlined above, lanet Finch's (1996) contribution 
provides a valuable clue to the relationship between ideology and family policies. She 
(1996) suggests that policies are often ideologically driven and are based on 
assumptions about what families should be doing. Finch thus echoes the concept of 
ideology as a process which provides the basis for a framework for the substantive 
examination of the relationship between party political ideology and changing family 
lGann (1995) has criticised studies which examine 'ideologies' (e.g. Fascism, Nationalism, 
Communism) on the grounds that any political statement may be consttued as ideology, and she 
stresses the value of studying ideology as a concept 
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policies, first, by conceptualising the function of ideology and, second, by identifying 
policy change as a possible indicator of this function. Ideology in the specific context 
of the thesis is understood as a process in which changes in party political ideologies 
precede, and are essential for, changes in family policy. 
Family policy 
When compared to the study of ideology, family poiicy appears to be a relatively 
modem field of inquiry (Kamerman and Kahn, 1997: 6). Much of the debate has 
focussed on either the explicit/implicit classification of family policies across 
countries (Kamerman and Kahn, 1978: 3), or across different disciplinary boundaries 
(Hantrais and Letablier, 1996). In addition, the definition of family policy is 
fundamentally dependent upon a definition of 'family'. Linda Hantrais and Marie-
Therese Letablier (1996) have explored the wide variety of definitions of the family 
as defined for statistical purposes by national and supra-national institutions, by 
policy makers or by sociologists. The authors highlight the difficulties of defining the 
family in the context of increased diversification of family forms. These definitions 
do not always correspond to traditional nuclear family definitions based upon the 
heterosexual married couple of breadwinner and housewife who live together with 
their biological children. Increased instances of lone parent or reconstituted families 
in EU countries have limited the utility of family as a concept. In spite of this, 
political parties have regularly referred to 'the family' or 'families' and policy 
measures have contained family in their titles (family credit, allocations familiales, 
plus de cargas familiares). 
Differing political definitions of the family can be said to reveal differing party 
political ideologies. Given the specific focus in the thesis on changing family policies, 
as opposed to changing family forms, it is necessary' to take account of variations in 
institutional definitions across time and space. Of the three countries, only Spain 
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defines the family in its Constitution, and this definition has been interpreted as being 
intentionally vague and therefore flexible (Valiente, 1995c). Indeed, as a flexible 
definition of the family is convenient for political parties, it is also useful for the 
purposes of this thesis. Adopting a rigid definition of family policy would, at best, 
limit the scope of the present study to a very specific set of measures, as suggested by 
Brin (1991), or, at worst, call into question the inclusion of both the UK and Spain in 
the analysis given the lack of 'family policy' as an official term during the case study 
period. If a flexible definition of the family allows for married or cohabiting couples, 
lone parents with children and reconstituted families, then family policy would refer 
to any deliberate state action which targets families whatever their form. This action 
may include measures which seek to regulate relationships between partners or 
parents and children, which provide material support for families (in cash or kind). In 
addition the thesis considers abortion and contraception which, while not strictly 
targeted at families, provide additional significant indicators of party political 
ideologies containing themes of pro-natalism and anti-feminism. For the purposes of 
the thesis, family policy is defined as consisting of measures which seek to regulate or 
support either couples, or a parent, or parents and their dependent children. 
Since each policy measure within family policy may be based upon distinct party 
political· ideologies, it is important to examine those themes of party political 
ideologies associated with each of the family policy measures examined in the case 
studies. Two advantages of this approach are: first, the focus on individual policies 
allows for cross-national comparison to be made of countries which do not claim to 
have a coherent family policy; and second, this approach is not affected· by 
institutional changes (for example changes in the departments which are responsible 
for each policy measure) or changes in name (such as 'family allowances' being 
renamed 'child benefits'), either or both of which may prove significant indicators of 
changes in party political ideology. 
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The study of the relationship between party political ideology and family policies thus 
focuses on distinct family policy measures as opposed to 'family policy' as an 
overarching concept. The measures selected for study all fit the above definition of. 
policies which aim to regulate or support families and are, henceforth, collectively 
referred to as family policy or family policies. 
Hypothesis and research questions 
It has been stated above that scientific interest in the relationship between politics and 
family policy has grown in the 1990s in France, the UK and Spain. Within this 
growing body of research, ideology has been identified as a recurring theme, most 
commonly in the UK literature. In the context of the thesis ideology is understood as a 
process which focuses on the relationship between party political ideologies and 
changing family policies. According to this theory of ideology, changes in family 
policy are the product of changes in party political ideologies. 
The thesis contests the argument that only changes in the ideology of political 61ites 
bring about changes in policies, on the grounds that other variables, including minor 
parties, lobbies, economic conditions or legislation from supra-national bodies such as 
European Union directives, also play a role. The thesis investigates the hypothesis 
that, whereas changes in party political ideologies may be translated into changes in 
family policies, any changes in family policies resulting from any other variable may 
in turn bring about changes in party political ideologies. 
The concept of 'change' is central to the understanding of the relationship between 
party political ideology and family policies. In seeking to examine such a relationship, 
change or continuity in both family policies and party political ideologies must be 
identified. The thesis thus seeks to answer the following key questions across the 
three countries studied: 
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I. To what extent have family policies changed? 
2. To what extent have family policies converged! diverged across the countries? 
3. To what extent have party political ideologies relating to the family changed? 
4. To what extent have party political ideologies relating to the family evolved in 
terms of the politicallefi and right and across the countries? 
5. Has the relationship between family policies and party political ideologies evolved 
along similar lines? 
6. Is it possible to demonstrate a causal relationship between changing party political 
ideologies and family policies? 
7. Do changes in family policies result from changes in party political ideologies, 
does the reverse relationship exist or do both processes act interdependently? 
Methods 
The key methods are a case study approach to the dimensions of changing family 
policies and party political ideologies and cross-national comparison of the results of 
the national case studies. First, changes in family policy, in each country, are 
examined through the longitudinal analysis of primary and secondary documents 
relating to eight family policy measures from their origins to the end of the study 
period. The approach to changing party political ideologies is based upon the 
thematic, qualitative analysis of the election manifestos of the main political parties of 
each country from the late 1970s to the late 1990s. Party ideologies are examined in 
relation to the same eight variables presented above plus pro-family statements. The 
ideological presentation of the relationship between the state and families or 
individuals is also a significant element which runs through the case studies and 
conclusions and is of particular relevance to the discussion of ideology and 
Althusser's concept of Ideological State Apparatuses. The results of these two stages 
are then compared in each national case study focusing on convergence and 
divergence between both dimensions. 
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The results of the national case studies are then compared cross-nationally in order to 
observe convergence or divergence between the following phenomena: the 
development of family policies across the three countries; the development of party 
political ideologies in relation to the family across countries in terms of political left 
and right. Through the comparison of the findings from the national case studies an 
attempt is made to draw broader conclusions about trends in family policy change and 
party political ideologies given that the three countries are all Western European 
liberal democracies. The results are also considered in relation to the theory of 
ideology and the relationship between the state and citizens therein, in an effort to 
unravel the central question of the relationship between party political ideology and 
changing family policies. 
Structure and content 
The thesis begins with a critical review of family policy literature. Chapter 2 thus 
looks at the development of the study of family policy change with special reference 
to works that have examined questions of ideology, party political ideologies or 
politics in relation to the family. The chapter first considers the contribution of single-
country studies carried out in France, the UK and Spain. The review is dominated by 
references to France since this is the country where the largest body of literature 
. exists. Second, cross-national comparative studies of family policy are evaluated, 
taking particular note of methodological approaches that may be applied to the thesis. 
Chapter 3 reviews the concept of policy change in the Anglo-Saxon policy analysis 
literature, with particular reference to the work of Paul Sabatier (1988), whose 
concept of belief systems (and their classification in terms of relative resistance to 
change) provides a valuable starting point for the methods used in the empirical case 
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study analysis. Chapter 3 provides a critical re-appraisal of Marx's theory of ideology 
and later interpretations, notably that of Louis Althusser, and his contribution to 
Marx!s original concept. These contributions to the study of ideology and the 
relationship between the state and citizens are then considered in relation to national 
. contexts for ideology, themes of the family and the ideologies of the political parties. 
Chapter 4 presents the methods employed in the remainder of the thesis and examines 
John Clayton Thomas' approach to the study of party manifestos in the analysis of 
ideological change. The chapter develops a framework for the substantive case studies 
of changing family policies and party political ideologies. The eight family policy 
measures which form the basis of this framework are contextualised in relation to 
traditions of party political ideologies in France, the UK and Spain. In addition, these 
measures are categorised in terms of their objectives relating to state regulation or 
support for families and family life. This distinction adds a further analytical 
dimension, making it possible to examine whether regulatory or support measures and 
the party political ideologies which inform them are more or less resistant to change 
following Sabatier's model. In combination with the approaches outlined in Chapter 
3, Chapter 4 thus presents the framework for the case study analysis and includes case 
study design, as well as highlighting the advantages and pitfalls of a cross-national 
comparative approach, country selection and the choice of manifestos as indicators of 
party political ideologies in relation to the research questions and the hypothesis. 
Chapter 5 presents the statistical background to family policy change in the three 
countries through indicators of population trends . and family behaviour. The core of 
the chapter consists of a historical study of the eight family policy instruments (as 
22 
identified in Chapter 4) and the theme of the family in the evolution of political 
ideologies of left and right. This development is presented for the three countries, thus 
providing the necessary context for the analysis in the national case studies. 
The first country study, Chapter 6, examines changing family policies in relation to 
changing party political ideologies in France from 1981-97. Over this period the 
previous stability of French family policies became increasingly threatened in the 
context of a series of economic crises and questions of state intervention. As with 
each national case study, Chapter 6 first presents the political context; second, it 
examines the development of each party and its ideology, with special reference to the 
family and the relationship between the state and the citizen; third, it explores 
changing party political ideologies through the thematic, qualitative analysis of the 
evolution of each of the eight family policy instruments and pro-family statements in 
the election manifestos of the main political parties, and concludes by comparing 
policy change with party ideological change over the case study period. 
The case study of the UK from 1979-97 in Chapter 7 pays particular attention to the 
impact of Thatcherism, and its opposition to the 'nanny state', on both family policy 
change and the political ideologies of the other political parties. The UK case study 
examines the impact of Thatcherism of upon the family in political ideologies across 
the parties and examines how some family policies and party ideologies may have 
changed as a result. 
The final national case study in Chapter 8 examines the radical effects of Spain's 
Transition to Democracy upon party political ideology and family policy change 
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through the shift in the ideological foundation of the state. Further, it explores the 
impact of radical political changes in Spain from 1977-96. Finally the chapter reviews 
the regulatory measures and the major transformations they underwent in the early 
part of the study period in spite of opposition from within right wing party political 
ideologies. 
Chapter 9 returns to the seven research questions and provides a cross-national 
comparative analysis of the three case studies and draws comparative conclusions 
about the relationship between party political ideology and changing tilrnily policies. 
Comparative analysis is thus used to reveal changes in national family policies and to 
examine whether a relationship can be established between political ideologies and 
family policies, and whether such a relationship helps to explain cross-national policy 
divergence or convergence. It examines the ideological change observed in the party 
manifestos across the countries in order to examine the extent to which there is 
evidence of conve!ging/diverging trends and whether family policies, although 
different, may also be converging across the three countries. A final level of 
comparison explores the nature of state intervention in the family sphere through a 
focus on the key themes of left and right wing party ideologies in relation to the four 
dimensions: 'public' (state intervention), 'private' (responsibility), individuals 
(women, children, workers) and the family. The comparison of national party political 
ideologies over timeseeks to demonstrate whether parties in their election manifestos 
in France, the country that has the greatest level of institutionalisation of family 
policies in this study, changed their ideological focus during the study period. In 
direct contrast, the analysis of the UK manifestos examines whether a developing 
cross-party consensus can be found in relation to the privatisation of the family as a 
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theme in cross-party politics. In Spain, parties appear to remam divided across 
traditional party ideological boundaries of left and right in relation to family policies. 
A comparison of the findings is used to demonstrate to what extent family policies 
have evolved in line with party political ideologies. It remains difficult, however, to 
establish a strong causal link between the two dimensions. 
Although it is clear that a dynamic relationship exists between party political ideology 
and changing family policies, the chapter further suggests that a policy measure's 
relative resistance to change may be related to the degree of change in the party 
political ideologies it embodies. In addition, given the exploratory objectives of the 
thesis, reflections are made relating to the limitations of the present study that may 
benefit future research into the questions and themes examined. 
Chapter 2 - ANALYSING FAMILY POLICY CHANGE: NATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE APPROACHES 
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In this chapter, family policy as a field of scholarly inquiry since the 1960s is 
examined. It looks at the approaches that have been adopted to identifY and track 
changes in family policy, and investigates how the study of family policy has 
developed and changed in France, the UK and Spain through a critical review of key 
works in this field. In identifYing the questions and methods that have dominated the 
study of family policies from the 1960s to the 1990s, the chapter examines the extent 
to which the study of party political ideology has been present in the existing body of 
both national and comparative literature. 
Although the family has long been linked with the foundations of party political 
ideology (see Elstain, 1983), it was not until the second half of the twentieth Century 
that concem with 'family policy' as a distinct sub-category of social policy became 
the source of widespread party political and academic debate (Kamerman and Kahn, 
1997: 6). In addition, this growth in interest in family policy coincided with or, 
perhaps more especially, was stimulated by a range of socio-demographic 
transformations which have taken place in the industrialised world over the period 
from the 1960s to the 1990s, a fact which is reflected in the large number of 
sociological and demographic studies of the family during this period. The sections 
below focus on the national literature of France, the UK and Spain, followed by a 
review of cross-national studies. 
Family policy research in France 
France has a strong tradition of research into a wide range of issues affecting the 
family domain, as a result of its long 'obsession' with the family (Brin, 1991), which 
can be traced back to the private 'family wage' schemes of the late nineteenth . 
Century (see Chapter 5). This tradition is further underlined by the important role 
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played by French experts and their approaches in the growth in cross-national 
comparison offamily policies within the EU. The study offamily policy in France has 
been further facilitated by the nomenclature of benefits, services and even institutions 
which have traditionally included a range of clear references to the family or families 
(Questiaux and Foumier, 1978; Laroque, 1985; Brin 1991; Bussat and Chauviere, 
1997). 
The contribution to the study of family policy and its evolution that has been made by 
authors from within France can, in some instances, be seen to mirror the changing 
concems of national policy makers. Examples of this parallel development can be 
seen in studies of population trends during the 1930s, family income during 1960s or 
enquiries into lone-parent families in the 1980s and 1990s. The reasons for this almost 
certainly stem from a high level of institutionalisation not only of family policies, but 
also of research and may be linked with Alhtusser's concept of Ideological State 
Apparatuses (see Chapter 3). 
As in the UK and Spain, a number of specialist agencIes carry out, or provide, 
funding for research into questions relating to changing family policy issues, although 
concern with the family is generally more explicit in France, In political terms, the 
most significant research producers on family issues, given their direct links with 
policy makers, are the Ministere des affaires sociales (Ministry for Social Affairs) and 
government think tank the Conseil economique et social (CES). In 1985 the Ministere 
des affaires sociales published a major study of post-war French family policy: La 
politiquefamiliale en France depuis 1945 (Laroque, 1985). Pierre Laroque's4 (1985) 
study brings together experts from the fields of history, law, demography, sociology, 
public administration and service provision. Taking the 'Golden Age' (1938-58) of 
French family policy as the historical foundation, the study focuses on the 
, Pierre Laroque was the director general of Social Security in the Ministry of Employment in the early 
1980s, as well as the honorary president of the social section of the Conseil d'Etat (the government 
advisory cornmittee). 
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demographic questions raised by the evolution of family forms into the mid-1980s 
and examines the legal status of family members, benefits, fiscal measures and the . 
role of the Caisse nationale des allocations familiales (CNAF) (national child benefit 
fund) and the regional Caisse d'allocations familiales (CAF). By comparing family 
transformations with developments in family policy (notably financial measures) and 
demonstrating possible links between policy change and family behaviour, Laroque 
explicitly seeks to stimulate debate as well as providing a rigorous appraisal of post-
war family policy change. 
Hubert Brin (1991), in a report to the CES, uses a historical and sociological approach 
to family policy change along similar lines to those of Laroque (1985). After a brief 
examination of the evolution of intervention in the French family sphere since the 
Middle Ages, Brin (1991) focuses on the relationship between socio-demographic 
change, public opinion in relation to family issues and the evolution of family 
policies. A notable addition to Brin's report, reflecting the burgeoning interest in 
cross-national comparison, is the inclusion of a European dimension, largely based 
upon the findings of another report published by the Haut conseil de la population et 
de la famille under the direct responsibility of the President of the French Republic 
(Tabah and Maugue, 1989). 
In his observations about cross-national comparison of family policies, Brin (1991) 
notes: 'comparer I'effort fait en faveur des families dans les differents pays europeens 
n'aura validite que sur la base d'une identification de transferts non necessairement 
classifies dans la rubrique des aides aux families' (the comparison of family policy 
initiatives taken in different European countries can only be rigorous if based upon 
the identification of re-distributive measures which are not necessarily classified· 
under the heading of family policies) (Brin, 1991: 65) such as through tax relief. Brin 
thus highlights a major pitfall encountered by researchers examining family benefits 
using a comparative approach. He argues that cross-national comparison ought to be 
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based upon comparability of measures as opposed to comparability of tenns. This 
approach is central to the selection of policy measures which are examined in the 
substantive case studies in the thesis. 
While examining the context of family change and family policies in Europe from a 
specifically French perspective, Brin (1991) identified an important methodological 
consideration which is of special relevance to the present study: the problematic 
nature of comparing policies which may not appear immediately comparable due to 
linguistic and/or cultural distinctions. 
This theme is developed further by Jean-Claude Barbier (1990, 1994, 1996) who 
stresses the importance of the 'symbolic' nature of family policies in different 
national contexts. Barbier argues that purely symbolic measures may play an 
important role in the longer term legitimisation of new arenas for public intervention 
(such as the family in the present study). For example the appointment of a Minister 
of the Family who does not have real powers may represent a symbolic effort towards 
the legitimisation of family policies in countries where family policies have 
previously been implicit (Barbier, 1996: 104), such as Virginia Bottomley's 
appointment as Minister for the Family in the UK in 1994 (see Chapter 7). The 
creation of a ministry without portfolio thus, on the one hand, represents the symbolic 
value of the family for the government, but on the other hand, the lack of any real 
financial support indicates either a lack of commitment to family policies or the 
possible existence of ideological conflict surrounding state intervention in family life. 
In the latter instance, the symbolic measures may, over time, indicate a political will 
to implement family policies as a first stage in incremental change (see 
'Incrementalism' Chapter 3). Through the examination of the symbolic value of the 
term 'family' in social policies, Barbier argues that: 
In countries which do have a family policy, state intervention is only acceptable if it 
rests upon social representations that lend it legitimacy. In the same way, a measure 
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such as maternity leave (implying paid maternity leave) is only acceptable if it is set 
in the context of the nonnative belief that it is fair and legitimate for working mothers 
to take a temporary break from employment to look after their children (Barbier, 
1996: 104). 
Barbier's conceptualisation of the symbolic effects of policies is clearly based on the 
seemingly abstract elements of 'social representation' and 'normative belief. In 
addition, he also uses the term 'dominant imaginary representation' (Barbier, 1996: 
104). Through the use of the above terms, Barbier focuses upon the key function of 
abstract elements in changing family policies. His conclusion that 'not enough 
attention is given, in the construction of Europe, to the collective social processes 
which could lead to change' (Barbier, 1996: 105), when taken in the context of those 
social processes identified above, further supports the need to pursue a range of 
variables affecting policy change including party political ideology. Both Barbier 
(1996) and Brin (1991) therefore highlight the need for researchers to look beneath 
official terminology for the effective comparison offamily policies. 
In addition to the Ministere des affaires sociales, the CES and the Haut conseil de la 
population et de la famille, the CNAF is a further high profile family agency which 
plays a key role in the production, commissioning and funding of research in a broad 
range of issues affecting families. Since its foundation in 1945, the CNAF's principal 
function has been to administer child benefits, provide services and carry out and 
disseminate research (Laroque, 1985) into a broad spectrum of issues surrounding 
family policies and family change. 
In addition to in-house research and commissioning, funding or publishing outside 
projects, the CNAF publishes a quarterly journal entitled Recherches et previsions 
which had reached over 50 editions by 1999. Research commissioned by the CNAF is 
often related to the agency's functions of benefit administration (Rassat, 1995; Afsa, 
1995; Math, 1996; Fagnani and Rassat, 1997) and service provision for families 
(Strobel, 1995; Dubois and Retour, 1995; Debordeaux, 1996), although support for 
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comparative research also has been provided (Lefaucher and Martin, 1995; Hantrais 
and Letablier, 1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1996a, 1996b; Bussat and Chauviere, 1997, 
Jenson and Sineau, 1997; Martin and Hasssenteufel, 1997). In addition to the research 
commissioned by the CNAF, research into matters of family policy is supported and 
carried out by the Ministere de l'emploi et de la solidarite Mission recherche et 
experimentation (MIRE) which has published conference proceedings comparing 
social welfare systems in Europe, including family policies (for example MIRE, 1994; 
1997). 
This wide-ranging and active research community in France provides the expertise in 
terms of demographic, economic and sociological approaches, upon which policy-
makers can, in theory, consult to inform their decisions. The results of this activity 
often find their place in party political debate and the media (Commaille, 1997). In 
1981, the new Socialist President, Franc;ois Mitterrand set up the Institut de l'enfance 
et de la famille (IDEF) which has funded major family and family policy change 
research, the most significant of which was entitled La famille: I'etat des savoirs (de 
Singly, 1991). This publication represents a major multidisciplinary review of the 
French family policy debate, bringing together contributions from over forty experts 
from the social sciences (demography, law, economics, ethnology, history, 
psychoanalysis, psychology, political science, sociology) in an attempt to provide an 
exhaustive appreciation of the questions facing families and policy makers in France 
at that time. Within these objectives, La Fammille, edited by Franc;ois de Singly 
(1991), provides a valuable addition to the literature through its examination, in the 
five main sections, of family formation, family life, intergenerational exchanges, the 
family in politics and society and the family as viewed by the social sciences. 
The fifth part of the book, 'Le regard des sciences sociales sur la famille', identifies 
nine distinct methodological approaches to the study of the family. Sociological, 
historical and demographic approaches are presented, and it is upon these three 
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disciplinary pillars that the ovetwhelming majority of family policy research in 
France has been based (de Singly, 1991). This trend is reflected in the family policy 
research in other countries including the UK and Spain (see below). In addition to 
these approaches, however, economists, psychoanalysts, psychologists, lawyers and 
political scientists are given the opportunity to outline their particular perspective on 
family policy issues. Of special relevance to the present study is the chapter focusing 
on political science approaches in which Jaques Commaille (1991 b) emphasises the 
central position the family has occupied in politics and political ideas in France such 
as the Vichy motto of'Patrie, Famille, Travail' (fatherland, family, work). 
Commaille (1991 b: 413) suggests that this ideological role for the family is a defining 
part of right wing thought, although this theme is not developed in detail, other than 
by examining the possibility that political opinion or affiliation may be transmitted 
from one generation to another along ideological lines (199Ib: 417-19). It is, 
however, curious that Commaille (1991 b) appears to consider the transmission of 
political ideologies or party affiliation as having a specifically right wing nature rather 
than being generally applicable to all political ideologies5• In spite of this, his 
argument does highlight an important element of the relationship between ideology 
and family policy, namely that state support of the family as a social institution may 
represent an attempt to maintain the status quo through ideological means, echoing a 
central theme ofMarx's theory of ideology (see Chapter 3). 
A further aspect examined by Commaille (1991 b: 414-15) is the use of the family as a 
metaphor for political systems. The family as metaphor has been employed to 
describe two levels of the political. The first of these has been the description of the 
king as 'father' in absolutist regimes or, indeed, in totalitarian regimes, such as the 
description of Lenin and other Communist leaders· as 'father of the people' 
l Commaille and M~ (1998: 126) later ~ote that this often synonymous relationship between the 
family and right wing ideas stems from the 20"' century obsession of right wing politics with the 
family. 
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(Comrnaille: 1991b: 415). The second use of the family as a political metaphor has 
been the description of the 'political family', made up of party members and activists. 
The latter distinction also rests upon a notion of the party leader as father and 
members as 'wives' or 'children'. Both of these examples of family metaphor rely 
heavily on patriarchy as the 'natural' order of (political) society. Given this strong 
symbolic value of the patriarch in wider political thought in France and elsewhere, the 
notion of patriarchal authority as a central element of the family in political ideology 
and discourse may be interpreted as, first, a reflection of political thought generally 
and, second, an attempt to legitimise patriarchy through the statutory support of 
paternal authority in family policies, for example during the Vichy regime in France 
and Francoist Spain (see Chapter 5). 
In spite of the chapter title, Comrnaille's (1991b) contribution fails to present the 
possible advantages of a political science or political theory approach to the study of 
family policies. While this may appear as a major oversight, it merely reflects both 
limited inquiry into political questions of the family by family policy researchers, on 
the one hand and, on the other hand, the lack of family policy oriented research 
carried out by political researchers in any of the countries included in this study. 
Comrnaille (199Ib: 421) is aware of this fact and makes a plea for further research 
centred on political discourse concerning the relationship between state and families 
in the context of the public/private debate. This latter point is central to this thesis in 
the national case studies of France, the UK and Spain (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). Indeed, 
Comrnaille, has followed his own suggestions as co-author (with Claude Martin) of 
Les enjeux politiques de la famille (Comrnaille and Martin, 1998). In this study, the 
authors seek to further debate in the growing concern of social sciences with the 
politics of the family in France. In a continuation of Comrnaille's earlier theme 
(199Ib), they argue for the further study of the family in the context of politics. Their 
approach is based upon a shift in perspective: 'la famillle ne nous interesse pas pour 
elle-meme: elle nous interesse dans la mesure Oil eUe constitue un revelateur 
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privilegie du politique et de ses mutations' (our interest is not in the family for its own 
sake: the family is of interest only insofar as it represents a privileged indicator of 
politics and political evolution) (Commaille and Martin, 1998: 9). Through a focus 
upon what the authors term 'la crise de la democratie' (the crisis of democracy) 
(Commaille and Martin, 1998: 9) the relationship between the political and the family 
is developed. This development places great emphasis on the threat posed to social 
order by the individualisation of society which has taken place in much of Europe 
since the 1960s. It is in this context that the authors make numerous references to 
ideology and changing family policies. As with other studies, no clear definition of 
ideology can be discerned from the text, and it is not clear whether ideology is used to 
refer to a theoretical approach or as a synonym for political beliefs, ideas or doctrines. 
Both oJ these dimensions play a key role in this study. Significantly, the authors 
describe party political ideologies as an explanatory factor in continuity of family 
policies through different political regimes (Third Republic, Vichy, Fourth Republic) 
(Commaille and Martin, 1998: 137-8) the echoing the theory of ideology as a process. 
Further analysis of party political ideology focuses on the distinctions between left 
and right in terms of the family. Commaille had earlier identified this distinction by 
describing left wing family policies as aimed at reducing inequalities and social 
exclusion through welfare transfers, whereas the right conceptualised the family in 
relation to social order and the good of the nation (Commaille, 1991 a) thus 
highlighting a central distinction between the two, namely on the one hand targeting 
individuals, and on the other protecting the family unit as a primary group. Givcn 
Commaille's earlier work (199Ia), a notable contribution of Commaille and Martin 
(1998) to the analysis of the family within party political ideology is the theme of the 
preservation of the family as a building block of social stability. Traditionally this had 
been almost exclusively associated with right wing party political ideologies, but 
Commaille and Martin (1998) argue that this concern appears to be crossing party 
political boundaries Of left and right from both French and cross-national perspectives 
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(Cornmmaille "and Martin, 1998: 124-6). The ownership of the family as a part of 
right wing political ideology is therefore blurred. Cornmaille and Martin (1998) thus 
suggest the possible convergence of party ideological positioning around the theme of 
the family in France and other European countries. 
While Cornmaille and Martin make interesting reflections concerning the relationship 
politics and the family, and ones which are central to the present study, it is not made 
clear on what basis they draw their conclusions. Indeed, a lack of clarity in the 
methodology and inconsistent data sets are major failings of this study. The historical 
examination of political thought and the family followed by the analysis of a range of 
political documents (including inconsistent use of party manifestos) appears to be the 
central methodological approach in this study. The further incorporation of a cross-
national dimension is also somewhat inconsistent with the major reference country 
being the UK, and to a lesser extent Belgium, Southern Europe and the EU. 
The comparative dimension does, however, enable the authors to draw further 
conclusions. The most significant of these, for the present study, is that a right/left 
split no longer sufficiently covers the complex construction of positions in relation to 
the family either in France or other European countries (Commaille and Martin, 1998: 
128). This convergence, if demonstrated would provide an important indicator of an 
ideological shift between left and right and is therefore explored further in this thesis. 
While the work of Cornmaille and Martin (1998) is open to the above criticisms, their 
insights into the. relationship between political ideology and the family represent an 
innovative contribution to the study of family policy which had, at that point, largely 
been based upon the analysis of socio-demographic change and financial transfers. 
Analysing family policy change from the perspective of socio-demographic 
transformations has remained central to major studies of France, in spite of growing 
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interest in the contributions of alternative approaches suggested in by Commaille 
(199Ib). One notable exception appears in John Ambler's (1991) analysis of the 
French welfare state in the context not only of changing society but also changing 
ideologies (Ambler 1991). In Chapter 5 of the book, R6ni Lenoir (1991: 144-86) 
examines the development of societal pressures facing family policy makers, such as 
the depopulation of France, changing moral codes, and perhaps most significantly, the 
growth of women's paid employment from the 1950s. Although much of his work is 
based on a historical description of French family policy and changing socio-
demographic trends, Lenoir's contribution comes from his critique of political 
ideologies and their place in the broader debate on family policy change. Particular to 
the French case, are two positions which are generally referred to in French language 
literature as 'familist' and 'natalist' (Brin, 1991; Lenoir, 1991; Bussat and Chauviere, 
1997). Lenoir identifies both familist and natalist thought as having had an impact on 
the-evolution of family policies during the inter-war years (1991: 144-48). He further 
identifies a shift in the dominant ideas from a familist position (generally the welfare 
of families founded upon moral concerns) towards that of the natalists (scientific 
responses to scientifically identified problems, exemplified by economic measures to 
combat demographic pressures) based upon the shifting emphasis offamily policies in 
the post-war period (Lenoir, 1991: 146-47). In this way Lenoir appears to suggest a 
causal link between political ideas and family policy change, although, as with Martin 
and Commaille (I 998), this theoretical question is not pursued further. 
The further historical development of family policy is also presented by Lenoir as 
having been influenced by the 'nationalist-meets-patriarchalist' right wing ideology of 
the Vichy regime (1940-44) which significantly placed the family above the State in 
its iconography, blaming the French military capitulation to Hitler's forces in 1940 on 
France's failure to renew generations (Lenoir, 1991). In the post-war period, Lenoir 
(1991) describes how, in contrast to earlier opposition, French parties of the left and 
the Confederation generale du travail (CGT) (Communist-led worker's union) came 
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to support the idea of an integrated, state-run family fund which had been traditionally 
been supported by the French right. This shift by the left suggests that ideas in favour 
of family protection had crossed traditional political divides and lead to some level of 
consensus (Lenoir, 1991: 152). In spite of this, 'rifts clearly emerged, less between 
fonnal political parties than between movements, regarding the preferred type of 
family and moral values' (Lenoir, 1991: 153). 
Of particular interest for the French case study in the thesis is Lenoir's (1991) 
conclusion that in spite of financial pressures threatening the continuity of French 
family policies since 1981 (see Chapter 6), the legitimacy of family policy as a target 
of social action was maintained (Lenoir, 1991: 183-85). Although far from conclusive 
or exhaustive, Lenoir's examination of the possible influence of political ideologies 
on family policy change in France may provide an important starting point for the 
present study. 
The contributions of Commaille (1991 b), Commaille and Martin (19?8) and Lenoir 
(1991) have, on the one hand, pointed to the possible value of a political analysis of 
family policy change and, on the other, revealed the lack of a political/ideological 
dimension in existing French research. Mass media interest .and coverage in France 
provides the family policy debate with a certain legitimacy and constant presence in 
the French polity (Commaille and Martin, 1998: 7). This, combined with a number of 
regular conferences, has lead Martin and Hassenteufel (1997) to conclude that 
initiatives such as the 1994 International Year of the Family, which helped stimulate 
debate in other countries6, are unnecessary in the French context of active research 
and regular, high profile, political debate surrounding changing family policy issues 
(Martin and Hassenteufel, 1997: 110). 
6 Such as in the UK with appointment of the first Minister for the Family (Cronin, McGlone and MilIar, 
1995: 169) and Spain as revealed by major state-funded research initiatives (for example Alberdi, 
1995). 
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The family within social policy study in the United Kingdom 
In the English-speaking world, study of finnily policies has been growing rapidly 
since the late I 960s and some studies from the United States have been instrumental 
in the development of comparative, cross-national approaches, providing influential 
precedents in both methodology and analysis (for example Kamerman and Kahn, 
1978). In the UK, Margaret Wynn's Family Policy (1971) broke new ground by 
advocating that governments should pursue family policies, focusing on families with 
young children. Her work can also be seen a setting a precedent for family policy 
research in the British context by developing prescriptive and critical family policy 
analysis. A further influence on approaches to family policy in the UK has come from 
a focus upon continuity (for example Laslett, 1972, 1980; Laslett and Wall, 1972; 
McFarlane, 1978) or change and diversity of family forms (Aries, 1962; Shorter, 
1977; Stone, 1977; Anderson, 1980). 
The strongest advocate of the family continuity theory has been Peter Laslett (1972, 
1980; Laslett and Wall, 1972) who argued that family forms in Western Europe have 
remained basically the same over several hundred years. He cites the two-generation 
family as the most common family form and argues that this 'nuclear family' predates 
industrialisation rather than being a product of it (Laslett and Wall, \980). 
In the literature that has interpreted the family through an emphasis on change the 
central argument has been the increasing privatisation of family relationships. One of 
the earliest contributions was by the French author Philippe Aries 7 (\ 960) who 
focussed on change in the perception of children and childhood. Aries saw childhood 
as having developed from the Middle Ages perception of children as small adults 
through the Renaissance vision of childish innocence. This transition he argues has 
had a profound effect upon Western Society and has informed the development of 
7 Although Aries was French, his work in translation (notably 1962) has been influential and widely 
cited in the British literature (Fox Harding, 1996: 91). 
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both child protection (based upon innocence) and education (based upon control) 
(Aries, 1960). It has, however, been argued that emotional links between parents and 
children were in evidence before the period identified by Aries (see Pollack, 1983). 
In spite of criticisms, the theme of change central to Aries' work is developed in 
relation to families by other authors (Shorter, 1977, Stone, 1977, Anderson, 1980). 
Edward Shorter (1977) and Lawrence Stone (1977) both argued that family 
relationships became increasingly based upon emotional links rather than economic 
ties. This was identified, in particular, by Stone (1977) who maps the development of 
families based upon open lineage through the patriarchal nuclear family to the closed 
domesticated family. This latter category of family, which Stone identifies as early as 
the seventeenth century, was characterised by spouses choosing each other and 
investing more love and time in children than previously. This transition thus implies 
a move towards the greater independence of families within society and thus, 
increased privatisation of the family sphere. 
Further work on continuity of family types has looked the negative aspects of 
patriarchal continuity from the feminist perspective (see Jeffreys, 1985; Walby, 
1990). The feminist critique cites the family as the locus of continued division of 
labour, and some authors have interpreted women's sexual emancipation as further 
compounding inequalities between the sexes (see Barrett and McIntosh, 1991: 71-6). 
Although much work on family continuity has been based on long-term historical 
analysis, Robert Chester (1985) argues that continuity can also be identified in post-
1960s family relationships. While family life in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s became 
increasingly characterised by divorce, cohabitation and women's paid employment, 
Chester (1985: 185) argues that these trends represent what he terms the 'neo-
conventional family'. While this may seem contradictory when compared to lo·nger-
term historical trends, he argues for the study of the life-cycle of families which 
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demonstrate patterns of continuity (notably the continued dominance of parent-
children households) which may not be identified by short term studies offamily life. 
While references to ideology are largely missing from the work on family continuity 
and change8, the dominance of the theme of continuity in the literature, most 
significantly in analyses of modern family types, points to a key element of the 
dynamic theory of ideology: the role of ideas in maintaining the status quo. 
Family literature in the UK has been largely concerned with the sociology of the 
family, work in relation to family policies has been largely produced within the 
broader field of social policy study. Family policy research has thus been situated in 
the long Anglo-Saxon tradition of social policy which has focused on issues affecting 
individuals, effectively children and women, such as poverty (for example Abel-
Smith and Townsend, 1965; Cole-Hamilton, 1991), health (for example Townsend et 
al., 1988; Baggot, 1994), gender (including Fraad et al., 1994; Goode, 1998) and 
housing (such as Niner, 1989; Malpass and Murie, 1990). 
For reasons, perhaps most notably identified by Hilary Land and Roy Parker (1978: 
332-3), the term 'family policy' has proven problematic when applied to the UK. 
While in many ways the UK can be seen as a pioneer of post-war social security and 
provided inspiration for other developing welfare states (Hills et al., 1994), policies. 
which explicitly seek to regulate or support family life have been relatively under-
developed (Ringen, 1997). The high level of official visibility of family policies seen 
in France has remained relatively absent from UK policies. It is in this context that the 
family policy debate has developed in the UK and, as a result, the number of studies 
that have been carried out explicitly concerning families has been far greater in 
France than in the UK. In the same way that UK family policies may be considered 
8 Michele Barrett and Mary McJntosh (1991) include ideas as a variable in their analysis but do not 
develop a theoretical role for ideology. 
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'implicit', that is to say any policies which affect families in the UK are rarely called 
'family' policies, the majority of research which is relevant to the objectives of the 
present thesis has been 'implicit' in terms of the family. 
Research impetus. and funding in the UK family sector has come from the Child 
Poverty Action Group (CPAG) (over lOO published titles), the Family Policy Studies 
Centre (FPSC) (for example Bernardes, 1995), the Institute for Public Policy 
Research (Coote, et al., 1990) among other policy studies groups. In addition the 
Economic and Social Research Council and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation have 
funded many projects by these groups that, although generally focusing on poverty-
related questions affecting the UK, have become increasingly geared towards 
European comparative research into family policies (for example McRae, 1995; 
Millar and Warman, 1995, 1996). It is interesting to note that UK family/social policy 
research has been largely based upon private initiatives which contrasts with the 
dominance of public institutions in French research support and production. 
While much of the literature with a family focus in the UK has largely targeted 
specific groups and issues which are not direcdy applicable to the objectives of the 
thesis, there are some exceptions, one of which is Diana Gittins' The Family in 
Question: changing households and familiar ideologies (1985). The subtitle suggests 
a concern with the relationship between changing social behaviour and ideology. 
Taking as her starting point as the preoccupation of the early 1980s New-Right 
ideology which claimed the family for politics, Gittins goes on to challenge 
ideological assumptions about the 'ideal' form and function of the family within 
society through a historical examination of family forms in the UK from the late 
eighteenth Century to the 1980s. She situates family forms firmly within the 
perspective of change, but interprets this change within the continuity of ideology. 
Gittins argues that while family forms have changed the relationships within families 
continue to be based upon beliefs of control and patriarchy. She goes on to examine 
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contemporary issues of gender divisions within families. Gittins thus suggests that the 
gap between the 'ideological family' and the reality of family life, or more 
appropriately 'families', has become more pronounced given the increased diversity 
of family forms. While Gittins (1985) does not claim to examine family policies, her 
conclusions lead to the questioning of state intervention in family life as the central 
means of social control, claiming that, 'family ideology has been a vital means - the 
vital means - of holding together and legitimising the existing social, economic, 
political and gender systems', (Gittins, 1985: 168). Such a firm assertion of the role of 
family ideology in social control in the UK clearly demands further empirical 
research in order to establish the extent to which political ideologies about the family 
can be identified in policies. 
A further publication which looks at political ideologies in relation to families is The 
Family Way: a new approach to policy-making (Coote et al., 1990). While this 
document is clearly political in intent, indeed one of the authors, Harriet Harman, 
later served as Secretary of State for Social Security in the 81air government, it does 
address the importance of the family in the political debate of the UK. The left wing 
nature of this publication results in a firm critique of Thatcherite ideology and family 
issues and identifies the important influence of the ~conomists Milton Freidman and 
Friedrich Hayek and the 'underclass' theory of Charles Murray (see Lister, 1996) 
upon the Conservative party of the 1980s and 1990s. While this critique provides a 
view of the development of the family in the political debate in the UK, its political 
objectives limit its analytical contribution. 
Two further contributions to the analysis of the importance of the· family in UK 
political ideologies point to a growing trend in the study of the relationship between 
politics and families (Lister, 1996; Muncie and Wetherell, 1995). The first of these 
contributions is Ruth Lister's (1996) examination of the family in post-Thatcher, 
Conservative rhetoric. Her analysis of family policy objectives during the first half of 
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the I 990s rests heavily on the role of ideology, notably the continuation by the Major 
government of the Thatcherite family ideology in his 'Back to Basics' speeches 
(Lister, 1996: 28). Lister (\ 996: 11) significantly refers to 'ideological positioning' 
and 'the ideological terrain' in relation to the right wing of UK politics in her 
introduction and conclusion respectively. While not claiming to examine the role of 
ideology within family policy change, Lister (\ 996) makes an important contribution 
to the study of UK family policies by demonstrating the frequency and extent to 
which political parties and governments have continued to pursue normative 
assumptions about families and their role in society through what Sheila Kammerman 
and Alfred Kahn (1978: 3) have called 'implicit family policies'. 
The second contribution to the study of the politics of family policy in the UK is 
provided by John Muncie and Margaret Wetherell (\995) who look at the evolution of 
F amity Policy and Political Discourse through an examination, first of the historical 
development of post-war social policies in the UK to the 1980s and, second, political 
ideologies and political discourse on matters of the family. Muncie and Wetherell 
(1995: 60-3) underline the particular importance of the Conservative party's claim to 
be the 'party of the family' and the relative lack of difference between the Labour 
party's position on the family. By highlighting the political battle for the family in UK 
politics, they point to the possible symbolic value of the family therein. This 
observation also echoes the French literature's claim that traditional divisions of right 
and left have been blurred in relation to issues concerning family policies (see Lenoir, 
1991: 152; Commaille and Martin, 1998: 124-6). Muncie and Wetherell's approach to 
ideology, however, relates to ideology as sets of political beliefs, as opposed to 
process, which may clarify questions relating to both the nature and timing of changes 
in family policy. 
The study of family policies in the UK has largely been contextualised within broader 
social policy studies, which may, in part, reflect the fact that family policies in the UK 
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are finnly situated within social policy rather than occupying a distinct policy arena as 
in France. The literature on continuity and change in family fonns revealed consistent 
trends including the dominance of the parent-children household arid patriarchy on the 
one hand, and a move towards the privatisation of the family on the other. These 
patterns of continuity and change are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the long-tenn 
approach to change has been necessary because change has been incremental over a 
number of centuries. Such incremental change supports a certain continuity and 
indicates the resistance of political ideologies to change (see Chapter 3). This 
continuity in family life appears to represent social stability which, taking Marx's 
theory of ideology, may be founded upon certain beliefs about family and their 
relationship with the state. Study of political ideologies relating to families has been 
shown as a limited area of inquiry in the UK literature. However, as in France, this 
aspect has been increasingly addressed in the 1990s, although such work has so far 
under-developed a consistent methodological approach or data source. 
Developing family policy study in Spain 
The family policy of Spain had, until the 1990s, barely been studied either by Spanish 
or foreign researchers. Some of the reasons for this, such as the legacy of the Franco 
era in Spanish political culture (Valiente, 1995b) are examined in Chapters 5 and 8. 
Spanish family policy research began to develop in the context of cross-national 
studies (for example in European Observatory studies), although some major national 
studies have begun to stimulate further interest and research, such as the report 
published by the Ministerio de Asuntos Sociales (ministry for social affairs) to mark 
the United Nations' 1994 International Year of the Family (Alberdi, 1995). The study 
edited by Ines Alberdi (1995) is a significant contribution to the study of Spanish 
family policy in the post-Franco period and examines changing family demography 
and sociology as well as the legal framework of family relations in contemporary 
Spain. 
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The literature on Spanish family policy reflects the relative institutional invisibility of 
family policies since the 1970s, although the comparatively late legalisation of 
divorce (1982) has led many authors to examine either the resulting legal issues or the 
socio-demographic effects of changing family forms (for example, Campuzano Tome, 
1986; Jglesias de Ussel, 1988; Borrajo, 1990; Flaquer and Soler, 1990). 
Few studies have examined questions of politics or ideology in relation to the family, 
although some references are made by Salustiano del Campo (1995). Del Campo's 
work examines the development of the family during the Authoritarian years of 
Franco through to the radical changes introduced during the Transition to Democracy 
and the first Socialist government. This study is largely based on the analysis of 
family and family policy issues in official documents including constitutions, Penal 
codes and Civil codes. In addition, he also examines statements of beliefs about the 
role of families in Spanish society notably from leading Catholic clerics. Through the 
study of the Franco regime, del Campo identifies the family as theme of fundamental 
importance in Spanish politics and society and one which underwent radical re-
evaluation in the late 1970s and early 1980s (del Campo, 1995: 149). 
Perhaps the most significant contribution from Spanish authors in terms of the thesis 
has come from Celia Valiente (1995) who proffers the theory that Spanish family 
policy of the democratic era (that is from 1977) can be understood in terms of the 
rejection of the family policy and inherent patriarchal ideology of the Franco regime 
(Valiente, 1995: 82-3). Valiente identifies six characteristics of post-Authoriarian 
family policies in Spain: low levels of public spending, institutional invisibility, 
contributory benefits, the central importance of tax relief, measures for large families 
and the overall fragmented nature of family policies (1995: 84). These characteristics 
show Spanish family policy as an underdeveloped area of public intervention. 
Valiente argues that this situation arises from the effects of the legacy of 
Authoritarianism: 
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The only advocates of strong public policies, family organisations, were too 
unimportant to play a significant role in the policy-making process. The other actors 
wanted, at any price, to be seen as distant and opposed to the pro-natalist and anti-
feminist Francoist family policies, and therefore, avoided policy-making in this area 
(Valiente, 1995: 92). 
This analysis provides a significant contribution to the understanding of Spanish 
family policies. Through her application of the concept of 'historical memories,9 to 
the case of post-Authoritarian Spanish family policies, Valiente suggests a change in 
the dominant ideas is a necessary factor for family policy change. 
Cross-national comparative approaches to family policy change 
The production of family policy research within France, Spain and the UK has been 
shown to have developed differently along national lines and in parallel with the 
predominant concerns and objectives of policy makers in each country. While these 
nation-centric approaches provide valuable and detailed insights into families policies 
in one country, comparative approaches can reveal many disparities not only in terms 
of type and availability of data, but also in terms of methodological approaches, 
culture and language. Interest in comparative research into family and family policy 
change has undergone rapid growth since the late 1970s with a new impetus in 
Europe arising from EU concerns with questions of demographic and social policy 
change in the 1980s and, internationally, since the General Assembly of the United 
Nations declared 1994 the International Year of the Family in December 1989. The 
remainder of the chapter considers the development of comparative studies of family 
policy change giving special consideration to those studies that examine France, 
Spain or the VK, including the research of the European Observatory on National 
Family Policies from 1990 to 1996. 
The first major international study of family policy change was the landmark work of 
Sheila Kamerman and Alfred Kahn, Family Policy: Government and Families in 
9 Valiente develops this concept from the work ofNancy Bermeo (1992). 
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Fourteen Countries (1978). The Kamerman and Kalm (1978) study sought to 
stimulate the family policy debate in the United States, which had been gaining 
momentum since a US Senate report into families in 1974, through comparison of 
family change and family policy measures in fourteen countries across North 
America, Western and Eastern Europe and Scandinavia. The study brought together 
national experts to report on each country and in so doing laid down the 
methodological blueprint for later studies (such as the European Commission studies 
edited by Wilfried Dumon, 1990; 1993; 1994). 
A major contribution of the Kamerman and Kalm study (1978), and one which has 
had long-lasting influence on comparative study of family policies, was to establish 
criteria by which the study countries could be classified. The relative terms 'explicit' 
and 'implicit', formed the basis for this classification. Kamerman and Kalm (1978) 
further refined this categorisation by including two sub-categories of explicit family 
policy which they termed 'explicit family policy a)' and 'explicit family policy b)' 
(Kamerman and Kalm, 1978: 3). 
The first of the three distinctions, 'explicit family policy a)', is defined as, 'specific 
programs and policies designed to achieve specified, explicit goals regarding the 
family' (Kamerman and Kalm, 1978: 3). This category identifies family policies in 
terms of both the target of the policies and the normative effects of those policies. The 
inclusion of these two elements thus assumes, first, a 'desire' or objective on the part 
of policy makers, for example to encourage an increase in the birth-rate, and, second, 
the policy makers' belief that a given policy is an appropriate means to the desired 
end, such as policies providing financial incentives for larger families. 
The second sub-category, 'explicit family policy b)', is distinct from the first with 
regard to policy objectives: 'programs and policies which deliberately do things for 
the family, but for which there are no agreed-upon over-all goals regarding the 
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family' (Kamerman and Kahn, 1978: 3). While the emphasis continues to be placed 
upon the family as a clear or legitimate target for state intervention, this category of 
family policy assumes general political consensus over the policy measures/ 
instruments, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, potential conflict or confusion 
over policy objectives amongst policy makers. This category, taking the earlier 
example of child benefits, may result in consensus over the need for universal 
financial support for families within a community of policy makers, and conflict over 
the objectives of the policy, such as either encouraging the birth-rate or seeking to 
combat poverty in young families. 
The authors define the third category, 'implicit family policy', as, 'governmental 
actions and policies not specifically or primarily addressed to the family, but which 
have indirect consequences' (Kamerman and Kahn, 1978: 3). This definition is 
intrinsically problematic in the context of the thesis on three counts: 
I. Identifying implicit policies may lead to forming arbitrary conclusions as to the 
objectives of a given policy measure for example, is the term 'child benefits' 
merely a synonym of 'family allowances'? The nomenclature of a range of policy 
measures is a result of the policy-making process, and distinctions in the naming 
of what appear to be concordant policies across two or more countries in terms of 
the implementation of a given policy may prove to be highly significant 
concerning the political objectives of that policy. 
2. It is difficult to distinguish the exact point at which government policy ceases to 
have 'indirect consequences' on the family, thus making further demands on the 
researcher to 'construct' the limits of family policy in those countries which do 
not employ the term 'family', or its plural, to designate either a policy field or 
individual policy measures. 
3. Kamerman and Kahn's (1978: 3) use of 'implicit' family policies solely examines 
the policy measures themselves (for example financial transfers or services for 
families). While this may be appropriate to their objectives, this position, if 
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applied to the present study, would not take account of family issues in the 
broader political debate. A consequence of a focus on implicit family would 
therefore be an underestimation of the symbolic value of the family within a 
national polity, an aspect which has been identified (Barbier, 1996) as a 
significant element of both the study of changing family policies and comparative 
study. 
The third pitfall of the implicit family policy category for the thesis is presented in the 
following example: If country A is presented as an example of explicit family policy 
and country B is cited as an example of implicit family policy, to conclude that in 
country B the family represents a low priority for policy makers or politicians without 
first examining the extent to which family issues and concerns are expressed in the 
broader political debate would be to ignore the 'symbolic' (Barbier, 1996: 104) value 
of the family within the study area. It becomes necessary to examine this debate in 
more depth in order to contextualise or identify 'implicit' policies. 
In addition, examples of explicit and implicit family policy countries may only reflect 
the political ideology of the dominant policy-making forces, such as a single party or 
overall majority government, which would ignore family ideology present in 
opposition parties. While this would demonstrate family policy change, which is only 
one dimension of the thesis, it is necessary to analyse the political ideologies of 
opposition parties in order to identify any changes therein. To overcome this pitfall, it 
becomes necessary to examine the policy alternatives presented by all the major 
parties within a national polity as opposed to solely concentrating on implemented 
policies. 
While recognising the second of the three pitfalls associated with the use of 
categorising family policies as implicit, Kamerman and Kahn (1978: 4) barely address 
the two further pitfalls, although they state that the use of the implicit family policy 
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category may serve 'to underscore the pervasiveness of government activity with 
regard to the family in those societies which deny having any family policy at all' 
(Kamerman and Kahn, 1978: 4). Thus, the identification of implicit family policies 
may prove an important factor in the study of the impact of political ideologies upon 
family policy change. Indeed, it may be possible to make a link between explicit and 
implicit categories and concepts of state intervention. 
While reference to implicit family policy is found in later work by Kamerman and 
Kahn (1997: 9), it is absent from the central methodological role to which the term 
was assigned in the earlier study (Kamerman and Kahn, 1978), which may suggest the 
authors' acknowledgement of its limitations. In spite of this, however, the grouping of 
countries in the later comparative study (Kamerman and Kahn, I 997), the UK, 
Canada, the United States and New Zealand, suggests that reference to implicit family 
policies has continued to influence choice of countries for international comparison 
given that three of these countries (UK, Canada and US) were categorised as 'implicit 
and reluctant family policy' in the 1978 study (Kamerman and Kahn, 1978). Further 
volumes (forthcoming) in the same series as the 1997 Kamerman and Kahn study also 
maintain the classification of the 1978 study. The continued use of Kamerman and 
Kahn's 1978 framework has clearly been influential in other studies (for example 
Martin and Hassenteufel, 1997) and has played an important role in the development 
of cross-national comparison of family policies. 
One effect of the influence of the implicit classification of family policies can be seen 
in later works, notably the comparative study offamily associations by Claude Martin 
and Patrick Hassenteufel (1997). Their analysis of the UK is based upon the 
assumption, 'la famille n'est pas une categorie d'intervention publique' (the family is 
not a category of public intervention) (Martin and Hassenteufel, 1997: 5). While this 
position may be defended on the grounds that the UK does not have coherent public 
policy area which is represented by the term 'family', it underestimates 
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transfonnations which have taken place in family policies and family policy debate in 
the UK since the late 1970s. This approach, thus, fails to consider the third pitfall of 
Kamerman and Kahn's classification of family policies, identified earlier in the 
chapter, as well as a growth in the appreciation of the symbolic impact of the family 
in the political debate in the UK (see Cronin et al., 1995; Lister, 1995; Muncie and 
Wetherell, 1995; Clarke and Henwood, I 997). 
A further significant development in the study of EU family policy was the founding 
of The European Observatory on National Family Policies in 1989. The European 
Observatory has carried out studies in a similar way to Kamerman and Kahn (1978; 
1997), and has relied upon reports from national experts as the basis for its 
publications. Whereas the Kamennan and Kahn (I978) study claimed a comparative 
element, the Observatory reports have been intended as annual snapshots of family 
policy at a given time. While the first set of reports introduced the historical 
development of family policies in the EU, subsequent reports have provided valuable 
updates on developments in family policies (social and economic measures, material 
and non-material infrastructure and family law) and demographic and social trends 
(European Commission, 1994: 41). Although "the reports do not strictly represent 
comparative studies, they are based upon a framework of questions and focus on 
coherent data related to family topics and are thus methodologically coherent. These 
reports are then co-ordinated and published either as volumes of national surveys (for 
example Dumon, 1990) or consolidated comparisons of family policies (such as Ditch 
et al., 1996a). 
The Observatory reports further raise the question, first examined by Kamennan and 
Kahn (I978), of how to define family policy in those countries which do not include 
'family' in social policy nomenclature. In his introduction to the 1990 volume, 
Dumon defines family policy as, 'any action by governments having particular 
objectives for the family' (Dumon, 1990: I). Such a definition is open to broad 
51 
interpretation due to the many ways in which both 'action' and 'family' can be 
defined. By employing the singular form, as opposed to 'families', it may be argued 
that this definition does not take questions of diversity of family forms into account, 
or given the problems of 'explicit' and 'implicit' family policy categorisation 
discussed above, this definition may lead researchers to neglect policies which may 
not state the family as an objective but may be analogous with 'family policies' in 
other countries (an exhaustive comparison of definitions of the family can be found in 
Hantrais and Letablier, 1996). 
The extent to which cross-national comparison can be rigorously maintained in a 
study comprising many different researchers or teams of researchers from many 
different countries can be very limited and problematic. Such studies (Kamerman and 
Kahn, 1978; Dumon, 1990, 1994; Ditch et al., 1996b; Kaufrnan et al., 1997) benefit 
from a wide selection of data collected by national specialists, but are often restricted 
by the limitations oflinguistic, epistemological or geographical differences within the 
research group. Given the possible pitfalls of such ambitious projects, comparative 
research which either focuses on a much smaller number of countries or is carried out 
by a small research team (for example Ditch et al., 1996a) can lead to more detailed 
examinations of questions of family policy change while avoiding the restrictions of a 
single country study. 
Bilateral cross-national comparisons of France and the UK, in particular, have been 
relatively common, although studies examining family policies only began to appear 
in the 1990s (Pedersen, 1993; Bussat and Chauviere, 1997). Susan Pedersen (1993) 
carries out a highly detailed study the development of family policies within the 
context of changing demography, social trends and the, growth of the welfare state in 
France and the UK from 1914 to 1945. In addition, Pedersen also examined ideas 
which have impacted upon family policy from writers, such as Emile Zola and his 
obsession with the redeeming power of a strong, fertile family life, and H. G, Wells' 
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view that women's emancipation grew out of their dependence upon responsible 
husbands (Pedersen, 1993: 26-32). Pedersen also examines the pioneering feminism 
of Eleanor Rathbone, the pro-natalism of the French Third Republic and William 
Beveridge's family wage and social insurance plan (1993). In spite of the range of 
policies examined by Pedersen (1993), it is her analysis of the ideas or 'logic' behind 
family policies which is of greatest significance to the present study. She bases her 
explanation of the distinct development of family policies on the impact of changing 
beliefs about state welfare provision and its links with family life. That Pedersen does 
this in two broadly similar (in terms of economy, demography and administration) 
countries, further suggests the importance of ideology as a basis for comparative 
research into the development of family policies. 
Exploring the relationship between ideology and family policy change 
While the number and scope of comparative and national studies of family policy has 
been growing during the 1990s, specific questions relating to either family ideology 
or the politics of family policy remain understudied. Gittins (1985) has demonstrated 
that the patriarchal ideology of the nuclear family played a significant role in the 
political thought of the British Conservative party during the late 1970s and 1980s. 
This theme has also been developed in the UK by Lister (1996) and Muncie and 
Wetherell (1995). Significantly, Gittins argues that, through a rejection of family 
ideology, it is possible to bring about a change in the dominance of patriarchy in the 
British context (Gittins, 1985: 168) and, by so doing, she implicitly suggests a need to 
change ideological preconceptions before it is possible to change family behaviour. 
The need to bring about a change in ideology in order to change either social 
behaviour or public policies is central to the theories of ideology examined in Chapter 
4 of the thesis. 
In the case of France, Comrnaille (1991 b) underlines the need for the link between 
ideas and family policies to be examined further. His later collaborative work with 
53 
Martin (1998) has followed this path further. While the authors raise some points 
which clearly correspond to the aims of the present study, the lack of a clear 
methodology or coherent body of data invites further development of these themes. In 
addition to Commaille and Martin, other authors have pointed towards the possible 
value of studying political ideologies and the impact of ideology on changing family 
policies in France (Lenoir, 1991), the UK (Muncie and Wetherell, 1995; Lister, 1996), 
Spain (Valiente, 1995) or from a comparative perspective (Pedersen, 1993). 
Growth in family policy study smce the 1960s has produced vast amounts of 
important data and analysis centred on demography, sociology, family economy and 
legislation, which have, to a large extent reflected the concerns and priorities of policy 
makers and social actors. This body of literature has, however, led to an imbalance in 
research methodology or in disciplinary approaches, which is exemplified by the very 
limited number of political science/policy analysis studies of family policy in France, 
the UK and Spain. 
Equally, however, political scientists and theorists have neglected study of the family 
and family policies due to their concerns with the 'big' questions of democracy, 
legitimacy or institutions, as highlighted by Jean Bethke Elshtain (1982). If, as 
Elshtain (1982) claims, the family has been a central pillar of political thought and 
history, as well as forming what has been commonly referred to as 'the foundation of 
society, indeed, of civilisation itself' (Gittins, 1985: 1) 10, it is surprising that it has not 
been more widely studied in the context of politics and political thought. 
The chapter has examined the existing bodies of literature which have taken families 
or family policy as a central theme for analysis. It has been demonstrated that an 
important link exists between the level of national approaches to state intervention 
and the family on the one hand, and the quantity and focus of research interest and 
10 See also the analysis of party manifestos in Chapters 6-8 of the thesis. 
- - - ---------
54 
output in each of three study countries on the other hand. The review of existing 
approaches to family policy study has also revealed disparities in the objectives and 
quantity of research across France, Spain and the UK. One common element was, 
however, the research disciplines which have focused on the family field which has 
been dominated by the study of family sociology (for example Chester, 1985; de 
Singly, 1991; Alberdi, 1995) and policy analysis (for example Kamennan and Kahn, 
1978; Laroque, 1985; Alberdi, 1995). The least represented of the social sciences in 
family policy study has been shown to be political science/theory and, specifically in 
the thesis, a focus on political ideologies in relation to changing policies. 
The review of the development of the political in family policy study has revealed 
some significant contributions to the relationship between political ideologies and 
family policies, continuity and change in ideologies and family forms and the 
relationship between political right and left and family themes. Many authors across 
three countries have referred to the possible influence of ideology within the family 
policy domain (for example Gittins, 1985; Brin, 1991; Cornmaille 1991a, 1991b, 
1998; Barrett and McIntosh, 1991; lones and MilIar, 1995; Valiente, 1995b; Hantrais 
and Letablier, 1996; Kamerrnan and Kahn, 1997; F1aquer, 1998). Yet, at the time of 
writing, little work has been published which examines this common, and seemingly, 
significant element offamily policy. 
-------------- - ----
Chapter 3 - ANALYSING PUBLIC POLICIES: RATIONAL ACTORS AND 
IDEOLOGUES 
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The present chapter examines approaches to the study of public policy, with special 
emphasis on the role of ideology therein. The aim is to evaluate the extent to which 
these different approaches may be applied to the study of the relationship between 
ideology and family policy change in France, the UK and Spain. 
The chapter begins by examining chronologically four major schools of public policy 
analysis in Anglo-Saxon literature: rationalism, incrementalism, networks and styles. 
The approaches are studied critically, and conclusions are drawn about the possible 
contribution each has made to the study of the relationship between party political 
ideology and family policy change. Particular reference is made to the work of Paul 
Sabatier and his concept of 'belief systems' (1988) within networks of actors, and the 
extent to which his approach may be applied to the classification of political beliefs 
relating to the family as analysed in the empirical case studies. Sabatier's work 
provides policy analysis with an empirical tool in what is an almost wholly theoretical 
field and is, therefore; examined as a possible starting point for the empirical case 
studies offamily policy change in France, the UK and Spain (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). 
After examining methods of policy analysis, the remainder of the chapter focuses on 
the development of concepts of ideology as tools for the analysis of changing family 
policies. Conclusions based on different approaches to policy analysis indicate some 
possible common themes with classical Marxist theories of ideology, a link that is 
explored in the context of the themes addressed in the present study, most notably the 
relationship between the state and citizens (families or individuals). Further, neo-
marxist interpretations, notably the contribution of Louis Althusser, of ideology and 
its role within the state are examined as key developments which contribute to the 
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aims of this thesis. The chapter concludes with a presentation of the national context 
for ideologies in each of the three countries. This highlights the nature of ideologies 
of state intervention thus establishing the key themes for the case studies. 
Public policy analysis in cross-national research 
As with the study of family policy (see Chapter 2), in(erest in public policy analysis 
and the policy process has grown rapidly since the end of the Second World War. A 
major characteristic of this growth is the emergence of distinct schools of thought 
which can be categorised in terms of the methods they have proposed. Given the 
range and number of approaches to public policy analysis, the present study is limited 
to those which have become influential in Anglo-Saxon literature. 
The approaches examined below have been selected not to provide an exhaustive 
review of policy analysis, but because their basic structures, hypotheses or 
methodologies offer a possible foundation for the examination of the relationship , 
between ideology and family policy change in the three case study areas. 
In their introduction to The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State, 
Christopher Ham and Michael Hill (1984: 2) present policy analysis as a product of 
an intellectual tradition which has developed from the work of Marx, the Webbs and 
Keynes. Although, as Ham and Hill (1984) suggest, it is possible to follow the 
historical thread back to the founders of the social sciences, the emphasis on 'policy' 
only grew during the 19508 and 19608, notably in the United States. The work of 
American political scientists, in particular Charles Lindblom (1959, 1965), later 
became particularly influential in the UK (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). 
Whilst remaining a' sub-discipline of political science, policy analysis can be 
considered as a distinct discipline due to the emphasis it places on ' ... finding out what 
governments do, why they do it, and what difference it makes' (Dye, 1975: 26), rather 
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than the more traditional focus in political science on the role and importance of 
institutions and structures of governments. Methods of policy analysis seek to 
describe and explain the processes whereby policies are formulated, implemented 
and/or evaluated. Policy analysis, however, may also be seen as a tool at the disposal 
of actors in the policy process, serving more than a merely descriptive function: 
'[Policy analysis] is an attempt to apply social science knowledge to the problems of 
government and to influence the activities and decisions of governments ... ' (Ham and 
Hill, 1984: 2). Policy analysis can therefore be considered as serving both descriptive 
and prescriptive functions. 
The theme of the descriptive and prescriptive roles of policy analysis is also 
developed by Ian Gordon et al. (1977). Their schema attempts to clarify these two 
possible objectives of policy analysis and their respective characteristics, thereby 
dividing policy analysis into what Ham and Hill (1984) describe on the one hand 'as 
an academic activity concerned primarily with advancing understanding', and on the 
other hand' as an applied activity concerned mainly with contributing to the solution 
of social problems' (Ham and Hill, 1984: 4). This schema is presented thus: 
Analysis for Policy 
Policy Advocacy 
Information for 
Policy 
Policy Monitoring 
and Evaluation 
Analysis of Policy 
Analysis of Analysis of 
Policy Determination Policy Content 
(Gordon et al., 1977: 26) 
Due to its dual function, policy analysis may thus be defined in terms of the research 
objectives of each analysis. 
The present research project is primarily concerned with the descriptive approach, 
termed 'analysis of policy' (Gordon et al., 1977: 26). Through the analysis of the 
relationship between ideology and family policy change in the case-study areas a 
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better understanding of those policies is developed. In addition, this analysis evaluates 
the impact of ideology and leads to the possible explanation of convergent/divergent 
trends across the three countries. If, however, the 'analysis of policy' brings certain 
factors to light enabling the possible improvement of the existing policy-making 
process, these factors should be considered valuable contributions in their own right 
as Thomas Dye (1976) and Ham and Hill (1993), amongst others, have suggested. 
Approaches to policy analysis 
In this section different stages in the development of approaches to public policy 
analysis are presented chronologically as follows: rationalism, incrementalism, 
networks and styles. The work of Paul Sabatier (1988) provides a central focus for the 
section due to its special relevance to the study of the relationship between ideology 
and family policy change through its development of the concept of 'belief systems'. 
The rational approach 
The first approach to policy analysis in the Anglo-Saxon literature has become known 
as the 'rational choice' approach or 'rationalism'. The rational approach to policy 
analysis developed along with interest in rational choice theory in both sociology and 
economics (Elster and Hylland, 1986). The rational approach is the simplest and most 
commonly criticised method of policy analysis reviewed here, indeed the majority of 
publications which examine it choose to attack its simplicity and limitations. 
Herbert Simon's (1957) influential work Administrative Behaviour is generally cited 
(for example by Ham and Hill, 1984) as having made the first important contribution 
to the rational approach to decision making. Simon (1957) applies this approach to the 
analysis of organisational decision-making based on 'goals', suggesting that the 
decision-maker should choose the alternatives which are most likely to achieve the 
goals which have been set. The choice of alternatives is made following 
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comprehensive, rational analysis of each in order to arrive at the 'best' or optimal 
solution (Simon, 1957). 
William G. Scott (1971) described the process of rational decision-making following 
four criteria: a search process to discover goals, the formulation of objectives after 
search, the selection of alternatives (strategies) to accomplish optimal objectives and 
the evaluation of outcomes (Scott, 1971: 19). This process, which follows on from the 
work of Sirnon (1957) is, in essence better suited to a normative, prescriptive 
approach, or as Amitai Etzioni states: 'rationalistic models are widely held 
conceptions about how decisions ought to be made' (Etzioni, 1967: 385) (italics 
added). Given the rational approach's reliance upon subjective evaluation as to what 
is 'best' or 'optimal', many of the assumptions made in the context of the rational 
approach have been dismissed as 'utopian' (Smith and May, 1980: 149); for example 
the possibility of measuring costs against benefits, the availability and comparability 
of data, and the possibility of establishing. causality. 
As a descriptive approach, rationalism simply does not represent a 'real world' picture 
of how policy is made, examples of which include its failure to make provision for 
'external' elements to the process, such as pressure to adapt policies in line with other 
associated policy decisions, the personal objectives of individual policy-makers 
(which may be interpreted as ideology), or simply that rationalism assumes politics is 
the pursuit of the 'optimal' solution (see Etzioni, 1967; Lindblom, 1979; Smith and 
May, 1980). 
Incrementalism 
Perhaps one of the most vociferous critics of the rational approach has been Charles 
Lindblom (1958, 1965, 1979). Much of his critique has been directed at rationalism 
being too abstract and divorced from the real world of decision making. Lindblom 
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(1958) has contested that policy can be decided upon in the way that the supporters of 
rationalism advocate. Through his criticism, Lindblom came to develop his own 
approach to the question; an approach that has since been widely regarded as the 
natural opposite of rationalism (Smith and May, 1980; Ham and Hill, 1984; Rhodes 
and Marsh, 1992; Dowding, 1995). 
In his work with David Braybrooke (\ 963), Lindblom set out an eight-point critique 
of the rational approach, which they prefer to term the 'synoptic ideal' (Braybrooke 
and Lindblom, 1963: 12). Braybrooke and Lindblom present the main reasons why 
the rational approach can be seen as lacking in realism, such as the limits of man's 
problem solving capacities, financial limitations to analysis and the myriad forms of 
policy problems. As a consequence, Lindblom proposes a different approach which he 
initially termed 'the science of muddling through' (\959: 73), and later as 'successive 
limited comparisons' or 'disjointed incrementalism' (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 
1963: 18). 
Lindblom's approach differs fundamentally from rationality on the grounds that 
policy success is to be judged according to whether the policy secures agreement of 
the interests and actors involved, as opposed to striving for an ideal 'set of values in a 
futile attempt at superhuman comprehensiveness' (Lindblom, 1959: 88). Lindblom 
held the view that proceeding through incremental changes allows the decision-
makers to work through policy decisions whilst constantly being able to evaluate 
expected outcomes. In this way, they are able to return to individual problems as and 
when they arise and, as a result, be in a stronger position to solve these problems. The 
objectives of given policies can be adjusted in line with available means and 
situations, as opposed to striving for an unattainable ideal future state (Lindblom, 
1959, 1979; Biaybrooke and Lindblom, 1963). 
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Lindblom argues that this approach is both descriptive and prescriptive. As a 
descriptive approach, 'muddling through' was defended as an accurate description of 
the decision making process in the United States at the time (Lindblom, 1959: 73). As 
a prescriptive approach, it has the advantage of allowing for constant evaluation and 
adjustment of policy outcomes. He argues that it is probable that policy-making in 
other modem democracies can be described as exemplifYing a certain level of 
incremental change, whether this is the case for the family policies of France, Spain 
and the UK will be examined later. 
Lindblom's later work The Intelligence of Democracy (1965) continued to develop 
this approach, clarifYing two types of adjustment a decision maker can make: 
'adaptive adjustments', in which decisions are adapted in response to decisions made 
elsewhere; and 'manipulative adjustments', undertaken in order to elicit a desired 
response from other decision makers (Lindblom, 1965: 31). In order to perform these 
adjustments methods such as consultation, negotiation or bargaining could be used, 
Lindblom terms these 'partisan mutual adjustments' (Lindblom, 1965: 33). 
In contrast to reactions to rationalism, incremental ism seems to have been received 
with less hostility, an attitude summed up by Ham and Hill: 'there is a large measure 
of agreement in the literature on decision making that disjointed incrementalism is a 
good description of how decisions are actually made' (Ham and Hill, 1983: 83). As a 
prescriptive model, however, incrementalism has received a certain amount of 
criticism due, in part, to 'real world' consequences of examples of incremental 
decision making, one infamous example being the gradual engagement of the United 
States in the Vietnam war (Hill, 1993a: 196). However, examples of actual 
incremental decision-making may be identified in many countries where policy is 
decided as a result of constant evolution through debate. 
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Due to the possible shortcomings of incrementalism as a prescriptive model, 
combined with the rational approach's lack of scope as a descriptive tool, some 
analysts have attempted to find a middle ground in what Smith and May came to term 
'the artificial debate between rationalist and incrementalist models of decision 
making' (Smith and May, 1980: 147). 
Smith and May (1980) chart the split between rationalist and incrementalist models, 
concluding that both approaches may prove equally 'costly' (Smith and May, 1980: 
150), in terms of their 'real world' consequences, when used prescriptively. However 
they argue that incrementalism tends towards 'conservatism' in decision-making 
suggesting that it may barely succeed in changing anything, or as Hyderbrand puts it: 
'the question remains whether incremental change is only a form of adaptation which 
leaves basically intact what ought to be changed' (Hyderbrand, 1964: 164). 
Yehezked Dror (1964) is similarly critical of incremental change, describing it 
interestingly as an 'ideological reinforcement of the pro-inertia and anti-innovation 
forces' (Dror, 1964: 153). Dror's criticism provides an important clue as to the 
possible use of incrementalism in this research project. If the incremental approach 
can be considered as a tool for the defence of a dominant ideology, then its existence 
(and policy consequences) in a given country's decision-making process may provide 
an indicator as to the nature of that dominant ideology. 
Dror advocates an approach which incorporates both rational and extra-rational 
elements to combine 'realism and idealism' (Dror, 1964: 157). In brief, whilst 
accepting the descriptive value of Lindblom's 'muddling through' thesis and 
appreciating, to some extent, the prescriptive intentions of the rational approach, Dror 
(1964) feels that the latter could be improved via the incorporation of extra-rational 
elements such as judgement, creativity or 'brain storming'. Dror sees the inclusion of 
abstract processes as a more real world description of how policies are decided upon. 
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If 'judgement', for example, is identified as a key element of the decision making 
process then elements that may infonn, blur or lend bias to judgement, notably 
ideology, must also be considered as having an impact upon any policies anived at. 
Neither Dror nor his contemporaries used the tenn ideology to describe elements 
which may have a tangible impact upon the decision making process or its outcomes. 
The continuing debate surrounding rational and incremental models shows the extent 
to which 'analysis for' and 'analysis of policy' are not considered as being entirely 
separate activities, as Gordon et al. (1977) claimed. The descriptive analysis of policy 
inevitably reveals the flaws or strengths in a given decision-making process. 
Rationalism has been shown to go some way to providing an ideal, albeit abstract, 
model of decision-making. However, this does not mean that it may not be used as a 
descriptive approach, until rationalism has been applied to all policy processes in 
every country, it cannot be dismissed as speculation and probability as Lindblom has 
argued. 
Incrementalism has been shown as embodying a certain amount of descriptive value. 
However, the key element of the incremental approach in the context of this thesis is 
its intrinsic tendency towards conservatism. Incremental changes to policy largely fail 
to address fundamental issues indeed they seek not to do so. This approach thus 
leaves the core of any policy measure or political system intact. It is this aspect which 
may prove of value in the present study of party political ideology and family policy 
change. If ideology serves to maintain thc status quo of one group's dominance over 
another, then the system supported by it must also remain stable. Any change must 
therefore be gradual as revealed through incremental policy analysis. If 
incrementalism in policy change can be identified in the case studies, this may 
provide a valuable indicator not only of the. existence of political ideology, but may 
also lead to the identification of the defining characteristics of the party political 
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ideology in each case allowing its relative impact upon family policies to be 
examined. 
Policy Networks, Sub-Systems and Iron Triangles 
Whilst the debate surrounding the rational/incremental approach was developing, a 
different approach to the analysis of public policy was also emerging in the United 
States (Jordan, 1990), one which went on to influence the core of the policy analysis 
debate in the UK. This approach was first adopted by John L. Freeman in The 
Political Process (1955) in which he suggests that the analysis of public policy should 
be approached by emphasising the importance of what he terms 'sub-systems' 
(Freeman, 1955: 11). According to Freeman a sub-system is made up of bureaucrats, 
politicians and interest groups. Policy decisions are seen as being the result of the 
three-way, interdependent relationship of the actor groups or organisations. Freeman 
suggested that the policy decisions which arise from the sub-system, although 
previously considered as being insignificant, have a much wider reaching influence to 
the point where it may be possible to see the whole of public policy as the sum of the 
smaller decisions of the sub-system (Freeman, 1955). 
A development of the sub-systems or 'sub-governments' literature, which has become 
one of the best-known labels for the policy process of the United States within the 
literature is the 'iron triangle' (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). The iron triangle develops 
the idea of the sub-system by incorporating the notion of a symbiotic relationship 
between three parties (for example central government, parliamentary committee and 
dominant interest group). All members of the iron triangle share similar interests and, 
in order to succeed, must act interdependently (Peters, 1986). 
However, iron triangles were criticised for being too rigid in their description of the 
relationships between actors, as well as being too specific to the political context of 
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the United States. As a response, terms such as 'policy communities' (Heclo and 
Wildavsky, 1974) or 'issue networks' (Heclo, 1978) were proposed in order to make 
provision for freer relationships between the various actors. Although often grouped 
together, there are some differences between the sub-system/iron triangle approach 
and the policy communities/issue networks approach. The main one being that the 
community/network approach adopts a much looser framework than, for example, the 
rigid structure of the iron triangle. Instead of focusing on just three groups of actors, 
the networks/communities allow for varied and changing numbers and types of actors. 
According to Keith Dowding (1995: 136), the terms, 'sub-systems', 'iron triangles', 
'policy communities' and 'issue networks' are merely 'metaphors' which serve to 
identifY and describe the links between various public and private actors and their 
respective roles within the policy process. Dowding (1995) questions whether the 
policy network approach can be anything more than a system of classification, and 
concludes that the approach is flawed because the independent variables are not 
characteristics of the network itself, but characteristics from within the network 
(Dowding 1995: 158). 
Although the network approach, through its emphasis on actor groups may appear of 
limited importance for the analysis of the relationship between ideology and family 
policy change, it may help explain the pervasive nature of state intervention in the 
family as it may reveal policy measures which may impact upon families in countries 
which do not claim to have family policies. For example, in countries classified as 
exemplifYing implicit family policies (Kamerman and Kahn, 1978), study of the 
relationships between actors in the policy process may reveal the extent to which 
individual actors or groups of actors hold influence across policy areas. It may be 
possible to identifY and demonstrate the extent to which the same actors operate in 
different networks whilst maintaining a given ideological position. In the UK for 
example, policies which may be considered as forming 'family policy' are not 
formulated within a coherent family policy framework (such as a Ministry or other 
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institution) and thus cross the boundaries of different policy networks. In this situation 
the identification of the networks and their actors may be a useful means of 
identifying a pervasive ideology with an impact on policy areas such as divorce, 
abortion, child support, employment, education and direct taxation, all of which may 
be considered as implicit family policy instruments in terms of their relative impact 
(Kamerman and Kahn, 1978). 
Policy 'styles' 
The approaches to policy analysis discussed this far have all shared one thing in 
common, namely a tendency to focus on a single geographic area. In Europe in the 
late 1970s, however, a novel approach began to gain favour, that of 'policy styles'. 
The policy styles approach developed from a desire to broaden the single country 
analysis of policy in order to examine the extent to which political processes and 
policy outcomes in different countries could be seen as converging/diverging. 
In the preface to Policy Styles in Western Europe, Jeremy Richardson (1982) 
identifies the key questions of the policy styles approach as follows: '[Are] the 
problems and policy responses, and the political processes adopted in formulating 
those responses, converging in Western Europe? Do Western European democracies 
have a particular 'way of doing things', and ' .. .is it possible to identify the primary 
characteristics of the policy processes in individual countries with a view to 
classifying them according to a simple typology of policy styles?' (Richardson, 1982: 
4) ( original emphasis). 
Richardson's questions provide the basic outline of the policy styles approach, 
namely the classification based on the way in which policy is decided upon or the 
nature of the policy outcome. This approach can be identified in other areas of the 
social sciences such as the study of welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990) and, 
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notably, family policy (Kamerman and Kahn, 1978). From the point of view of a 
cross-national inquiry, it is easy to see the possible advantages of studying a particular 
'way of doing things'. However, this approach has proved problematic in its 
application due, in no small part, to the vast area it addresses. In order to be able to 
identify the policy style of a single country, all national policy must be studied, 
otherwise false conclusions may be reached. This rigour must in turn be applied to 
however many countries have been chosen for comparison, if, as Richardson (\ 982) 
suggests, Western European policy styles are to be examined, then at the very least all 
EU member states must be included. Such a vast undertaking is, in purely practical 
terms, problematic, although increased availability of data from EU-wide research 
programmes may facilitate such an approach in the future. 
The concept of policy style may be interpreted in a different way. The same approach 
may be adapted to change its focus from the style of a nation - how all policies are 
made in one country - to the style of a policy area, in effect posing the question can 
separate areas of policy - for example defence, education, welfare be considered as -
embodying a 'style' within a single national context? If so, how far is this style 
consistent through the same policy area in different countries? This may provide a 
useful comparative indicator of family policy change and its possible convergence 
across France, the UK and Spain. 
Taken further, this concept may be valuable in the study. of national contexts for 
ideology. Following the discussion of ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses 
(below) the concept of national 'style' is re-visited to establish the national context for 
state intervention in each of the countries. Whereas Richardson sought to examine 
convergence/divergence of policy making styles, the application of his concept to the 
present study seeks to explore the extent to which the national styles or contexts for 
state intervention can be seen to have converged/diverged over a period of two 
decades. 
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The limitations of policy analysis 
The case-studies in Marsh and Rhodes (1992), and Hill (1993a) suggest that policy 
styles may exist, not in terms of national boundaries, but in each different policy area 
as outlined above. The study of policy networks has spawned the use of adjectives, 
such as professional networks, territorial networks, inter-governmental networks, 
among others. This may well point to how different approaches can be combined in 
order to develop a more comprehensive approach to policy analysis, although the 
identification of policy styles is not made explicit. 
The review of approaches to the analysis of policy points to some initial conclusions 
as to how existing methods may be used to study the relationship between ideology 
and family policy change. For the purposes of the thesis, the first contribution comes 
from incrementalism which proffers an approach to the study of policy making and 
change. Change, or more accurately limited change, is intrinsic to the incremental 
approach, however, incremental change, whether adaptive or manipulative, can lead 
to or demonstrate conservatism on the part of decision-makers. This conservatism 
allows for the maintenance of the status quo and may indicate the presence of a 
dominant political ideology within a policy area. Incrementalisrri may thus prove a 
valuable concept in the present study. 
A focus on policy networks may prove useful towards a better understanding of which 
actors (and their beliefs) can be seen to shape family policies. However, the complex 
and often 'invisible' nature of actor networks requires a far more detailed study than 
the limitations of the thesis can accommodate. In addition, the identification of the 
political beliefs of actors within policy networks is highly problematic. Interview 
methods may be used to help understand actors' beliefs, however such methods would 
only be appropriate for the study of change if interviews were carried out over a 
sufficient number of years as beliefs may change over time (this is explored further in 
Chapter 4). 
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The final element of policy analysis which may contribute to the objectives of this 
research project is revealed in the cross-national comparative ambitions of the policy 
styles approach as discussed above. The literature suggests that it may be possible to 
examine the extent to which either a. national style exists for each of the three 
countries I I , or the extent to which a policy style exists across countries, revealing in 
effect a 'family policy style' which is common or otherwise to. France, the UK and 
Spain. 
Sabatier's concept of belief systems and advocacy coalitions 
While many methods of policy analysis have been applied to empirical case studies, 
family policy has not been the focus of such studies. Such a lack of study of family 
policy may result from the relative invisibility of the family as a target of a coherent 
policy area in the US and the UK as demonstrated in the previous chapter. In addition, 
while elements of the above approaches can be used in the context of family policy, 
their application could not account for the possible impact of political ideology on' 
policies thus limiting their value in the present study. One possible exception to this is 
the approach presented in Sabatier's article' An advocacy coalition model of policy 
making and change and the role of policy oriented learning therein' (\988). 
Sabatier's (1988) work is of interest to the present study on two major counts: first, he 
includes 'belief systems' as a variable in his analytical approach to policy, a concept 
which may prove analogous to ideology or ideologies; second, the focus of the 
analysis is on change and 'policy learning'. These two elements suggest that 
Sabatier's model and objectives correspond to the focus of this thesis, although his 
empirical case study, anti-air pollution policy, does not. Sabatier's model attempts to 
develop the US policy communities approach, although he criticises the effectiveness 
of short term analysis. He acknowledges that short-term analyses result from the need 
11 Although this would be limited to the area of family policy rather than a general, national policy 
style as suggested by Richardson (1982). 
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for short-term policy solutions. In addition, Sabatier underlines the importance of the 
interests of actors, which may not always be simply to find the best solution, as 
rationalism would argue. Interests may include actors' beliefs or ideologies 
conceming the objectives of policies and the means used to meet them. Sabatier sets 
out a framework for the analysis of policy change which rests upon three criteria: 
understanding policy change requires a time perspective of a decade or more; 
2 the most useful way to think about policy change is through a focus on the 
interaction of actors from different institutions interested in the policy area; 
3 public policies can be conceptualised as sets of value (or ideological) priorities 
and causal assumptions about how to realise them. (Sabatier, 1988: 131) 
Sabatier terms actor groups within the policy network 'advocacy coalitions', which he 
describes as groups within the sub-system which share the same beliefs. These beliefs 
he sees as acting as the political 'glue' uniting the members of the sub-system 
(Sabatier 1988: 141). Through a central focus on political beliefs, Sabatier's theory of 
policy change is clearly much closer ·to including the impact of ideology on policy 
making than any of his peers. In addition, his use of the term 'glue' is also compatible 
with one of the key characteristics of ideology, namely to maintain the unity and 
stability of groups or even society as a whole (see Marx and Engels, 1975; 
Scarborough, 1984; van Dijk 1998). Sabatier does not however use the term ideology. 
While it is not possible to provide conclusive proof as to Sabatier's use of terms, his 
use of belief rather than ideology may be a result of thc 'End of Ideology' school 
which devalued the analytical function of ideology in the US (Gann, 1995). The 
description of processes in Western liberal democracies as ideological was deemed 
inappropriate simply because such political concepts were considered as 'not 
ideological' (Larrain, 1979). 
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Actors' beliefs, according to Sabatier (1988) can be seen as falling into three 
categories: 
1 deep core beliefs: those beliefs least susceptible to change; 
2 near core beliefs: beliefs associated with the policy area which are open to but 
resistant to change; 
3 secondary aspects: policy-specific elements that are open to change (Sabatier, 
1988: 145). 
Examples of deep core beliefs may include subjects such as the nature of man, 
freedom, human rights or the fundamental relationship between the state and citizens 
which are highly resistant to change and may be present whatever the policy area. 
Near core beliefs, on the other hand, are specific beliefs relative to the policy area, 
such as orientation of substantive policy conflicts, identification of policy target 
groups, choice of policy instruments (coercion versus persuasion) and so on (Sabatier, 
1988: 145). 
Secondary aspects are understood by Sabatier as being non-ideological because they 
are related to policy-specific questions, which are highly susceptible to change, as a 
result of fluctuating budgets, administrative rules or short-term political priorities 
(Sabatier, 1988: 145). If change is identifiable in secondary aspects alone, Sabatier 
argues that ideologies are not the motors for change as change is the result of 
practical, material or pragmatic concerns. This may not be entirely the case, indeed 
deep core beliefs about the economy may override other beliefs such as those 
pertaining to the family thus leading to ideological conflict or paradoxes within one 
political group, examples of which can be seen throughout the case studies in the 
impact of monetarism on right, and in some cases left, wing parties (chapters 6, 7 and 
8). 
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Identifying these three levels of belief complements the incremental approach by 
identifying not only whether incremental changes to policies are made, but also the 
level of beliefs that are most susceptible to incremental change. If, as Sabatier (1988) 
suggests, deep core beliefs are very difficult or difficult to change, it is improbable 
that incremental change will impact upon such beliefs. If policy change within a given 
country can be identified as being incremental, it may then be possible to either 
demonstrate the persistence and level of impact of political ideology within a specific 
policy area (thus identifying the existence of consensus therein) or simply political 
inertia or the prioritisation of policy change. 
Sabatier's concept of belief systems has been questioned in relation to his 
classification of the three types of belief shown above. Alison Hann (1995), while 
suggesting that the approach provides a 'new and potentially powerful explanatory 
framework' (Hann, 1995: 20), criticises Sabatier's approach by suggesting that, rather 
than classifying beliefs in terms of their resistance to change, it may be possible to 
divide beliefs into the following two categories: 'empirical beliefs about the world; 
values, norms and wants' (Hann, 1995: 23). 
Hann (1995) suggests that both categories may be resistant to change to varymg 
degrees, thus dispensing with the need for deep core, near core and secondary aspects. 
In the context of Marxist interpretations of ideology, it may be possible to suggest that 
Hann's 'empirical beliefs' are not, in fact, beliefs in the true sense at all because they 
are based on scientific proof. Science arid scientific proof are the antithesis of 
ideology (Althusser, 1971a; Marx and Engels, 1975). Further, it is unclear whether 
'values', suggesting deeply held beliefs and 'wants', perhaps only short-term in 
nature, can be grouped in the same category. 
Certainly, Sabatier (1988) feels confident that policy makers are not merely driven by 
their short-term interests, although this too is questionable, but that they are driven by 
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commonly held beliefs. Hann (1995) also objects to the thesis that policy makers seek 
short-term solutions and asks: 'if it is shown empirically that individuals (or groups) 
within an advocacy coalition do not share core values, then surely this seriously 
undermines Sabatier's second hypothesis namely, actors will demonstrate consensus 
pertaining to the policy core?' (Hann, 1995: 24). If this is the case, as Hann (1995) 
suggests, then it is in part thanks to Sabatier's innovative approach that such questions 
come to light. Indeed, as Hann also states interest in the role and impact of beliefs on 
policy change had been virtually absent previous to Sabatier's work (Hann, 1995: 19). 
In spite of her objections, Hann remains optimistic about the possible development of 
Sabatier's approach. 
In addition, Hann points to the possible utility of the classical Marxist approach to 
ideology in relation to the concept of 'belief systems', as stated above. Hann suggests 
that in spite of the conflict between the various advocacy coalitions, they are all 
members of the political elite and as such they share certain deep core beliefs or 
ideology resulting in policy outcomes which reinforce the ruling class's dominant 
position (Hann, 1995). 
Further, Hann also suggests that feminist theory could, along similar lines, point to 
male domination although this may prove weaker given possible political or 
ideological conflict irrespective of gender issues, which may result in some areas of 
highly gendered policy (notably abortion, equal rights, single-parent benefits) being 
affected. 
In addition to the impact of beliefs, Sabatier (1988) identifies further influences on 
policies which may be extemal or 'non-cognitive', such as socio-demographic change 
or the intemal dynamics of actor groups (Sabatier, 1988: 135-9). The influence of 
external factors (Sabatier, 1988: 145) does not constitute the central core of Sabatier' s 
analysis. However, the particular relevance of socio-demographic change in the 
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family policy sphere, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, supports the need to 
examine such influences on political ideologies in the context of the present study 
(see Chapter 5). 
Although flawed, Sabatier's approach highlights the importance of the study of 
political ideology and its impact on policy change. Combined with elements of the 
incremental, network and style approach to policy analysis it may be possible to 
develop an approach to the question of the relationship between ideology and family 
policy change. In addition, Sabatier's reference to the possible effects of socio-
demo graphic influence suggests that the combination of the approaches examined 
above may provide the theoretical basis for the empirical case studies of family policy 
change in contemporary France, the UK and Spain. 
Ideology: defming analytical tools 
One of the major ambiguities present in Sabatier's work lies in his use of the term 
'belief system' (Sabatier, 1988). It has been suggested above that this term may be 
considered analogous to ideology, and that due to the pejorative connotations 
ideology has acquired, most notably in the US, the term has lost some of its place as a 
descriptive or analytical tool for social science research (Larrain 1979; Gann, \995). 
What follows is a brief examination of the development of the term ideology and its 
use in the social sciences. This section aims to re-appraise the analytical utility of 
ideology and evaluate its application it to the case of family policy change through an 
examination of its evolution as a concept within Marxist and neo-Marxist theory, 
which may, as Hann (\995) suggests, helps 'sharpen-up' the aims of Sabatier's model 
(\988). The central aim of this section is to examine concepts of ideology in their 
explicit application to the aims of this thesis. As a consequence, the focus is upon the 
role of ideology in the relationship between the state and citizens. 
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The tenn ideologie was first coined by the French thinker, Antoine Destutt de Tracy 
in 1798 (Head, 1985). Since that time the concept of ideology has been transformed 
and developed many times, with each development adding its own particular 
connotations. Initially a expressed by de Tracy as the 'science of ideas' (Head, 1985) 
ideology rapidly became used as a pejorative term to describe any political doctrine or 
'belief system' (Funderburk and Thoebaben, 1994: I). Napoleon Bonaparte was 
instrumental in this transformation in the meaning of ideology. Bonaparte had once 
figured in the ranks of the Ideologues, a group who had sought to further the cause of 
the 'science of ideas' (Eagleton 1994), but later became a highly outspoken critic of 
the movement, referring to them as 'windbags' (Eagleton, 1994: 5) and painted them 
as being politically impotent, idealistic and the instigators of political unrest. As a 
result, ideology was discredited and fell into a period of disuse. 
Marx, Engels and ideology 
By the mid-nineteenth century, the term ideology was adopted by a new generation of 
thinkers who were to have a much wider influence on the world than de Tracy and 
many of his contemporaries. The works ofKarl Marx (1818-83) and Friedrich Engels 
(1820-95) and the vast number of publications devoted to them have undoubtedly had 
an enduring impact on the development of political science, economics, sociology and 
thought. The influence of their theories can still be discemed in the day-to-day 
political life of many regimes throughout the world. 
Perhaps their most important contribution, and that upon which their many works 
were founded, was the concept of historical materialism. The key doctrine of 
historical materialism is clearly a development of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's 
dialectic, . and is based on a process of historical development through conflict. 
Whereas Hegel saw development as taking the form of change' in tenns of the 
metaphysical Geist, Marx and Engels (1975) saw both conflict and change as being 
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finnly rooted in society and, crucially, the way in which a given society creates and 
redistributes its wealth. The basis of this conflict is that of 'opposing' classes, one 
dominant, through its control of the means of production, and the other subordinate, 
due to its dependence on the financial rewards for labour. It is in this conflict between 
the oppressors and the oppressed, that, according to Marx and Engels, ideology 
becomes an important factor (1975). 
The tenn ideology is prominent from early in the works of Marx and Engels, with The 
German Ideology (1845-46) being particularly representative of the growing 
importance of the tenn to both writers. In spite of this, it is difficult to identify clearly 
the principles of a theory of ideology from Marx's work, an aspect which has fuelled 
debate among Marxist scholars to the present. In the introduction to Marx 's Theory of 
Ideology (1982), Bhikhu Parekh suggests that 'Marx did not offer an unambiguous 
statement of his theory of ideology' (Parekh, 1982). Terry Eagleton does not go quite 
so far, suggesting that 'Marx and Engels never produced a fully-fledged theory of 
ideology' (Eagleton, 1994: 23), but he goes on to stress that some of their work 
contains 'suggestive ideas in this direction'. In Marxism and Ideology, Jorge Larrain 
(1983) writes in detail about the problems concerning Marx's theory of ideology: 
.. .there is no general definition or systematic treatment of the concept in his writings 
which provides a defmitive version. Of course, Marx gives numerous clues by using 
the concept in a certain way and by describing some of its essential features in the 
context of concrete analyses. But on the whole it is necessary to accept that the 
concept of ideology is not satisfactorily elaborated in Marx' s writings and that in 
consequence it must be reconstructed and theoretically elaborated from the various 
scattered elements provided by the texts. (Larrain, 1983: 7) 
Given the difficulties suggested above, it is not surprising to find discrepancies in the 
various definitions of Marx's theory of ideology. However, whether Marx and Engels 
produced a concrete theory of ideology or not has not discouraged later theorists from 
pursuing this line of inquiry (for example Lukacs, 1923; Gramsci, 1971; Althusser, 
197Ia). Nor does it detract from the key importance of their contributions to the wider 
debate surrounding ideology. 
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Marx's definition o/ideology 
Perhaps the most misleading aspect of Marx's use of the term ideology can be traced 
back to his early tendency to criticise, often strongly, the ideas of Hegel and the 
Young Hegelians. From his earliest writings, and in letters to his father (Parekh, 1982: 
I), Marx had been openly critical of many aspects of Hegel's work, but it was Hegel's 
idealism that attracted the brunt of the criticism. In Contribution to the Critique 0/ 
Hege/'s Philosophy o/Right (1843), Marx subjects Hegel's idealism, defined by Marx 
as Hegel's view of consciousness and its duality, to 'ridicule' (Parekh, 1982: I). In 
later works (The Holy Family, 1845; The German Ideology, 1845-46) however, this 
critique is developed, but with a major difierence, namely the displacement of the 
term idealism by 'ideology'. 
From this point in Marx's development, it seems that the terms idealism and ideology 
became synonymous, appearing to be interchangeable. In this context, it is possible to 
say that ideology was, originally, merely another, albeit derogatory, term for Hegel's 
idealism. This view is upheld by Parekh (1982), and is elaborated upon in Chapter I 
of his book, Marx's Theory 0/ Ideology. 
Although ideology in the works of Marx and Engels has had many connotations, it is 
the role played by ideology in the maintenance of a ruling class position which, as 
identified in Hann's reappraisal of Sabatier's approach to policy leaming (1995: 26), 
is of greatest interest in the context of the present study. As outlined earlier, the 
Marxist concept of ideology is closely linked with historical materialism. For Marx 
the ruling class holds the means of material. production and thus controls the 
economic base of society and the key to redistribution. In Marxism, the economic 
base in any society generates social formations known as the superstructure. The 
superstructure consists of social activities including politics, religion, morality, art and 
science, all of which are determined by the economic base. In this context, ideology is 
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both the 'beliefs' which supply the justification and framework for the economic base 
and its superstructure, and the 'process' by which they become accepted as such. 
Similarly, Larrain (1982) suggests that ideology controls the means of 'mental' 
production. This is to say that the ideology of the ruling class becomes the ideology of 
society as a whole (Larrain, 1979; 1982) or, as Marx puts it, the ruling class 'is 
compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interests as the 
common interest of all members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to 
give ideas universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid 
ones' (Marx and Engels, 1975b: 43). In this way, ideology plays a core role in the 
determination of the relationship between the state and its citizens. 
In contrast any ideas developed by the dominated class are not considered by Marx as 
ideology because they do not serve the function of maintaining the dominance of the 
ruling class. While this latter point has been the source of conflict within Marxist 
circles (for example Marx never considered his thought as ideology) (Larrain, 1982), 
it is important for the purposes of the thesis to stress that such a concept of ideology, 
by justifying and maintaining the dominance of the ruling class, serves a socially 
reproductive role. Ideology thus maintains the status quo, the ideology of the 
dominant class becomes the norm, the ideology of society as a whole, and therefore 
remains unchallenged. In this sense ideology can function to maintain the patriarchal 
family model, for example, as shown in Chapter 2 (Gittins 1985; Barrett and 
McIntosh, 1991) by expressing such a family model as 'natural', 'normal' or 
'desirable' . 
This element of the concept of ideology is of great importance to the thesis insofar as 
it provides a possible basis for an analytical tool for the comparative study of family 
policy change in France, the UK and Spain. Ideology defined as ideas which serve to 
maintain the dominance of the ruling class (or policy elites) allows a wide spectrum 
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of dogma (in the form of legislation and policy, party manifestos, religion, education, 
the arts, the media and the sciences) to be examined with a view to showing how, and 
to what extent, these dogma, and any changes in them, shape the society in which 
they are contextualised (Parekh 1982). 
By comparing changes in family policies with expressions of party political ideology 
it may be possible to analyse the extent to which policy changes are the result of any 
changes in party political ideology. Equally it may be possible to demonstrate that 
although policies change, the ideological assumptions upon which they are based 
remain static, any examples of such change may be revealed through incremental 
policy making (see above). 
Neo-marxist contributions to Marx 's concept of ideology 
After Marx's death, controversy surrounding the concept of ideology formed an 
important source of debate among his intellectual descendents with both positive and 
negative concepts finding favour (see Larrain, 1982 or Eagleton 1994 on the 
contributions of Vladimir Ilich' Lenin, Karl Kautsky, Antonio Labriola, Franz 
Mehring and Georgii Plekhanov, Georg Lukacs and Edouard Bemstein). The debate 
covered a wide range of interpretations of ideology which led, in many cases, to a 
number of contradictory definitions and interpretations. Given the wide variety of 
neo-marxist interpretations of ideology, the present study examines the work of two 
key theorists who have made fundamental contributions to the relationship between 
the state and citizens and role of ideology. 
The first of these two contributions was elaborated by Antonio Gramsci (1971). 
Gramsci employed the term 'hegemony' to describe, not the ideological domination 
of subordinate classes by the political elites, but a situation in which subjugated 
classes in modem society willingly accept their exploitation. In the context of this . 
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thesis, hegemony sets the ideological context for the relationship between the state 
and its citizens, and may be represented not in the acceptance of the family as the 
social norm by polities, but by families themselves. Family policies would therefore 
be seen by the electorate as an acceptable, indeed necessary, sphere of state 
intervention. As such it may be expected that in societies in which family hegemony 
exists, such as in France, the theme of the family and family policies would be present 
in political debate, notably during election campaigns. Equally, a situation of 
hegemony may exist in a society which does not consider the family as a legitimate 
field of state intervention, as in the UK. In either case the identification of hegemony 
may further understanding of the ideological nature of family policy evolution and the 
role of ideologies of state intervention. 
The second development of Marx's concept of ideology, which may prove important 
for the objectives of the thesis, is the contribution of Louis Althusser, one of the most 
influential Marxists of recent times (particularly in his native France). Althusser's 
work in this area focuses on the two uses of ideology examined above and helps 
clarify the duality of Marx's use of ideology by making the distinction between 
structural 'ideology', and historical 'ideologies'. According to Althusser, 'Ideology is 
a 'representation' of the Imaginary Relationship of Individuals to their Real 
conditions of existence' (original italics and punctuation) (1971 a: 241) and is the 
'structure' in which changing representations, or ideologies, function. In effect 
ideology is a constant whereas ideologies change as they serve to uphold 
transformations in political systems or dominant groups in society. It is thus, 
according to Althusser, through the study of changing ideologies that other change 
(social, economic, political) may be examined. 
Althusser's use of ideology contributes to the aims ofthis thesis in three further ways. 
First, in the essay Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (l971a), Althusser, 
unlike Marx, accepts that the exploited class expresses an ideology which acts as a 
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unifYing force and, as such, forms a central role in revolutionary theory (Althusser, 
1971 a). While this does not correspond directly to the possible ideological nature of 
family policy change, it hints at the nature of ideology as a unifYing force in bringing 
about this policy change (such as the role played by feminist groups in Spain in the 
legalisation of abortion), and thus echoes Sabatier's (1988) concept of a 'glue' which 
holds policy advocacy coalitions together. 
Althusser's second contribution (1971 a) is to state that the opposite of ideology is 
'science'. Although Marx had also suggested that 'science' appeared to be the 
opposite of ideology, this was never made explicit. If science, as Althusser (l97Ia; 
1971b) proffers, is the opposite of ideology, then it may become possible to 
distinguish between what is ideological and what is not. Any 'beliefs' which may be 
proven scientifically are, according to Althusser, not ideology. Without this 
contribution to Marx's original outline of a concept of ideology, the validity of results 
from any analysis of ideology would be devalued. It must be possible to define what 
is not ideology in order to clarifY that which is (Althusser, 1971 a). In addition this 
also removes arguments which may state that everything, or indeed nothing, is 
ideology. In the light of this single aspect of Althusser's work, it is not surprising that 
the essay Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (197Ia) has been heralded as 
'the most influential exposition of ideology in the last two decades' (Bottomore, 
1983: 223) and 'the key text in ideology for our time' (Eagleton, 1994: 87). This 
element of the concept of ideology also under lies the need for the critical analysis of 
the use of 'truths' in political rhetoric. Any examples of this may be distortions for the 
purposes of justifYing an ideological position. This type of ideological distortion is 
found throughout the analysis of the FN manifestos (Chapter 6). 
The third contribution to the theory of ideology, and most important in terms of the 
aims of this thesis, rests in Athusser's understanding of the relationship between the 
state and citizens. The state, according to Althusser (1971 a), is coterminous with 
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capitalism as the fonner exists to protect the interests of the latter. Following this, it is 
possible that democracy, as a political ideology and a system of government, may also 
be cotenninous with capitalism, insofar as democracy provides the illusion that all 
people are equal and hence hides relations of economic exploitation or dependency. 
Althusser mentions two mechanisms that serve to maintain this relationship between 
state and citizens. The first he tenns 'Repressive State Apparatuses,12 through which 
the state has the direct power to enforce behaviour, most clearly demonstrated, for 
example, by the criminal justice system, the police and the prison system. The second 
and most significant in the context of this thesis, he tenns 'Ideological State 
Apparatuses' (1971a). 
Ideological State Apparatuses 
Althusser's concept of Ideological State Apparatuses attempts to explain how 
individuals within society internalise and, subsequently, act upon ideologies. 
Ideological State Apparatuses are institutions that generate systems of beliefs and 
values which may cover any area of society and social interaction which individuals 
and/or groups either believe or not. Examples of these Apparatuses include 
institutions or organisations such as schools, religions, political parties, legal systems, 
arts, sports and, significantly in the present study, the family (Althusser, 1971 a: 239). 
Through this concept Althusser identifies specific means by which ideology maintains 
the status quo, as in Marx's means of intellectual production and Gramsci's 
hegemony. The family, is thus identified as an Ideological State Apparatus which 
serves to maintain or justify a model of society, and the relationship between the state 
and individuals. This link between ideology and the relationship between the state and 
citizens is further echoed in social policy literature. While Althusser presents 
democracy as cotenninous with the ideology of capitalism, Nicole Questiaux and 
Jaques Fournier (1978) contextualise the historical development of state intervention 
12 Althusser uses upper case letters throughout his work, this stylistic trait is maintained in this 
examination of his study of ideology. 
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through social policies within the development of capitalism. This link is of central 
importance to the examination of the relationship between party political ideologies 
and changing family policies insofar as it highlights the importance of ideological 
representations of the relationship between the state and its citizens. 
Analysing ideology 
The above review of the development of concepts of ideology has identified some 
valuable contributions to the aims of the present study by Marx (1975) and Althusser 
(l97Ia): 
• ideology is the structure within which ideologies maintain the dominance of the 
ruling class 13 within a society; 
• ideology is also the process by which ideologies become accepted as dominant or 
are challenged and undergo changes and transformations; 
• ideologies are systems of beliefs relating to the nature of society and the 
relationship between the state and citizens; 
• ideologies, although most strongly embodied in the 'dominant' ideas of society, 
can be any system of ideas which seeks to shape society; 
• ideologies are generated within Ideological State Apparatuses, an example of 
which is the family; 
• the opposite of an ideology is 'science'. 
The above elements of the concept of ideology when applied to the review of 
approaches to policy analysis, Sabatier's (1988) approach to policy change and 
Hann's subsequent critique (1995), support the following premises: 
• Sabatier's concept of deep core and near core 'belief systems', due to their 
resistance to change and their unifYing function, can be considered as 'ideologies' 
for the purposes of the thesis; 
13 For the purposes of the present study the ruling class is synonymous with the political party in 
power. 
84 
• deep core ideology may be seen as synonymous with the Marxist concept of 
superstructure insofar as it are the structure that determines the fundamental nature 
and limitations of all other assumptions, norms and beliefs within a state, for 
example the political system. In cases where the deep core ideology is transformed, 
change may be expected to occur in ideologies and policies within the same 
structure, context or state. This can be seen in the changes which took place in 
Spanish family policy after the demise of Franco's authoritarian regime; 
• near core ideologies may be considered as synonymous with the Marxist concept 
of 'ideologies', the beliefs which are fundamentally linked with, but are open to 
change within the limitations of the deep core ideology of a state. To illustrate this, 
if the family is presented as a legitimate sphere of state intervention (deep core) the 
measures employed to support the family (near core) may change, even radically, 
over time without questioning the deep core ideological assumption of state 
intervention in the family; 
• cases of incremental policy making, because of its inherent conservatism, may help 
reveal ideological policy making, insofar as small adjustments are most likely to 
leave deep core and near core ideologies unchanged. Incremental policy making is 
most likely to change what Sabatier terms secondary aspects, the practical details 
of policies such as changes in the value of benefits as reactions to fluctuating 
economic conditions. It is important to note, however, that in cases where 
secondary aspects remain unchanged in the face of strong practical arguments (for 
example maintaining high child benefit payments during budgetary crises) this 
may be a significant indicator of the relative strength of ideologies. 
In addition to the contributions of the Marxist theory of ideology to the aims of this 
thesis, the review of policy analysis approaches also allows for the identification of 
dominant policy actors and the extent of their influence (based on the network 
approach), as well as the cross-national comparison of convergent/divergent trends 
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(policy styles). The combined contributions of the approaches discussed above form 
the foundation of the methodological approach of the thesis. 
National contexts for ideologies of state intervention 
Earlier, in the discussion of the concept of policy 'styles' it was suggested that 
France, the UK and Spain may be understood in terms of national styles or contexts 
for ideologies of state intervention. If this theme is considered within a development 
of Althusser's concept of Ideological State Apparatuses, it becomes possible to go 
further and situate each country within the ideology in which state intervention has 
been conceptualised. In order to analyse these contexts, this thesis considers each 
country and its political parties in relation to four 'thematics', to use the postmodem 
jargon, based upon the opposition of public/private and family/individual. 
In Chapter I, each country was briefly presented in order to examme its 
appropriateness for inclusion in this study. These presentations are explored further 
below to provide an explicit context for ideologies of state intervention in each case: 
Of the three countries, France has the strongest traditions of state intervention. This 
statist tradition has its roots, like much of French public life, in the Revolutionary and 
Post-Revolutionary period. By the time of the case study period, state intervention 
had become a founding characteristic of the nation and could be seen in a number of 
Ideological State Apparatuses. In terms of social and family policies, a situation of 
heteronomy developed, represented by high taxation and a highly developed safety 
net of vertical and, for families, horizontal redistribution. Althusser's Ideological 
State Apparatuses can be seen in the level of institutionalisation of the family in 
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French public life in bodies such as the CNAF or the UNAF (see Chapters 2, 5 and 6). 
While the French statist tradition may be considered as the deep core ideology within 
which family policy is situated, there is some· conflict across political parties when 
these are situated in relation to the four thematics. 
The French parties of the right have traditionally sought to preserve the family 
through public intervention. While right wing ideologies generally have a traditional 
obsession with the family, largely as a result of the influence of the Catholic Church, 
public intervention is not considered as a defining characteristic of ideologies of the 
right. Consequently, this interventionist tradition gives French right wing parties a 
national style. 
Equally, while the parties of the French left have pursued interventionist public 
policies based on the rights of individuals, they have also targeted the family as a 
primary group. Thus, the ideologies of the left may be considered as being situated in 
the broader French ideology of state intervention. In spite of this, the French left and 
right have been polarised over issues within the deep core ideology, notably in 
relation to pro-natalism (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
Polarisation of left and right has been largely absent in the British polity. As in 
France, the national context for ideologies has determined the limits of party political 
ideologies in relation to state intervention. The UK has been characterised by a 
general consensus based upon privacy, responsibility and autonomy. As a 
consequence, families have not generally been an explicit target for state intervention. 
Social and economic policies have been based upon the ideological backdrop of 
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individual responsibility/autonomy. This broad cross-party consensus was, however, 
brought into question in the 1970s by the emergence of New RightlThatcherite 
ideology and its focus on the themes of privacy and the family. The impact of this 
ideological development on the cross-party consensus in the UK is explored further in 
Chapter 7. 
The case of Spain is distinct from both France and the UK, and traditions of state 
intervention are of special interest due to the radical break in political and ideological 
continuity which took place in 1975. Previous to the case study period, Spanish state 
intervention mirrored that of the French right, being based upon pro-natalism and the 
teachings of the Catholic Church. The left did not have an official voice. Thus 
Chapter 8 explores the emergence of party conceptions of state intervention on both 
the left and right in the light of the political legacy of Authoritarianism. 
The three countries therefore stand as examples of legitimate state intervention, 
suspicion of state intervention, and an emerging polity which has no explicit context 
for state intervention. The case studies explore the evolution of party political 
ideologies not only in relation to changing family policies, but also in the national 
contexts for ideologies of state intervention; 
Chapter 4 - PARTY POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND FAMILY POLICY: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
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The prevIOus two chapters have examined different approaches to family policy 
change: comparative approaches, approaches. to policy analrsis and the place of 
ideology. This chapter develops an analytical framework for the study of family 
policy change in contemporary France, the UK and Spain based on the core elements 
of the concept of ideology (see Chapter 3), combined with Sabatier's belief system 
approach to analysing policy change. 
The chapter begins with a review of the methods used in the case studies in Chapters 
5-8 and includes a critical review of John Clayton Thomas' (1975) attempt to analyse 
party political ideology and change. The case study design is then presented with a 
focus on the rationale behind country selection, the choice and limits of the time span 
for the analysis and the criteria for and limitations of data selection. In addition, this 
chapter considers some advantages and disadvantages of cross-national comparison 
with special reference to problems such as language barriers which are particularly 
relevant to the thesis given the centrality of original documents in French and Spanish 
in Chapters 6 and 8 respectively. 
The review of family policy analysis in Chapter 2 revealed that the existing body of 
literature has largely neglected the potential impact of party political ideology on 
family policy change, or where this has been a focus of research, it has been limited 
and solely applied to single-country studies. While this can be explained in part by the 
scientific development of the field in France, the UK and Spain, which has been 
dominated by demographic, sociological and economic studies, it may also result 
from the wider neglect of political ideology as an analytical tool in the social sciences 
(Beardsley, 1980) and the potential difficulties and contradictions of concepts of 
ideology as demonstrated in Chapter 3. In addition, the study of the political 
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dimension of family policies has been a limited objective of family policy research to 
date (Elshtain, 1982; Commaille and Martin, 1998). 
Case study design 
The case study approach and structure adopted in the thesis relates directly and 
systematically to the research questions (see Chapter 1). The following sections 
present the structure, the methods used and some of the pitfalls encountered during 
the research. 
Country selection 
The first stage in the case study design was the choice of study countries. In the 
selection of the countries for a comparative project conducted by a lone researcher, 
language is an important consideration. This factor was fundamental in the choice of 
the countries which are analysed in the case study section of the thesis (Chapters 6-8). 
It has been argued (Hantrais and Ager, 1985) that problems (including lack of 
translated sources, delays in dissemination of research, underestimation of culture and 
context or translation interference ) arising from the linguistic elements in cross-
national study can be overcome by greater co-operation between linguists and social 
scientists, or in better language training for the social scientist or vice versa. 
Countries which may have provided a deeper understanding of the questions 
examined in the thesis include Germany (Christian-Democratic political tradition) and 
the Scandinavian countries, which have been the focus of family policy study since 
the I 940s. However, it was not possible, given practical, language or logistical 
limitations, to include these countries in the present study. France, the UK and Spain 
were chosen for the present study on account of the language expertise of the author. 
Analysis could thus be carried out on the original documents to overcome the 
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numerous disadvantages of working in translation which the Thomas (1975) study 
encountered (see below). 
While the language proficiency of researchers may, to a certain extent, guard against 
linguistic or cultural subjectivity, this alone does not provided sufficient justification 
for the choice of countries to be compared. Other factors such as knowledge of the 
countries, comparability and availability of data all play a role. In the case of the 
present study, the countries are all member states of the EU and they display certain 
similarities in terms of their political and socio-economic development. In addition, 
the countries present interesting choices for case study in relation to their distinct 
traditions of state intervention. If language was the sole variable, any combination of 
countries in which French, English and Spanish are spoken could have served as 
cases, such as, Senegal, New Zealand and Bolivia, three states which do not share 
similar political and social characteristics. While knowledge of the languages and 
familiarity with the countries selected made the study feasible and practical, this 
selection also has its limitations. A different mix of countries would be expected to 
produce different results. Selection of three countries is supported by Nick Manning 
(1993: 15) who argues that this number provides the case study method with a 
comparative dimension without sacrificing depth. 
In addition to the researcher's knowledge of the languages and the countries in the 
cases studies, the selection of the countries in this thesis is significant within the field 
of family policy study. In Chapter 2, France was shown to be a pioneer in the practice 
and study of family policy leading to it being classified as an example of 'explicit' 
family policy. In contrast, the UK stood as an example of 'implicit' family policy. 
Study of Spanish family policy was demonstrated as a relatively recent development 
in both single-country and cross-national studies. Where Spain has been studied, it 
has been described as distinct from Northern European countries in terms of gender 
division (Abrahamson, 1991), demographic change (Roussel, 1992; 1994) or family 
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values (Guerrero and Naldini, 1996), and is generally considered within the Southern 
European model offamily life and family policy (Guerrero and Naldini, 1996 
The final consideration in the selection of the three countries was the research 
expertise, funding and resources available to the author. The majority of the research 
project was supported both financially and materially by a research studentship in the 
Department of European Studies at Loughborough University (UK). The fieldwork 
carried out in the thesis was made possible by the EU-funded Training and Mobility 
of Young Researchers (TMR) programme 'Family and the Welfare State in Europe' 
co-ordinated by the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES). The 
author was awarded a TMR fellowship for the duration of six months each in 
Barcelona (January-June 1997) and Paris (July-Decemeber 1997). While working as 
an assistant to senior researchers, it was possible to collect the majority of the data in 
support of the case studies of France and Spain. 
Time span 
The centrality of the concept of change to the research design implies the need for a 
longitudinal study. It is also helpful to examine how other authors have approached 
the same issue. Sabatier (1988) studied political beliefs in relation to policy change. 
Thus his approach to length of study period offers an appropriate starting point. In 
terms of the nature of data to be analysed and, indeed, the mechanics of the analysis 
itself, Sabatier's approach (1988) remains vague, one element of his argument which 
is made very clear, is the need to examine policy change over a period of at least a 
decade. Building on the work of Carol Weiss (l977a; 1977b) and Charles Lindblom 
and David Cohen (1979), Sabatier argued against short-term policy evaluation on the 
grounds that such approaches underestimate influences on policy and do not allow for 
a complete formulation/implementation/reformulation cycle. Although the central 
objective of such an approach is policy evaluation, the argument for a sufficient time 
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span also holds true when applied to the examination of the relationship between 
party political ideology and family policy change insofar as deep core ideologies are 
unlikely to change in very short periods of time. 
The thesis argues that in the context of family policy, an area intrinsically linked with 
demographic trends, a much longer period of time (two or three generations) is 
required. It is for this reason that Chapter 5 examines family policy change over a 
period from the 1930s to the mid-late 1970s to provide the necessary historical 
context for the substantive national case studies. This time span represents a period of 
dramatic change in social attitudes, demography and the economy in all three 
countries, and in political institutions in France and Spain in particular. 
The case studies of changing party political ideologies focus on a shorter period for 
two reasons: first, the size limitations of the thesis; and second, and more 
significantly, the need for comparability across the three countries. This second 
consideration is necessary because Spain before 1975 was not a democratic state and 
did not have any legal political parties. The importance of the political context to the 
case studies is further underlined by the selection of different dates for the beginning 
of each national case study. For ease of comparability, it may be argued that a 
common start date, such as 1980, would have provided a solid foundation for the 
analysis. In terms of developing parallel chronological analysis, such an approach 
might have proved convenient. It was decided, however, that basing the analysis on a 
common start date would be arbitrary and would deny the spccificity of the social and 
political context of each country, a factor which is central to the comparative aims of 
the thesis. It is for this reason that the national case studies cover a different time 
period. Each examines a time period based upon the relative consistency of political 
leadership in each country. The focus on election manifestos (see below) delimits the 
end dates for the three case studies to the most recent general elections at the time of 
writing, which were in 1997 for France and the UK and 1996 in Spain. 
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The French case study (Chapter 6) begins in 1981, a year which marked the election 
of the first left wing majority in the Assembly and the first Socialist President of the 
Fifth Republic (founded in 1958) and an important break in family policy traditions. 
The period of Socialist dominance of the presidency, in the person of Fran<yois 
Mitterrand, continued until 1995, although there were numerous shifts between left 
and right wing majorities in the Assembly during that time. 
The starting point for the case study ofUK family policy change (Chapter 7) is 1979 
on the grounds that the election of the Conservative party under the leadership of 
Margaret Thatcher represented an ideological break with the period .of 'consensus' 
which had exemplified British politics since 1945 (Kavanagh, 1988). The period saw 
the Conservative party under Thatcher, and later John Major, dominate British politics 
until 1997 and was a period of great change in political ideologies and the place of the 
family therein. 
The political context of the Spanish case study (Chapter 8) is not merely identified in 
terms of the dominance of political leadership. Rather post-I 977 Spain represented a 
new era in the history of the nation. The events following the death of General 
Francisco Franco in 1975 led to the birth of democracy and represent a fundamental 
shift in deep core ideology of the state. The first elections were held in 1977 and are 
thus taken as the starting point of the study of Spain. As with France and the UK, the 
period covered in the national case study largely corresponds to the dominance of a 
single political party, namely the Socialist PSOE and their leader Felipe Gonzalez, 
from 1981-96. 
Analysing family policy change 
Family policy change is examined longitudinally, and conclusions are drawn in 
relation to the key concept of change. The study of changing family policies covers 
Chapters 5-8. Chapter 5 is a key element of the case study section as it provides the 
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historical context for the national case studies in Chapters 6-8. Family policies 
(defined below) are studied from their origins in each country to the start of the study 
period (see above) in the later chapters. While it may be argued that this structure 
(Figure 4.1) breaks the continuity of the study of family policy change, there are a 
number of advantages in relation to the objectives of the thesis as a whole: 
Figure 4.1: Case study structure 
Family policy change in Parallel study of FP and PPI Results of national case 
France, UK and Spain to late change studies of FP and PPI 
1970s compared 
~~ France FP across countries ~ UK PPI across left 
---. Spain 
PPI across right 
FP = family policies, PP! = party political ideologies. 
First, the changes in family policy which are of greatest interest to the present study 
are those which can be related to changes in party political ideologies. This is best 
clarified through the parallel study of these two dimensions in the national case 
studies (Chapters 6-8); second, if family policy change was a separate focus to 
changing party political ideologies, it would still be necessary to cross-reference both 
dimensions in order to maintain balance and context, this would result in substantial 
repetition; third, the study of family policy change in Chapter 5 serves to 
contextualise the central case studies of the thesis and is not intended as an analytical 
chapter. Failure to contextualise the case studies sufficiently would lead to a lack of 
understanding of significant long-term trends/traditions which may have had a 
significant impact upon party political ideologies and family policies in the study 
period. Longer study periods which would cover the origins of family policy were 
rejected on the grounds that practical limitations would result in insufficient depth of 
study, consistent collection of data would be hindered and, as shown earlier, 
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comparative parameters would be lost in relation to political regimes, notably Vichy 
in France and Franco's Spain. 
The three national case studies thus focus on the extent to which family policies have 
changed in each country in parallel with party political ideologies during the study 
period and describe the direction of change in each case in relation to the thematics of 
public/private and family/individual. Given the problems of defining family policy 
(Chapter I) and the potential pitfalls of equivalence of terms in cross-national 
comparisons (see Figure 4.2), eight family policy measures were selected to form the 
basic structure of the analysis. 
Figure 4.2: Framework of family policy measures 
Regulatory measures Support measures 
abortion child benefits 14 
contraception fiscal measures 
divorce maternity leave 
parental authority childcare 
Chapter 2 reviewed existing national and cross-national approaches to the study of 
family policy and showed the potential for confusion in the cross-national 
transference of terms. While one country in this study, France, has a long tradition of 
explicit family policies this is not the case for the UK and Spain (see Chapters 5). To 
overcome problems of definition and comparability, the thesis examines a range of 
eight key family policy measures as opposed to family policy as a whole. 
14 The tenn child benefits is used here to mean cash benefits paid to parents with dependent children. 
The choice of this tenn, as opposed to family allowances, has been dictated by the working language. 
While there may be conceptual differences between counnies, this kind of benefit can still be identified 
in each case (Brin, 1991). 
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While neither the UK nor Spain has all official body of policies called 'family policy', 
there are implicit policies which seek to either regulate or support family life. This 
approach has been adopted following Brin's (1991) conclusions that a focus upon 
policy measures helps reveal family policies in those countries which do not explicitly 
target families as a primary group (see Chapter 2). 
Regulatory policies are represented by laws (either civil or penal) and are thus not 
primarily a burden on a country's finances, although there are exceptions (see below). 
The primary function of regulatory measures is to create the framework for family life 
and may be represented in legal measures relating to marriage (for example consent 
and contract). Regulatory measures may be considered as ideological, embodying 
certain normative beliefs about the relationship between the state and citizens and 
'ideal' family forms and is thus of value to the objectives of this thesis. 
Support measures may represent considerable financial commitment for governments 
in the form of direct financial transfers or provision of services. Given the economic 
implications of such measures, their nature and relative support may indicate the 
relative strength of ideologies relating to specific policy objectives. For example, a 
substantial provision of childcare services may, on the one hand, indicate commitment 
to providing mothers with the choice to take up employment or bring up their own 
children, or on the other hand, it may be interpreted as pushing mothers into work, 
particularly poorer mothers who are seen as a 'burden' on the state. The nature of 
financial transfers is also an important indicator of party political ideology with 
vertical transfers generally pursued by the left and horizontal ones by parties of the 
right. 
The analysis of both family policies and political ideologies in the case studies is 
therefore structured around eight family policy measures which are found in each of 
the three countries. The eight measures, shown below, represent four regulatory 
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measures and four support measures all of which have been addressed in the party 
manifesto samples for each country at various times. While there may be some 
crossing over in the objectives of each measure (for example, maternity leave may 
serve regulatory ends, just as free provision of contraception may be considered as 
support for families), they have been classified in relation to their position within 
political debate rather than their 'real-world' impact upon families for the purposes of 
this study. 
Regulatory measures 
The first of the regulatory measures, abortion, continues to be highly controversial 
and has been strongly opposed on religious (notably by the Catholic Church) or moral 
grounds, as well as within the context of pro-natalist arguments. 
Abortion is supported in the context of women's freedom of choice and its 
legalisation has been interpreted as a sign of modernisation (Guerrero and Naldini, 
\996). Such a controversial issue reveals the strength of ideologies in relation to these 
two positions. Where abortion has been legalised and freely provided by health 
services, it has required some financial commitment by the state. However the moral 
nature of abortion debate situates it firmly within regulatory measures. In addition, 
opposition to abortion is clearly a strong element of right wing party political 
ideology and is, therefore, of particular interest to this study. 
Contraception is closely linked with the themes of the abortion debate and it has been 
opposed both by pro-natalists and by the Catholic Church. In some instances, 
however, contraception has been· seen as a way of reducing the number of abortions. 
In recent times, contraception has been generally supported in the context of women's 
choice and family planning, although its earlier development in the UK was 
associated with Malthusian fears of over-population. 
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Divorce is a measure of central importance in the context of the diversification of 
family forms and individual choice. Its legalisation in Southern European countries 
has been interpreted as an indicator of modernisation. As with abortion, divorce is 
generally opposed by right wing ideologies which support 'traditional' nuclear 
families, and those who consider the breakdown of families as a source of social 
disintegration leading to crime and other anti-social behaviour. This position has 
famously been expressed by the American, Charles Murray (1989) who became 
influential on the ideological position of the Conservative party in the UK from the 
late 1980s. In France the Front National has also interpreted divorce as a sign of 
social breakdown. 
The fourth of the regulatory measures, parental authority, is associated with both 
gender equality and the public/private debate. The term 'authority', as used in the 
context of the present study, may also be understood in terms of 'responsibility' to 
which a shift has been noted in recent years (MilIar and Warman, 1996: 22-3). The 
loaded term 'authority' is maintained for the present study as it primarily holds 
connotations of patriarchy and thus highlights parental authority measures as a means 
of regulating gender relations within families. Equally, reform of patriarchal measures 
generally support equality between the sexes. In a second instance, the authority and 
rights of parents may be subject to state intervention such as in cases of parental 
neglect where the state becomes guardian, thus indicating the relative 'value' of 
parents or the family in bringing up children. This is largely the case in the context of 
the UK. Such policy measures may indicate deep core ideology, in the relationship 
between the state and individuals, as well near core ideologies relating to patriarchy. 
Support measures 
Child benefits represent the most significant of the four support measures examined 
below. Financial support in the form of universal child benefits is a significant 
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indicator of state support for the family as a central component of society. Both the 
real-term value of allowances, eligibility for payment (from the first or second child) 
and the person to whom payments are made (mothers or fathers) may indicate state 
commitment to the family, pro-natalist objectives or the rights of women. Further, 
given the demands such allowances may make on state budgets, the defence of this 
universal benefit in times of economic crisis may indicate the persistence of pro-
natalist right wing ideologies. 
Fiscal measures in the form of income tax allowances have generally considered 
either marital status or number of dependent children. Respectively, such measures 
may indicate support for marriage, or pro-natalist or familist ideologies on the right. 
Given their relation to income tax, such measures have little impact upon poorer 
families. Use of tax relief to support families is difficult to analyse because of the 
complexity and range of taxes in each country. In France tax relief for families is 
highly visible, in the UK income tax relief has focused on married couples but has 
had little impact, whereas in Spain, tax relief for families is very difficult to identify 
but may, in fact, have a significant impact on family budgets (Fernandez Cordon, 
1995)15. 
Maternity leave and child-care, although distinct measures, may be considered 
together in terms of their objectives which are either to protect or support the rights of 
women in paid employment, guarantee rights on return to work and provide pre-
school child-care. Parental leave is also examined under the banner of maternity leave 
as it may indicate support for family ties by enabling both parents to play a part in 
child-rearing. The lack of such measures may indicate anti-feminist ideologies by 
limiting women's choice and encouraging mothers to raise their children at home. 
" At the time of writing Lluis Flaquer is conducting research in to the vast number of tax measures in 
Spain and points to a far greater impact on families than has been previously believed (personal 
communication, 1999). 
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Anti-feminist ideologies relating to women's work may also be indicated by the lack 
of guarantees on return to work after giving birth to a child. 
While it may be argued that the above family policy measures do not represent what 
may be termed family policy as a coherent whole, they have been selected with the 
specific objective of examining the relationship between party political ideologies and 
family policy change. The range of measures covers ideological issues including the 
themeatics of public/private and family/individual, pro-natalism, pro-life stances, 
patriarchy/anti-feminism, limits of state intervention, gender equality, poverty and the 
role of families in society, providing the context and framework for the analysis of 
political ideologies. 
In addition to the policy measures discussed above, the case studies also focus on 
general pro-family statements in the manifestos (see below). Such statements may 
prove revelatory of the symbolic value of the family in the ideology of a given 
political party. Any change revealed through the analysis of this variable is considered 
in relation to the ideological position as represented by the analysis of the eight policy 
measures. 
It is through the focus on pro-family statements that it may be possible to explain the 
absence of certain policy measures in the manifestos as follows: where a party 
expresses no position in relation to abortion, for example, in a state where abortion is 
legal, this may be interpreted as either acquiescence or silent disapproval. The 
examination of this single variable, however, does not provide sufficient information 
in support of either position. If, however, pro-family statements, such as those typical 
of right wing ideology, are present.in the manifesto, it may be possible to interpret the 
absence of the measure as silent opposition, notably in states where abortion is more 
socially acceptable and therefore opposition to it may risk alienating a proportion of 
the electorate. If no such pro-family statements are present but a general left wing, or 
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liberal, ideological position is clear from the other measures, then the absence of 
abortion may be interpreted as stemming from acquiescence, in effect, legal abortion 
is a stable and accepted component of the party ideology in relation to the family. 
Analysing political ideologies 
The analysis of the impact of political ideologies on policy change has been largely 
neglected (Chapter 3) by political scientists in spite of the ubiquitous use of the term. 
The following section examines two notable examples of the substantive study of 
political ideologies and their impact. 
John Clayton Thomas (1975) sought to examme ideological change in a cross-
national context. The objective of Thomas' research was to examine the extent to 
which the impact of party political ideologies had declined in the context of the 'End 
of Ideology' debate which claimed that ideological conflict was no longer present in 
the West (see Bell, 1960; Larrain, 1979; Gann, 1995). In a different study, Elinor 
Scarborough (1984) examined party political ideology and its impact upon voter 
behaviour in Britain and concluded that ideology plays a role in shaping wider society 
(Scarborough, 1984). Both of these studies differ from the vast majority of work upon 
ideology insofar as they seek to explore measurable manifestations of ideology and 
ideologies rather than examining the concepts from a wholly theoretical perspective. 
Thomas' (1975) approach was to collect data in the form of party manifestos and, 
using thematic, quaiitative analysis, to codify the respective ideological position of 
each party in relation to ten issues which he had identified as providing indicators of 
ideology. These issues included nationalisation, secularisation, provision of social 
welfare or constitutional change (Thomas, 1975: 8-11). Political parties from eleven 
countries were examined over a period of between thirty to eighty years depending on 
the availability of data. The ideological position of each issue was scored 
qualitatatively within a ten point range (from -5 to +5). Two independent coders 
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determined the position of each party in relation to the extremes of each scale with 
results being presented in tables for each country (Thomas, 1975). Thomas' analysis 
showed that certain issues were more resistant to change than others across the eleven 
countries. In addition, his results revealed that some issues proved to be more resistant 
to change over time than others, although these were not always the same issues in 
each country, suggesting a 'national' character to political ideologies as discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
In the work of Scarborough (1984), 'ideology' was used as a means of classification, 
rather than as a process. The study was based upon the quantitative analysis of voter's 
opinions in relation to what Scarborough considered as defining elements of each 
party's ideology. Typologies of party ideology (for example Conservative ideology, 
Labour ideology) were developed and results were based upon questionnaire 
respondents' support or not of given policy issues. While this approach was a useful 
means of examining voters' perceptions of party ideology and any possible links with 
voter behaviour (Scarborough, 1984), it did not seek to explain policy change and is 
thus not directly applicable to the objectives of the thesis. In addition, Scarborough's 
(1984) work only examined Britain and therefore did not seek to draw cross-national 
conclusions. 
In contrast, Thomas' (1975) pnmary objective was to examme the evolution of 
ideology in a cross-national context. The element of Thomas' (1975) approach which 
may be most appropriate to the aims of the thesis is his system of ideological issue 
codification. As stated earlier, Thomas used independent coders in the analysis of the 
data. Results were synthesised and presented numerically in tables. The final analysis 
was both cross-national and longitudinal. From this, the author drew his conclusions 
as to the extent and nature of ideological change for the study sample. 
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While this approach was innovative, any conclusions drawn are problematic for four 
reasons: first, Thomas' statements of extremes of opinion, although informed, may be 
criticised as being arbitrary; second, the interpretation of these statements is carried 
out by the coders who may, in turn, interpret the statements differently either from 
one another, or from Thomas; third, the coders worked on translations of the original 
documents which may have resulted in involuntary distortion either by the different 
translators or the coders; fourth, as a result of the large number of countries studied 
(11), the very long time span (up to 80 years) and the fact that only two researchers 
carried out the coding, the study was open to the possibility of misinterpretation of 
data due to a lack of knowledge of both, or either, the cultural or historical context in 
which the manifestos were written (see below). 
The first and second of the above limitations to Thomas' approach are perhaps the 
most problematic if applied to the thesis. Thomas attempted to avoid subjectivity in 
classification by using independent coders, a method which cannot be used in the 
present study and may ultimately result in subjectivity of conclusions. The third and 
fourth limitations are less problematic in the present study than in Thomas' work 
given the linguistic competence and experience of the author. As a result, while 
Thomas' work provided a revelatory contribution to the study of ideology, the 
specific method of codification and subsequent quantitative analysis are open to 
criticism on the grounds of subjectivity. 
The above limitations do not, however, necessitate a complete rejection of Thomas' 
work. On the contrary, Thomas demonstrated that it may be possible to measure the 
impact of party political ideologies and thus provides a valuable starting point for the 
exploration of the hypothesis posited in this thesis. It is possible to apply Thomas' 
basic method of comparing party manifestos cross-nationally and over time in order 
to provide an indicator of any relationship between party political ideologies and 
family policy change. In addition to the study of party political ideology it is also, 
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therefore, necessary to study changing family policies in order to compare the two 
and draw conclusions about any relationship. This relationship has not, at the time of 
writing, been the focus of research. Perhaps the most useful contribution of Thomas's 
approach, for the aims of this study, however, was his selection of party manifestos as 
an expression of 'ideological position'. 
Criteria for data selection 
One of the most problematic questions to arise in the present study relates to the 
selection of sources to provide an indicator of party political ideology. A wide range 
of data sources were examined and considered in the methodological development of 
this thesis. These included minutes of party conferences, transcripts of political 
debates, survey/questionnaire data, interviews with key actors and secondary analyses 
of party political manifestos. 
The minutes of party conferences, while providing a useful insight into the debate 
leading to policy development by the parties, have the disadvantage of not being fully 
representative of the party as a whole due to the fact that the individualised nature of 
some debate may lead to further distortion of position. If further examination of 
specific elements of party ideology is required, notably in relation to specific points, 
historical analysis of the debate upon which the party's position was originally 
decided may prove highly valuable. The detailed and measure specific nature of such 
an exercise may point to potential future research projects. 
Transcripts of the debate among policy makers were rejected as they may reflect 
individual actors' views as opposed to the ideological position of the party they may 
represent. While continuing to pose some problems, both of these sources can prove 
valuable for a micro study of the debate surrounding one policy dimension. 
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Survey data in the fonn of questionnaires and interviews with influential actors in the 
process of family policy fonnation are also highly problematic for a number of 
reasons. The most fundamental pitfall in the use of questionnaire or interview 
techniques to examine the concept of ideological and policy change relates to the 
reliability of memory. Interviews can only provide reliable indications of ideological 
position relating to the time of the interview; as the respondent's beliefs may have 
changed over the time period, their recollection of past events may thus be distorted. 
Additional problems associated with these techniques included: the possibility of 
'leading' answers through use of unintentionally loaded questions, this is of especial 
importance in relation to identifying ideologies; the practical problems associated 
with establishing contact with key actors from the 1970s and 1980s; practical 
difficulties in arranging interviews with a large number of individuals as 
representatives of twelve parties across three countries; the reliability of an 
individual's interpretation of the ideology ofa political party. Infonnation collected in 
the fonn of interviews may have the advantage of providing particular insight into the 
background of particular questions, and, if combined with the other sources discussed 
here, would fonn the basis for a highly rigorous study. As with the other potential 
sources, interviews could be employed in future research projects seeking to examine 
micro questions. 
Given the rejection of the above potential indicators of party political ideology, the 
utility of manifestos was examined, notably in light of their centrality to the Thomas 
(1974) study of change and political ideologies. Party manifestos were considered as 
representing an indication of party political ideologies. They are generally debated, 
voted upon and agreed democratically either at a party congress or by a party 
'cabinet'/elite. Although there may be conflict over content among individual party 
members, manifestos can be considered as representing the party's ideological 
position at a given point in time or, according to Martin Rosenbaum, they serve as 'an 
authoritative proclamation of party policy issued at election time' (1997: 210). It is, 
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however, important to underline the rhetorical nature of election manifestos, they may 
be either a consistent ideological expression, or a transient reaction to short-term 
issues that are perceived as being populist responses to the wishes of the electorate. 
The use of party manifestos in the present study thus relates directly to ideology and 
the key concept of change. As outlined above, establishing a longitudinal analysis is 
fundamental to the aims of this thesis. The examination of party manifestos make it 
possible to situate ideological positions, through statements, declarations and policies 
in manifestos, firmly in relation to dates of publication thus allowing the key concept 
of change to be studied. 
In addition, all of the parties examined in the case studies published manifestos during 
the time period, allowing for consistency in the sources to be analysed, a necessary 
consideration for cross-national comparison and the drawing of any conclusions 
relating to convergent/divergent trends in party political ideologies. Further, the use of 
election manifestos had the practical advantage that the researcher was able to collect 
a complete set of original documents for all of the parties in the three countries over 
the time scale allowing for consistency in the case study analysis. 
There are, however some pitfalls to basing analysis of political ideologies on party 
manifestos. In certain cases, the electoral ambitions of parties may lead to a 'watering 
down' of party position in order to present a more attractive package for voters. The 
extent to which policy statements in manifestos are turned into real policies after 
electoral success is also unclear, although studies such as the present one may further 
understanding in this area through the comparison of the manifestos with documented 
policy change, although this is not an objective of this thesis. In addition, the use of 
manifestos may have distorted any findings in the present study as a result of the 
presence or absence of themes. Use of a broader data set may have helped to explain 
better any 'absent' measures. Although manifestos are becoming less important 
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indicators of party position in the context of a media culture which has increased the 
importance of the 'sound bite', they served an important communicative function 
during the study period. 
Party manifestos were selected in preference to these other sources as the most 
appropriate data for the analysis of changing party political ideology. Manifestos 
represent a consistent indicator, both cross-nationally for the countries in the thesis 
and historically, of (generally agreed) party political ideologies. The manifestos in 
this study were collected directly from party offices during field work visits to France 
and Spain or from libraries in the case of UK manifestos. The parties selected 
represent the main (more than an average of 5 per cent of the vote at general 
elections) national political parties over the period studied. 
Analysing party political ideology in manifestos 
Political ideologies are studied in longitudinal national case studies within the 
conceptual framework of the eight family policy measures. General election 
manifestos of the main political parties for each country provide the basis for the 
analysis and are examined qualitatively in relation to the eight core measures/themes 
of the framework and pro-family statements. The presence or absence of each of the 
eight family policy measures is examined according to the criteria discussed above. 
The data set of sixty-one hard-copy party manifestos was translated into machine-
readable form using scanning equipment and software. This method was initially 
chosen with a view to carrying out computer-based qualitative content analysis. The 
programmes Atlas and Nud*st were evaluated in relation to the machine-readable 
manifestos. While these packages included some useful thematic mapping features, it 
was felt that the time taken entering analytical parameters was excessive relative to 
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their benefits in the specific context of the present study. However, based upon this 
experience, a simpler approach to coding the documents was developed. 
All of the party programmes were converted into Microsoft Word word-processing 
form. The 'find' feature was used to carry out key word/thematic (phrase) searches of 
the documents l6• Any key words found were highlighted in bold type and entered into 
an index. The result was that documents could be consulted thematically following 
criteria selected specifically by the author in relation to the thematics of 
public/private, family/individual as well other core questions such as state 
intervention and pro-natalism. This approach was particularly beneficial in 
accommodating cultural as well as linguistic differences in terminology: for example 
in the case of 'abortion', although the literal translations avortement and aborto exist 
in French and Spanish respectively, the more common term in legal texts and 
manifestos is interruption volontaire de grossesse or, equally commonly, IVOl7 in 
French. In Spanish, although aborto is used in legal documents, one manifesto 
(PSOE, 1986: 84) significantly contained the euphemism, metodos quintgicos 
anticonceptivosl 8. Without this approach, significant cultural differences and data 
would have been ignored. The converted and coded/indexed documents were 
consulted more effectively than the original documents during the analysis stage as 
cross-referencing was possible and efficient, either in machine readable or hard copy 
form, using in the first instance the 'find' function, and in the second instance, the 
page numbered index and bold type. 
However, some drawbacks were encountered during the scanning process. First, some 
of the older manifestos, in particular the Spanish ones, were of poor quality in paper 
form which led to numerous scanning errors. This was overcome siinply by the 
16 The broadest range of key words/themes possible was used and were based upon the eight family 
policy measures. 
17 Literally, 'voluntary termination of pregnancy'. 
18 Literally, 'methods of surgical contraception'. 
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manual entering of the problematic sections. In spite of this, the majority of the text 
was scanned correctly. One common error in the scanning of the foreign language 
documents was the misreading by the scanning software of accented characters. Other 
scanning errors resulted from the wide range of formats and fonts used in the original 
documents. The most common error of this type was the failure of the software to 
recognise column breaks. In spite of the initially time-consuming exercise of scanning 
the sixty-one party manifestos, and the subsequent indexing process, the benefits in 
time gained and accuracy of analysis clearly outweighed the earlier disadvantages. 
Identifying the relationship between ideology and changing family policies 
If only national case studies were used it would not be possible to answer more than 
two of the seven research questions: To what extent have family policies changed? To 
what extent have political ideologies relating to the family changed? As the objective 
of the thesis is to examine the extent to which common factors can be identified in the 
relationship between party political ideology and family policy change, it was 
necessary to do more than consider these cases in parallel. The final analytical stage 
of the thesis therefore employs cross-national comparative methods to examine 
convergence/divergence across the parties and policies over time, across ideological 
boundaries and across the three countries in order to address the research questions 
(Chapter 1). 
The cross-national comparison of countries facing similar problems in relatively 
similar social, political and economic contexts, such as OECD countries (Rose, 1986) 
may suggest either positive or negative policy lessons (Heidenheimer et al., 1990) as 
well as shed light on the relationship between party political ideology and changing 
family policies. Thus, comparing the different ways in which different countries 
address similar problems may identify parochial assumptions or phenomena which 
would not have become clear from a single-country study (Rose, 1986; Heidenheimer 
et al., 1990), although a three country study cannot make claims to universality. 
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A second aim of comparative study reflects the cross-national nature of some areas of 
public policy. On questions such as the environment, immigration and supra-national 
institutions, the problems faced by policy makers are themselves cross-national, 
thereby highlighting the benefits of comparisons for policy learning. Although this 
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was not the case for family policy during the study period, increasing worker mobility 
in the EU and the subsequent need to transfer entitlement to contributory or other 
benefits has future cross-national implications. 
The third reason for companng policies cross-nationally relates to developing a 
greater understanding of questions about political systems, the policy process and 
policy change (Heidenheimer et al., 1990). This aim is clearly less of an applied 
undertaking than those presented above, and is generally limited to theoretical 
research. It is, however, applicable to the present study given its objectives of 
understanding political ideologies and policy change. 
The major issues of cross-national comparison include conceptualisation of research, 
selection of countries, selection of data and language barriers. All of these issues have 
been addressed above. The results of the national case studies are compared in the 
following ways: 
• Policy change over the study is compared across the three countries. This level of 
comparison reveals the extent to which family policies have evolved across three 
countries. 
• Changing political ideologies are compared across national boundaries, right and 
left wing parties are compared separately to identifY the role of 'the family' in each 
party's political ideology through a focus on public/private and family/individual. 
• The third level of comparison brings together the results of the family policy and 
party political ideology dimensions in order to examine the extent to which change 
in each can be seen to represent convergent! divergent trends. Here the distinction 
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between right and left provides an indicator of which political ideologies may have 
had the greatest, if any, impact upon family policy change . 
• Finally the thesis concludes (Chapter 9) with the examination of causality in the 
relationship between changing family policies and political ideologies and relates 
the results to the discussion of concepts of ideology (Chapter 3). 
Chapter 5 - CHANGING FAMILIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
FAMILY POLICIES 
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The present chapter sets out the context for the substantive case study approach of the 
thesis through a focus on statistical indicators of population and family change and a 
historical analysis of the origins and development of the eight family policy 
framework measures (Chapter 4) and the nature of state intervention therein (Chapter 
3). The descriptive approach to changing family policies also reveals the central 
themes of family policy debate in the three countries in preparation for the analysis of 
political ideologies in Chapters 6-8. The statistical analysis covers the case study 
period from the 1970s to the second half of the 1990s, whereas family policy change 
is studied up to the start dates of the national case studies, thus providing a clear 
context for the parallel analysis of changing family policies and party political 
ideologies in France (Chapter 6), the UK (Chapter 7) and Spain (Chapter 8). 
Socio-demographic change and families 
The following section focuses on statistical data which examine trends in population 
growth, family formation, divorce and familylhousehold types. This approach serves 
to highlight the key statistical indicators within which political debate evolved during 
the study period. It may be argued that, given the centrality of the concept of abstract 
ideologies in the present study, statistical data or 'facts' may bear little relation to the 
policy concerns of the parties. However, the analysis of the party manifestos has 
revealed sufficient references to population and family statistics to warrant their 
closer examination. The following study of statistical indicators provides a control 
against which it is possible to measures those quoted by political parties in order to 
demonstrate any distortion offacts to meet political ends. 
If the above objective is to be met, it is necessary to examine 'reliable' data sets. In 
addition, the comparative dimension of this study requires that data be as harmonised 
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as possible across the three countries. It is for these two reasons that this study is 
based predominantly on data compiled by Eurosta!. The advantages of these data are 
numerous. They are collected using similar techniques for all EU member states and 
are regarded as reliable and comparable sources. Eurostat has collected a wide range 
of data which examine population trends and family forms. The studies are regularly 
updated either in the periodical Demographic Statistics and major publications such 
as Recent Demographic Developments in Europe (l996) from which the majority of 
the data in this section were taken. In addition, the vast majority of cross-national 
comparative studies of EU member states consulted during this research project have 
used Eurostat data, thus developing them as a standard reference point within the 
field. 
In spite of the relative merits of the data sets examined below it is important to remain 
objective in their interpretation. In addition to cautionary notes in Eurostat 
publications, Christophe Lefranc has warned against over-reliance on this type of data 
stating that, 'as with all findings produced from theoretical constructs, statistics 
always contain an element of subjectivity, and they are therefore far from representing 
the whole truth' (l996: 9). Statistical indicators are often used by the political parties 
in this study as representations of 'truths'. Their use as such, given Lefranc's 
argument, must be interpreted with caution. Indeed where parties do employ 
'statistical truths' in defence of their position great care must be taken to situate them 
in their proper ideological context before any observations may be made. This is 
exemplified in the highly loaded and out-of-context use of statistics by the Front 
national (see Chapter 6). In spite of the pitfalls of using statistics, such data can play 
an influential role in the formulation of policy and opinion, although establishing any 
kind of causal link may prove impossible (Hantrais and Letablier, 1994: 8). 
The socio-demographic transformations examined below are represented in a 
polarisation of opinion about families. On the one hand, these transformations, which 
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have resulted in the development of alternative family forms (MilIar and Warman, 
1996: 6), have been defended notably by the political left and feminist commentators, 
many of whom have identified the traditional, nuclear family as, 'a primary site, if not 
the primary site, of women's oppression' (Barrett and McIntosh, 1991: 20) (original 
emphasis). On the other hand, the supporters of the family and the political right have 
pointed to the relationship between the breakdown of the 'traditional' or 'natural' 
family order and the collapse of society or the nation, as exemplified in an address to 
the European Parliament Committee on Social Affairs and Employment by Mrs M. L. 
Cassanmagnago Cerretti quoted in The Anti-Social Family: 
It is striking that the widespread disintegration of the concept of the family as the 
nucleus of society, the increasing instability in family relationships reflected by the 
spread of cohabitation and divorces, the new position of women in society and their 
wish to work, the crisis in traditional moral values, the falling birth rate, which is now 
approaching or even falling below the rate required for the population to renew itself, 
are trends common to all the countries of Europe, even if they vary in intensity. Thus 
the future and the very survival of these countries are at risk. (Barrett and McIntosh, 
1991: 11-12) 
The above two positions form the opposing poles of debate surrounding the familyl9. 
The extent to which these positions have been support by the political parties is the 
focus of Chapters 6-8, the following section examines the extent to which statistical 
indicators reveal the increased diversification of families in France, the UK and 
Spain. 
Population trends 
Study of the historical origins of family policy is intrinsically linked with questions of 
population policy and policies to combat poverty (Dumon, 1990). The concern with 
the growth or decline of the population has left its mark on family policies relative to 
trends in each country. For example, countries which have identified falling birth 
rates and stagnation of total population as a problem might be expected to pursue 
I' 'The family' is used here intentionally because of its nonnative undertones in the debate. 
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some form of pro-natalist policy, as in the case of pre-1980s France. Conversely 
policies to control the population through various measures, such as the introduction 
of free contraception or better sex education, may be expected in countries fearing 
over-population. Table 5.1 shows the total population for each country and highlights 
similarities between the populations of France and the UK, although the stagnation of 
the French population during the first fifty years if the twentieth century helps explain 
the prominence of pro-natalist arguments in early family policy debate. The 
population of Spain can be seen to have grown steadily, as can that of the UK. 
Table 5.1: Population size (in thousands) 1900-96 
I France ! UK I Spain 
1900 38,451 I 36,554 18,594 
1920 38,798 I 42,769 21,303 
-1950 39,848 48,854 ~ 27,977 1970 49,655 53,979 33,824 
1981 54,029 56,341 I 37,636 
1991 56,893 57,684 I 38,876 
1996 58,265 58,697 I 39,242 , 
Source: Mitchell, 1978: 4-8 and Eurostat, 1996: 23 
Total population size does not fully reveal the extent of growth or stagnation, Table 
5.2 thus presents natural increase data which take into account the dimension of 
population renewal, a concept used widely in pro-natalist contexts. 
Table 5.2: Rate of natural increase (excess births over deaths) 1970-95(%) 
France UK Spain 
1970 0.61 0.45 l.ll 
1980 I 0.47 0.16 0.75 
1990 i 0.42 0.27 0.18 
1995 I 0.34 0.15 0.03 I 
Source: Eurostat, 1996: 25 
The most striking feature of the data in Table 5.2 is the rapid fall in natural increase in 
Spain notably during the I 990s. The highest in the comparison rate was recorded for 
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1970 during the Franco regime. Natural increase in both France and the UK has 
declined over the period although 1990 stands out an exception to this trend in the 
UK. 
Total fertility rates are also widely cited by politicians in the context of pro-natalist 
arguments. Table 5.3 shows a common decline in fertility across the three countries. 
While decline in France and the UK is very similar, the rate for Spain falls sharply 
after 1980 dropping to the lowest rate in the comparison by 1995. As with natural 
increase trends, this acceleration of fertility decline is record in the post-authoritarian 
period. 
Table 5.3: Total fertility rate 1970-93 
France I UK Spain I 
1960 2.73 2.72 2.86 
1970 2.47 2.43 2.90 
1980 1.95 1.90 _. 2.20 
1990 1.78 1.84 1.33 
1995 1.70 I 1.70 1.18 
Source: Eurostat, 1997: 116-17 
The above data reveal a common decline in fertility and natural increase which is not 
revealed by the focus on total population size. Of additional importance it the 
existence of internal disparities in fertility. Variations within countries may be 
understood in terms of regions, socio-economic groups or ethnicity. These factors are 
significant in terms of the political debate, notably in relation to the nationalistic 
stance of the FN in France, but are difficult to examine statistically especially in 
France where collection of data relating to ethnic origin is highly problematic. 
A further issue within the population debate which also raIses questions of 
diversification of family forms is the number of births outside marriage. These data 
have been identified as being generally easy to record and are thus reliable (Hantrais, 
1999: 20). 
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While similar trends were observed for the three countries in total population, natural 
increase and fertility, the extramarital birth data reveals Spain as a distinct case. 
Although the rate of extramarital births has been much lower in Spain than in France 
or the UK, it has grown relative to that ofthe other countries. 
Table 5.4: Births outside marriage (per 100 live births) 
France UK Spain 
1970 6.9 8.0 1.4 
1980 11.4 11.5 3.9 
1990 I 30.1 27.5 9.6 
1995 I 37.2 33.6 10.8 
Source: Eurostat, 1997: 110-11 
As with the decline in fertility this trend is accentuated significantly after the 
Transition to democracy. Extramarital births in both France and the UK represent a 
notable portion of all births which suggests a combination of trends including decline 
in marriages, an increase in cohabitation, a greater proportion of lone-parent families, 
growing divorce rates and the general diversification of family types. All of these 
trends have significant implications on family policy and are thus examined below. 
Diversification of family forms 
During the period examined III Chapters 6-8, debate relating to questions of 
population size became increasingly marginalised in the light of what has been 
interpreted as a crisis in the traditional family. In all three countries studied the 
common indicator of family formation had long been marriage. Marriage has been a 
key element of official recognition of the family. Indeed, the definition of a family for 
statistical purposes at the time of writing continued to be, 'a married couple without 
children or a married couple with one or more never-married children of any age or 
one parent with one or more never-married children,' significantly' 'married' in this 
definition includes consensual unions (United Nations Statistical Commission, 1986: 
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35), and thus underlines the symbolic value of the term in relation to family life. 
Table 5.5 shows' a steady decline in marriage rates across the three countries since 
1970. While trends are broadly similar, a generally higher rate is recorded for the UK. 
This decline appears as a common feature of the study period for all three countries 
and may signify a trend towards de-institutionalisation of the family. This indicator 
may, however, not relate the full story, as the decline in marriage in Spain coincides 
with a delay in the age of first marriage. Indeed Flaquer (! 998) has argued that, 
notably among the Spanish middle classes, marriage has continued to dominate 
family formation. Falling marriage rates are thus explained in terms of limited access 
to housing, increased time spent in higher education and the subsequent continuation 
of economic dependence of adult children 'on their parents. 
Table 5.5: Crude marriage rate (per 1,000 population) 1970-95 
France UK Spain 
1970 7.8 8.5 7.3 
-1980 6.2 7.4 5.9 
1990 5.1 6.5 5.7 
1995 4.4 5.9* 5.0 
* 1993 data 
Source: Eurostat, 1996: 33 
Accurate data for rates of cohabitation would be valuable in clarifying disparities in 
marriage rates acros~ countries. In France for example it is illegal to ask couples if 
they are cohabiting and therefore it is difficult to find reliable comparative data 
(Hantrais, 1999: 20). Two comparative studies have examined the question of 
cohabitation, the first (Eurobarometer, 1991) examined cohabitation among young 
people. In a survey of 15-24 year olds, it found that 14 per cent of French and 9 per 
cent of UK young people were cohabiting. In Spain this figure was I per cent. 
Although such data may be unreliable, the very small figure for cohabitation in Spain 
appears to support Flaquer's (\998) analysis. Further the much higher rate for France 
and the UK may also shed light upon disparities in extramarital birth rates. The 
second set of data which may help clarify issues of diversification of family forms 
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and extramarital births comes from Europeans and the Family' (Malpas and Lambert, 
. 1993). Table. 5.6 provides an indicator of the breakdown of national populations by 
marital status. 
Table 5.6: Distribution of the population by marital status(%) 
France Spain UK 
Married without having lived as 32.4 54.9 43.1 
a couple before 
Married after living as a couple 15.4 2.8 10.1 
before 
Remarried 2.8 1.2 3.4 
Single, never having lived with a I 20.1 , 28.2 23.0 , 
partuer before I 
Single, having lived with a 14.3 , 4.1 6.5 I partner before I 
Divorced 4.5 I 0.4 4.3 
Separated 2.1 i 0.8 1.3 
Widowers/widows 7.3 I 7.6 8.2 
Don't know l.l ! 0 0 
Source: Malpas and Lambert, 1993: 14 
While cohabitation is not specifically addressed, possibly as a result of legal 
restrictions in France, the number married or single people having previously lived 
with a partner is significantly higher in France and the UK than in Spain. The 1.1 per 
cent of respondents who did not specifY their marital status in France may also be 
explained by the legal restrictions on surveys of cohabitation. In addition the 
relatively large number of Spaniards who, whether married or single, had never lived 
with a partner before further suggests consensual unions represent only a small 
proportion off ami lies in Spain. 
The larger proportion of those having previously lived with a partner in France and 
the UK can also be understood in relation to divorce rates. Table 5.7 reveals further 
differences between, on the one hand France and the UK and, on the other hand, 
Spain. In this case the divorce legislation of each country is a significant explanatory 
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factor. Both France and the UK legalised divorce before Spairi. In addition, divorce in 
Spanish a two-stage process preceded by legal separation, which is not considered in 
the Eurostat survey. The differences in divorce legislation are also significant when 
compared to the dominant political ideologies in each country (Chapters 6-8). 
Table 5.7: Crude divorce rate (per 1,000 inhabitants) 
France I Spain UK 
1970-4 0.9 n/a (see note) 1.8 
1980-4 1.7 0.4 2.8 
1990-4 1.9 0.7 3.0 
1995 I 2.0* 0.8* 2.9* 
.. 
* denotes provISIonal data 
Note: Before 1981 divorce was illegal in Spain 
Source: Eurostat, 1997 
In this case national data are of great value. Although not presented in the same form, 
Spanish indicators of legal separation and divorce reveal legal separation to be a 
significant form of marital status. In 1991 39,758 legal separations were recorded, 
which is significantly higher than the number of divorces, 27,224 (Alberdi, 1995: 91). 
Data in Table 5.8 focus on a further aspect of family diversification: the proportion of 
lone parent families, as well as the number of children in families, which brings this 
study back to issues of population size and pro-natalist arguments. Negative 
ideological conceptualisation of lone parent families has been a central theme in UK 
family policy debate. 
In spite of disparities in the number of extramarital births and divorce rates, the 
number of lone parent families in Spain is relatively similar to that of France and not 
as far from the UK as in other indicators of family diversity. In terms of policy 
implications the data in Table 5.8 highlight the wide gender disparities of lone 
parenthood in all three countries. 
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Table 5.8: Proportion of families by type and number of children in 1990-91 (%) 
France Spain UK 
Couples without children 35.7 21.9 39.2 
Couples with children 53.9 68.1 47.2 
I child I 21.4 22.4 18.3 
2 children 20:6 28.0 20.0 
3 children 8.5 11.9 6.6 
4 children or more 3.5 5.8 2.3 
Lone-parent families 10.4 10.0 13.5 
Fathers with children 1.5 1.4 1.9 
I child 1.0 0.8 1.3 
2 children 0.3 0.4 . 0.4 
3 children 0.1 0.1 0.1 
4 children or more 0 0.1 0 
Mothers with children 8.9 8.6 11.7 
I child 5.5 4.9 6.8 
2 children 2.3 2.3 3.3 
3 children 0.7 0.9 1.1 
4 children or more I 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Source: Eurostat, 1995: 10-11 
In the context of pro-natalism, the table reveals differences between the countries in 
relation to large families. Although up to two children appears to be the most common 
family type in all three countries in all types of family with children. Again, these data 
do not distinguish between married, cohabiting or reconstituted families and as such 
may underestimate changing family forms. 
Family transformationsand policy implications 
The data relating to population and family diversity have revealed the SOCIQ-
demographic nature of families in France and the UK to be broadly similar, 
characterised by falling fertility and marriage rates, increases in the number of 
extramarital births and divorce. Lone parenthood across the three countries is similar 
although proportionately higher in the UK. IdentifYing consensual unions and 
reconstituted families was shown to be problematic, although the available indicators 
suggest growth in both of these family types. 
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In tenns of their implication for family policy, this section has noted the low rates of 
natural increase which may be translated into worries about renewal of the population 
and indicated in support for family policies with pro-natalist objectives. Indicators of 
diversity of family fonns and increased extramarital births have posed new challenges 
to family policy in all three countries. Growth in lone parenthood, extramarital births 
have implications of parental rights and responsibilities, as well as on financial 
contributions in the context of the publici private debate. 
In symbolic tenns, the statistical indicators point to a privatisation or de-
institutionalisation of families, most notably in France and the UK. This trend is 
conceptualised in tenns of 'family breakdown' in ideologies, notably on the political 
right, where diversity is perceived as a social problem. Given the symbolic nature of 
such political statements (notably by the Conservative party), it is unlikely that these 
are developed into policies, although elements of these arguments may shape policy 
refonn. 
Citation of statistical data in political propaganda has also been highlighted as 
significant in the context of the analysis of political ideologies. Their use as 'truths' 
may be understood in tenns of Sabatier's classification of beliefs and the ideological 
acceptance of nonns by society. Reliance upon empirical evidence in defence of 
beliefs serving an ideological function is a common feature of FN discourse and their 
use (or abuse) by the other parties may prove significant. 
In the following sections the eight framework family policy measures are examined 
from their origins in each country in relation to the political debate in which they 
evolved. In addition, key historical legislation is examined where it is significant in 
the development of family policies examined in Chapters 6-8, such as the Code de la 
famille and the Beveridge Report. The study of policy change and debate begins with 
France, which, compared to the other countries in this study, can be considered as a 
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pIOneer of family policy and an example of the statist tradition. Following. the 
examination of the eight family policy measures in France, the history and evolution 
of family regulation and support in the UK and Spain complete the background to the 
central analysis of changing family policies and political ideologies. 
France: the prehistory and history of family policy 
While the origin of some central themes of French family policy, such as concern 
with dwindling fertility rates and providing support for large families, date back to, or 
before, the French Revolution (Brin, 1991: 35), the most significant period begins 
with the formal institutionalisation of the family as a target for policies, the Code de 
la famille of 1939. Although the Code de la famille was an important move towards 
the institutionalisation of family policies in itself, and is therefore discussed in more 
detail below, the broader period from 1939 to 1946 has.been identified as the point at 
which modem family policies began to emerge in France (Questiaux and Foumier, 
1978: 117-18). 
The debate surrounding family policies since 1939 can be understood" in terms of 
shifting objectives between, on the one hand, the generally left wing ideology of 
vertical redistribution of wealth, rights of individuals and social assistance, and on the 
other hand, the generally right wing ideological concern with the renewal of 
generations, family, population and, in the case of the FN, national identity. For the 
purposes of the thesis, the former position is termed 'social action', whereas the latter 
position is referred to by the French term 'familism ,20. 
According to Laroque (1985: 9), the threat of another German invasion of France in 
the late 1930s was a key factor in the emergence of the Code de la famille. The old 
concern with the de-population of France was again highlighted by the threat of war. 
"'The tenns 'familism' or 'familist' are taken from the French 'familisme' 'familiste' and refer to 
political concern with the moral and social sole of the family, which is, implicitly, a family based on 
marriage and, often, paternal authority (see Lenoir, 1991). 
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The Code de la famille was explicitly pro-natalist and introduced regulatory and, most 
significantly, selective support measures to encourage population growth. 
The Code de la famille was a reinforcement of the legitimisation of state intervention 
in the family sphere in France. A significant element of the Code de la famille was its 
introduction of institutions which explicitly targeted the family which may be 
considered as examples ofldeological State Apparatuses (CNAF, UNAF). 
Since the late nineteenth century France has seen a steady rise in the level of 
institutional integration of the family and family interests. In a tradition stretching 
back to 1789, tensions between the State and the Church led to the statutory 
separation of the two in 1905 (Neant, 1991: 25). The significance of this separation in 
family terms has resulted in an increasing role for the state in the regulation or moral 
'guidance' of the family which had been traditionally the role of the Church. The first 
manifestations of state intervention in the family sphere came with the group of social 
laws, many of which had a family focus, introduced during the period 1900-14 (Brin, 
1991: 37). It was, however, the law of29 July 1939 (Code de la famille) that marked 
the beginning of the process of institutionalisation of French family policy, notably 
with the creation of the post of a junior minister for the family (Bussat and Chauviere, 
1997: 83). 
The concept of the family was further institutionalised in the Constitution of the 
Fourth Republic (1946), while the Constitution of the Fifth Republic (1958) continued 
to underline the nation's duty towards the family (Brin, 1991: 37). Other than 
government institutions such as ministries (which have been inconsistently devoted to 
family issues since 1939) and the Caisse nationale des allocations familiales (CNAF) 
(the agency which .administrated family policy spending as well as supporting 
research), the French family sphere counts a large number offamily institutions which 
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serve as primarily as lobbying groups but also as service providers (see Bussat and 
Chauviere, 1997 and Martin and Hassenteufel, 1997). 
Family associations in France have strong historical foundations originating in the 
'right to association' law of I July 1901 (Martin and Hassenteufel, 1997: 79). Even 
before the formal acceptance of family associations, mobilisation of family interests 
began to fall into two broad categories: those concerned with the demographic 
stagnation of France, and those who feared for the moral welfare of the family in the 
light of growing anticlericalism, which culminated in the legal separation of the state 
from the Church in 1905. 
These two burgeoning trends in family interest groups came to dominate thinking and 
debate surrounding family policy in twentieth century France and are referred to as 
'natalism' and 'familism' respectively (Bussat and Chauviere, 1997). Along with the 
older trends in family association mobilisation, an increase in the number of 'special' 
interest associations (focusing on lone parents, adoption, families with handicapped 
children) developed in the 1960s (Martin and Hassenteufel, 1997: 82-6). Although 
there are many different associations which claim to represent family interests, the 
overall importance of the family and its representation in the public sphere is 
underlined by the existence of a national body which continued to bring together all 
family associations in France at the time of writing . 
. While the first half of this century saw the birth of French family associations, the 
institutional acceptance of their role was galvanised with the creation of the Union 
nationale des associations familiales (UNAF) in the law of 3 March 1945 which was 
written into the Code de la famille (UNAF, 1977). Its main function is to advise 
policy makers and to provide families with official representation. The UNAF was, 
however, a development of the earlier Loi Gounot which had been adopted under the 
Vichy government on 29 December 1942. The family was highly symbolic in the far-
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right wing Vichy government, which translated the Republican revolutionary motto of 
Liberte, ega/ite, fraternite, into Patrie, jamille, travail (Fatherland, Family, Work) 
which thus emphasised not only the central role of the family in the Nation, but also 
implied the patriarchal nature of the state as political metaphor, as has been identified 
by Commaille (I99Ib) (see Chapter 2). The Loi Gounot continued to play a part in 
the institutionalisation of family associations even after the fall of the Vichy regime. 
In the immediate post-war years, the basic objectives of the law were maintained. 
However, the heavy financial burden of managing family services was transferred to 
the state, thus becoming an Ideological State Apparatus, and it was, in effect, 
'recreated' to become the UNAF which continued to be the representative of all 
member associations at government level. One significant difference between the 
UNAF and its predecessor in terms of the conceptualisation of the family, is its 
acceptance of a plurality of family 'types' and an openness to change: its members 
include groups which represent families founded in marriage with biological or 
adopted children, married couples without children and all those who exercise 
parental authority or guardianship of one or more children in their temporary or 
permanent care. Thus, although founded upon a tradition of pro-natalism, 'traditional' 
family values and anti-feminism, the UNAF adapted to the changing nature of French 
families. 
The UNAF is adhered to by one million families in 7,800 local groups making up 
more than sixty national movements or federations of which the eight largest play an 
active managerial role in the national body. Such support provides the UNAF with a 
powerful mandate to push for family measures in the French polity. Despite the 
potential power of the UNAF, its role remains simply to provide its opinion about 
proposed texts or measures, making, in theory at least, the attitudes of the families it 
represents known to decision makers. This role, clearly ends once a proposal becomes 
law. The legal, institutional status of the UNAF prevents it from opposing measures 
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become law, therefore it functions as a permanent advisory commission as opposed to 
a lobby (Martin and Hassenteufel, 1997: 113). 
Family policy measures in France 
By the late I 940s the family was firmly established as a legitimate primary group for 
state intervention in the French polity and public life. The remainder of this section 
focuses on the framework of eight family policy measures, their evolution and the 
origins of those political ideologies most strongly associated with them. 
Abortion 
Given the strength of the pro-natalist movement in the late 1800s and first half of the 
1900s in France, it is not surprising to find that debate surrounding abortion was 
influenced by demographic concerns as well as moral ones. While abortion in France 
was associated with prostitution and adultery (Accampo et al., 1995; Ranum and 
Ranum, 1972) pro-natalists such as Paul Strauss spoke out against illegal abortion as 
an important cause of France's demographic crisis (Pedersen, 1993; 366). While the 
crime of abortion or infanticide was outlawed under Christian law, this took on an 
institutional guise in Article 317 of the 1810 Napoleonic Penal Code. Under this law, 
women who had sought an abortion were liable to imprisonment, although the 
greatest penalties were reserved for the abortion practitioners who were subjected to 
longer sentences with hard labour (Accampo et al., 1995: 183). Article 317 of the 
1810 Code remained unchanged until the 1920s when increasing concern with 
France's failure to renew hits population led to the law being amended on 23 July 
1920 to make it easier to prosecute abortionists. The motion was passed by 500 votes 
for, to 50 against (Bouchardeau, 1992). By 1939, anti-abortion measures became an 
integral part of the Code de la famille (Pedersen, 1993) and each brigade of the police 
mobile had a special section charged with targeting abortionists (Bouchardeau, 1992). 
Thgese penal measures are also a clear demonstration of the althusserian concept of 
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Repressive State Apparatuses (Chpater 3). Under the Vichy regime abortion took on 
the status ofa crime against National security. The law of 15 February 1942 regarded 
abortion as treason and was punishable by the death penalty (Off en, 1991). On 30 
July 1943 a laundry woman was guillotined after having been found guilty of carrying 
out 26 abortions (Bouchardeau, 1992). 
After the Liberation, French attitudes towards abortion became increasingly liberal 
following campaigns by women's rights groups, such as Association Choisir (1973), 
and politicians such as Franc;:ois Mitterrand (Bouchardeau, 1992). The great change in 
attitudes came in 1972 following the highly publicised trial of a 17 year-old girl who 
had an abortion after becoming pregnant as a result of being threatened and coerced 
into having sexual intercourse (Association Choisir, 1973; Gouaze, Mouillaud, 
Serverin and Tetu, 1979). Abortion, or Interruption volontaire de grossesse (IVG) 
(voluntary termination of pregnancy) was legalised under strict conditions on the 17 
January 197521 • The law allowed for voluntary abortion to be performed by doctors 
up to the end of the tenth week of pregnancy and was adopted in the first instance for 
a period of five years. The law of 17 January 1975 was voted definitively on 30 
December 1 979,significantly, under the right wing government of Jaques Chirac 
(Bouchardeau, 1992) although it was not free as part of the health service in spite of 
its being predominantly justified on medical grounds. 
Abortion in France has been a highly controversial issue and debate has been sharply 
polarised, with both sides appearing steadfast in their position. In ideological terms 
the right has traditionally opposed abortion on moral and pro-natalist grounds while 
the left has sought decriminalise it in the context of policies aimed at supporting 
women's rights. Its legalisation resulted from strong campaigning and a change in the 
dominant ideological position dating from the Napoleonic period. However the 
21 Loi no. 75-17 du 17 janvier 1975 relative a l'interruption volontaire de la grossesse, Paris, Journal 
Officiel de la Repub/ique Fran,aise, pp. 8103-6. 
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refusal of the state to finance terminations may represent a reluctance to cause further 
conflict with anti-abortion lobbies. Although equally, this may be interpreted as not 
going far enough by pro-abortionists. 
Contraception 
In social terms, contraception had long been considered the equal of abortion either in 
terms of defiance of God or 'Nature' (Ranum and Ranum, 1972), its threat to 
population growth (Pedersen, 1993) or its associations with prostitution, adultery and 
immorality (Accampo et al., 1995). Further, the political left and right were, up to the 
post-war period, largely divided on the issue of contraception as they had been over 
abortion. While the left were largely in favour of the liberalisation of contraception, 
the right wing parties opposing contraception on the grounds morals and national 
security. However, while abortion was legislated against under the Penal Code, 
methods of contraception, notably condoms, were available from tobacconists and 
brothels from the mid-1800s although they were relatively expensive, at 
approximately half a woman's daily wage (Accampo et al., 1995: 179). After the first 
world war they became cheaper and' more widely available in spite the Law of 23 July 
1920. which criminalised the advertising of birth control methods and techniques 
(Pedersen, 1993: 131-2). The most outspoken critic of contraception was Femand 
Boverat who saw the falling birth rate as a direct result of the use of contraceptive 
methods (Boverat, 1924) and likened the voluntarily childless man to a traitor who 
should be ashamed to walk by a soldier's tomb or cry, 'Vive la France' (Boverat, 
1923: 284). Expressing the extremely deep core ideology of the value of children to 
the French nation. 
By the late 1950s France was entering the 'baby boom' and family planning had 
becoming increasingly acceptable in the light of decreasing concerns with 
depopulation and a growth in the women's movement. In spite of this, the 
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advertisement of contraceptives remained under strict control (Bouchardeau, 1992). 
During the period up to 1981 availability of contraceptives became increasingly 
widespread and there is little evidence of political opposition. The change in attitudes 
towards contraception in France is closely linked with the diminishing concern with 
population renewal. In this case empirical evidence about fertility was instrumental in 
a change in attitudes which eventually brought about policy reform. 
Divorce 
Thc origins of French political attitudes towards divorce are intrinsically linked with 
the development of Bourgeois revolutionary thought. The separation of state and 
Church was a central strand to this thought and the logical result was the introduction 
of civil marriage in the constitution of 3 September 1971 (Copley, 1989). Divorce 
became justifiable under one of the founding principles of the Revolution, Liberte. 
This was on two distinct grounds; first, marriage was merely a 'contract' and as such 
was not indissoluble; second, by liberating couples from an unhappy or unproductive 
relationship, divorce would encourage reproduction by allowing individuals a second 
chance. This second argument was contextualised in the revolutionary 'right to 
happiness' (Copley, 1989), but does, however, echo the recurrent obsession with the 
fertility of France in legislation seeking to regulate the family. 
This liberal attitude resulted in a divorce rate of the eighteenth century resembled that 
of the late twentieth century, with one in three marriages in Paris of 1793 ending in 
divorce (Copely, 1989: 22). Although such a high rate may be explained by an initial 
high demand from couples taking advantage of the new legislation (see also Chapter 8 
in relation to Spain). 
By 1803 divorce was opposed under Napoleonic law and stricter controls relating to 
the length of separation before divorce proceedings (from one to three years) and 
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more restricted grounds for divorce were introduced. By 1816 divorce was abolished. 
and a system of separation; which presumed the eventual reconciliation of couples, 
was introduced (Copley, 1989: 89). In spite of campaigns during the 1830s to 
reintroduce divorce (Phillips, 1991: 130), it was not until the Third Republic that 
divorce based upon matrimonial fault returned to the statute books in the form of the 
Naquet law of 27 July 1884 (Copley, 1989:113). Over the I 920s-30s, the Naquet law 
was gradually liberalised in relation to grounds for divorce. By 1940, however, the 
highly conservative objectives of the Vichy regime resulted in a tightening of the 
criteria for divorce. According to Roderick Phillips (1991) it is difficult to examine 
the statistical effects of the Vichy divorce reform, however the intentions of the 
legislation were unambiguous given the pro-family/pro-natalist objectives of Vichy 
family reforms (Phillips, 1991: 203-4). 
Divorce legislation changed little during the Fourth Republic and the early part of the 
Fifth Republic (1946-75), although its character was closer the laws of the Third 
Republic rather than those of the Vichy regime (Copely, 1989). This changed 
following the student protests and general strikes of May-June 1968, and by 1975 
divorce laws were liberalised (law of 11 July 1975) to include a wider range of 
grounds including mutual consent and a shorter period of separation, although this 
was not to the satisfaction of women's groups, and, indeed, men's groups who 
opposed the predilection of judges to award custody of children to the mother 
(Copely, 1989: 204-215). By the end of the 1970 legal divorce was an established part 
of French family law, although controversy in some area remained (see Chapter 6) 
Parental authority 
No element of state intervention into the family sphere is a greater indicator of gender 
inequalities than the regulation of the authority of parents. Commaille (199Ia; 1991b) 
examined the use of the family as a metaphor for the state and outlined the lineage of 
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the legitimacy of the patriarchal state from fathers, through the head of the state and 
ultimately to God (Commaille, 1991a: 265). It is within this idea of patriarchy that the 
stability of the family as an institution is conceptualised as the key to the maintenance 
of social order. The question of authority within the 'private' domain of the family is 
a common element of the policy dimensions examined in the thesis (see Chapter 6). 
Questions such as the recipient of family benefits, discrepancies between husbands 
and wives in divorce cases or the relative value of women's employment in relation to 
maternity leave or childcare provision. 
The dominance of the patriarch was well established across Europe from the middle 
ages (Mendras, 1997) and became most clearly represented in inheritance practices of 
the aristocracy which were generally based on transmission of property from father to 
eldest son, with daughters and younger sons being effectively disinherited through 
dowries or becoming established in a profession (Mendras, 1997: 154-5). 
Post-revolutionary France saw no major changes in parental authority, the head of the 
family remained the father with the only exception to this being widowed mothers 
(Brin, \991: 36). By the inter-war years, and as a result of the growing strength of 
feminist movements, measures were taken to increase women's rights to participate in 
matters of parental authority concerning issues such as consent to their children's 
marriage and educational decisions. By 1942, the advice of the mother became equal 
to that of the father in all matters relating to children (Off en, 1991), although it was 
not until 1965 that full equality between spouses on all matters was legally introduced 
(Rubellin-Devichi, 1990). Evelyne Sullerot clearly interprets this as a case in which 
ideas preceded policy change (Sullerot, 1992) given that political ideologies changed 
over twenty years before legislation was introduced. The full reforms were finally 
voted into the civil code in 1970. As a result of this legislation mothers were 
increasingly awarded custody of children in cases of divorce, a development which 
has also been interpreted as shift away from the dominant right wing, patriarchal 
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ideology: 'Cette legislation n'est pas le resultat de la retlexion perverse d'un 
technocrate en del ire: c'est le fruit de la necessite sociale, it la suite de siecles de 
desinten:t des peres pour les enfants legitimes, de difficultes des meres celibataires ou 
divorcees, de rancoeur des enfants abondonnes' (This legislation is not the result of 
the perverse reflections of a delirious technocrat, it is the fruit of the social necessity 
which comes from centuries of disinterest from fathers' about their legitimate 
children, the difficulties of never married or divorced mothers and from the rancour of 
abandoned children) (Dekeuwer-Defossez, 1988: Ill) 
Child benefits 
When examining the level of public spending on the family in France, it is important 
to distinguish between prestations and allocations. Prestations (literally 'benefits') 
familiales is used in the French context to refer to the range of financial and support 
measures which target the family including housing benefits, lone parent benefits, 
benefits for disabled children and so on. Allocations (literally 'allowances')familiales 
refers to a single policy instrument, which comes under the umbrella teim prestations 
familiales, and is a payment to families with children from the contributory scheme 
which seeks to redistribute resources horizontally from families witho.ut dependant 
children to. those with children and is understood in the thesis as 'child benefits'. 
Perhaps the most concrete indicator of government commitment to a given policy area 
is provided by the level of financial resources allocated to it. In the context of French 
family policy, the most consistent financial support measure has been child benefits. 
The origins of the family benefits can be found in the sursalaire familial (a wage 
supplement for employees with children) initiatives of the late nineteenth century. 
The earliest moves towards a family wage came in the armed forces, most notably the 
Navy in 1860 (Brin, 1991: 53), perhaps not surprising given the strong ties between a 
large population and national security. These early initiatives later spread to other 
areas of the public sector, such as the railways in 1890 and 1892, culminating in the 
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law of 7 April 1917 which introduced the family wage for all civil servants (Brin, 
1991: 53). 
In spite of early family wage initiatives, such as those taken by Leon Harrnel in 1891 
for the workers in his Val de Bois textile mills (Brin, 1991: 53), the private sector was 
relatively slow to follow the example of the state. By the end of the first world war 
however, an increasing number of private employers began to introduce family funds, 
in part, as a result of the campaigning of Emile Romanet in the region of Grenoble 
(Oreyfus, 1965), but also as a result of the growing support of employers for Social 
Catholicism which sought to consolidate capitalism with the social theories of Pope 
Leo XIII (Pedersen, 1993: 63). Although the commitment of private employers to the 
family fund has been interpreted either as Christian inspired benevolence or patriotic 
pro-natalism. Pedersen (1993: 63) suggests that the motivation behind the potentially 
costly family wage lay in the possibility of allowing employers to restrain wages 
during the boom years of the 1920s. Another negative consequence of the family 
wage is highlighted by Brin (1991: 53) who notes that market pressures may have 
resulted in discrimination against employing fathers. 
Whatever the motives of private employers, their efforts led to a comprehensive (if 
voluntary) system of family benefits which, according to Questiaux and Fournier 
(1978: 135-45), paved the way for a full state controlled and compulsory policy by 
1932. Pedersen (1993) goes further, suggesting that the work of the private employers 
did not 'influence the state, they replaced it; their caisses could extract voluntary 
contributions from businessmen that the Ministry of Finance could only dream of 
(Pedersen, 1993: 288) (original emphasis). Indeed she concludes that the subsequent 
central role of family policy in the French welfare state is a direct result of the private 
family wage schemes and their importance in industrial relations (Pedersen, 1993: 
288), as well as the ideas upon which they were founded, which have proved highly 
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resistant to change as demonstrated by the widespread political support of child 
benefits up to the 1980s. 
Child benefits were reformed In 1938 (decret-loi 12 novembre) in an attempt to 
resolve the confusion which resulted from the disparate 'family wage' system 
(Laroque, 1985: 9). Benefits were calculated as a percentage of an average fixed 
salary for each departement and were relative to the number of children; 5 per cent 
extra for the first child, 10 per cent for the second and 15 per cent for the third or 
subsequent children. The introduction of the Code de la farnille in 1939 saw these 
benefits target pro-natalist objectives, favouring large families of three or more 
children. The first Code de la famille reform was to abolish benefits for families with 
one child, although in order to encourage the birth of a first cljild a bonus was payable 
to couples who had their first child within the first two years of marriage. The benefits 
system clearly favoured larger families and payments were calculated at 10 per cent 
for two children, with three or more children receiving 20 per cent (Laroque, 1985: 
10). Although the demographic indicators allayed depopulation fears during the 1950s 
and I 960s, the child benefits system remained intact. By the early 1970s a new 
generation of politicians began to examine the possible reform of child benefits to 
target poorer families. Over the period 1970-72 a number of minor reforms with 
vertical re-distributive aims were introduced. This initiative was, however, short-lived 
and the remainder of the 1970s was characterised once again by right wing population 
fear which Laroque (1985: 25) terms 'neo-natalism' and which culminated in greater 
child benefit support for large families in the reforms of 17 January and 17 July 1980. 
Fiscal Measures 
The Code de la famille introduced fiscal measures as a further pro-natalist tool for 
state intervention in the family sphere. Unmarried people and married couples who 
had not had a child before the third year of marriage were penalised, whereas the tax 
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burden on families with three or more children was lessened. Tax relief based upon 
the number of dependent children was further developed up to 1980 and became a 
characteristic measure of French family policy. The most notable legislative reform 
was the law of 12 July 1977 with the complement familial (CF) or family tax 
allowance which was means tested and had the effect of discouraging women's paid 
work as the household budget was considered as a whole. The CF can be considered 
as incorporating minor elements of pro-natal ism and discrimination against women's 
work. In addition, being a tax credit it serves very limited re-distributive ends given 
that poorer families pay little or no income tax, and is therefore characteristic of right 
wing ideological expressions offamily support .. 
Maternity leave 
Maternity leave in France developed in line with an increase in women's work during 
the 1960s. However, the first significant measures were conceptualised in the context 
of right wing pro-natalism (Fagnani, 1994: 26), rather than the left wing protection of 
working mothers'. rights, and was thus consistent with the neo-natalist approach to 
family policies in France of the 1960s and 1970s. Increases in women's work was 
identified as a cause of falling fertility rates, thus the introduction of 16-week paid 
maternity leave in 1977 (Law of 12 July) and the conge parental (parental leave) 
guaranteed full re-instaternent for up to two years after the birth, although this was not 
paid or covered by social security (Renaudat, 1993). Maternity leave was reformed in 
November 1979, also in line with neo-natalist objectives, significantly with the 
introduction of 26-week leave for the third or subsequent child (Laroque, 1985: 26-7). 
Maternity leave was thus conceptualised within fears about population renewal, but, 
significantly given the growing proportion of women in the workplace, policy makers 
did not attempt to discourage working mothers. 
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Childcare 
French state intervention in the field of childcare developed from the early 1970s 
(Norvez, 1990), in similar a political context to maternity leave. A number of 
different types of collective day care centres were introduced generally gathered 
under the blanket term of 'creches' (see Math and Renaudat, 1997). In the 1977 
initiatives to develop assistance for working mothers, assistantes maternelles 
(childminders) were eligible for professional status after a registration process which 
included medical checks and a 'morality' survey (Math and Renaudat, 1997: 6). The 
measures introduced in the 1970s set out the framework for the future evolution of 
French childcare policies which had originally been intended to serve the objectives 
of both neo-natalism and support for the family-employment mix. The neo-natalist 
element of support for working mothers reveals a certain consistency in family policy 
objectives in France to 1981 which is characterised by the influence of socio-
demographic indicators on political ideologies. This tradition had been well-· 
established since the early 1900s obsession with the 'scientific' conceptualisation of 
state intervention. This emphasis on science recalls Althusser's observations on the 
ideological and non-ideological (Chapter 3). While scientific data may be non-
ideological in the Althusserian sense, their subsequent use as 'truths' is open to 
distortion by political ideologies. This distortion may be revealed in the 'conscious' 
use of inappropriate data to justity policy reform, or in conclusions based upon 
misinterpretations of short term trends. Equally, the institutions which have produced 
much of this research may be considered as further examples of Ideological State 
Apparatuses in the context of French state intervention in the family sphere. 
UK family policies: Beveridge and the post-war consensus 
As with the case of France (Code de la famille, 1939), and, to a lesser extent, Spain 
(reform of the C6digo Civil in 1982), contemporary family policies in the United 
Kingdom can be considered as having evolved from a major legislative reform, 
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namely the Beveridge Report of 1942. The impact of the Beveridge Report on the 
social policies of the UK post-war consensus cannot be underestimated (Hills et al., 
1994). 
In her detailed biography of Sir WilIiam Beveridge, lose Harris (1977) describes the 
origins of the Beveridge Report as a 'tidying-up operation' initiated by the treasury in 
order to bring together the many confusing elements of inter-war social security 
provision in a coherent package (Harris, 1977: 386). By the time of its publication on 
2 December 1942, however, Social Insurance and Allied Services (Beveridge, 1942) 
had evolved into a major policy document of almost three-hundred pages calling for 
wide-ranging and integrated welfare reform. Testimony to the Report's perceived 
importance coni.es in the form of the unprecedented, for a technical, govemment 
publication of this kind, sale of half a million copies (Hills et al., 1994: 18) and the 
report of an alleged mile-long queue at the government book shop in London 
(Beveridge, 1954: 114). Although very much a document of its time serving almost as 
propaganda to war-torn Britain, the .Beveridge Report is the most commonly cited 
historical document in UK social policy debate (Hills et al., 1994: 56) and remained 
significant to social policy debate of the 1980s and 1990s. The impact of the 
Beveridge report on social policies of the post-war consensus was such that the social 
policies and values of the period have been referred to as 'beveridgism' (Hills et al., 
1994) and the subsequent welfare state as 'beveridgian' (Pedersen, 1993: 333-53). 
The Beveridge Report's contribution to family policies and family policy debate rests. 
on two of Beveridge's fundamental assumptions; first, the role of the social security 
system (Beveridge did not use the term 'welfare state') and second, the nature of 
citizenship which is of particular relevance to the present study. Beveridge's ideas had 
developed during a period of mass unemployment in which millions of able workers 
found themselves subjected to what he considered the humiliation of means-testing. 
In Beveridge's view, state social welfare was closely linked with the economy and the 
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market, and as such he saw effective social provision as an important tool for the 
maintenance of a healthy economy (Hills et al., 1994: Chapter 3). The role of social 
security was, therefore, to maintain an effective labour force, and act as a deterrent to 
the 'idleness which destroys wealth and corrupts men' (Beveridge, 1942: 170). This 
latter statement, by employing the term 'men', reflects Beveridge's belief that men 
ought to be breadwinners and women mothers or housewives. Beveridge expressed 
state intervention in terms of establishing the conditions within which individuals 
took responsibility for themselves and their families commensurate with the UK 
context for ideologies of state intervention. 
8everidge's first task In the development of the social insurance system was to 
identify the different target groups and their needs, and it was here that the 
beveridgian concept of citizenship proved a stumbling block to proposed social 
security reform. He placed a high value on the married, working man, seeing him as 
an essential building block for a healthy economy and the foundation of a stable 
society (Beveridge, 1942). In Beveridge's view, giving individuals the opportunity to 
work in the conditions of full employment was the only true test of their right to 
benefit from the social insurance scheme (Pedersen, 1993: 338) a theme which 
continued to be central to UK political ideologies in the study period (Chapter 7). His 
core assumption was that a man's wage should be sufficient to cover not only his own 
needs, but also those of his wife. Beveridge's ideas, however, reflect the social norms 
of the times namely, female dependence and the ideal of the male breadwinner rather 
than deep core patriarchy as in France and Spain. As a result of this assumption, any 
benefits payable to married working men were calculated to cover, not only, their 
needs but also the needs of wives as dependants. In addition, Beveridge did not 
consider employment outside the home as the 'normal' state of married women 
(Pedersen, 1993: 340), and consequently any benefits due to women in dual-eamer 
. families were less than those paid to single working women. This position was 
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defended on the grounds that married women had the support of their husbands and 
therefore had lesser needs than single women (Beveridge, 1942: 7-8). 
The reasons for this apparent penalising of the married working woman may, more 
significantly, rest on the role which Beveridge ascribed to housewives, namely giving 
birth to and bringing up children, summed up in his pro-natalist assertion: 'in the next 
thirty years housewives as mothers will have vital work to do in ensuring the adequate 
continuance of the British race and of British ideals in the world' (Beveridge, 1942: 
53). While such a statement may seem nationalistic to the contemporary reader, the 
historical context in which the report was written, perhaps the lowest ebb in Allied 
fortunes during the second world war, must not be underestimated in the 
interpretation of Beveridge. lanet Beveridge (1954) and Susan Pedersen (1993) 
suggest that by valuing and recommending the provision of support, albeit through 
gendered dependence, for the unpaid work of 'housewives', the Beveridge report 
contains elements of egalitarianism although these may be 'merely rhetorical 
flourishes' (Pedersen, 1993: 339). 
The result of this conception of the dependency of the wife on the husband was a 
curious relationship between male and female citizens and the state. The contract 
between the working man and the state was both direct and public. Whereas women's 
contracts with the state were indirect and private, only coming into effect if their 
husbands-became dependant on state support. Married women's paid employment 
was discriminated against in the insurance system as men's wages were deemed to be 
sufficient to cover the needs of both spouses and women's unpaid work in the home 
was considered as private (Pedersen, 1993: 340). The central contribution of 
Beveridge to family policies was the introduction of universal family allowances 
(later child benefits) which served horizontal re-distributive aims. In addition, his 
assumptions about the role of family members has had a significant effect upon the 
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development of political debate about family issues in the UK and their impact upon 
the political ideologies in the study period is examined in Chapter 7. 
Policy measures for families in the UK 
The lack of a coherent system of family policy in the UK is a common theme of 
comparative studies (Chapter 2). However, as discussed earlier, the implicit nature of 
family policy in the UK may be a reflection of the national context of suspicion of 
state intervention in· 'private' matters. The following section examines the 
development of government intervention in family life within the framework of the 
eight support measures identified in Chapter 4. 
Abortion 
The abortion question in the UK was contextualised in similar terms as that in France. 
Abortion was considered as a 'deadly' sin by the Catholic Church and traditional 
Anglicans and was opposed accordingly (Leathard, 1980: 128). In spite of the general 
belief that the UK was facing over population rather than under population (Wicks 
and Chester, 1990: 110) demonstrated by the absence of pro-natalist policies (Land 
and Parker, 1978: 331) abortion has received opposition in demographic terms. In 
contrast to both France and Spain, the anti-abortion debate was limited to the short 
period of population panic during the late 1930s (Leathard, 1980: 60-2) rather than 
over a longer period. Pro-natalism is thus not a characteristic of right wing ideology in 
the UK. 
Abortion was illegal under the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act although 
custodial sentences for abortionists were far less severe than those in France. In 1928 
for example, Annie Bolton and the Reverend Francis Bacon were sentenced to six and 
fifteen months imprisonment respectively for administering abortificant drugs 
(Simms, 1980:3). It was, however, not for demographic reasons that attitudes towards 
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abortion began to change. Deaths resulting from illegal abortions became a central 
question, and in 1929 the 1861 Act was amended to allow for 'therapeutic' abortions 
although this was ambiguous and difficult to regulate as the definition of therapeutic 
included the patient's mental health based upon doctors' 'good faith' (Leathard, 1980: 
127). 
By 1967 lobbying from pressure groups such as the Abortion Law Reform 
Association (ALRA) and increased concern about world over-population heralded a 
change in the law (Leathard, 1980). The Abortion Act received the royal assent on the 
27 October 1967 and permitted abortion for social reasons up to the twenty-fourth 
week of pregnancy and required the consent of two doctors (Le Faou and Blum-
Boisgard, 1992). The evolution of abortion law reveals differences in the primary 
concerns of family policy makers in France and the UK. Public health concern 
appears as a primary concern in the legalisation of abortion which faced little 
opposition within political ideologies about pro-natal ism or religious/moral, although 
the latter was the stronger source of opposition 
Contraception 
Under UK law it has never been an offence to distribute or use methods of 
contraception although the advertising of contraceptives was, theoretically, subject to 
the 1857 Obscene Publications Act (Leathard, 1980). Controversy began to increase 
after W. W.I. when voluntary birth control clinics began to supply information on 
contraceptive methods, such as Marie Stopes', Society for Constructive Birth Control 
and Racial Progress (Stopes, 1927). In 1922 government policy was made clear in a 
statement by the Home Secretary which said that a court would not consider a 
publication obscene simply because it addressed questions related to contraception 
(Leathard, 1980). In spite of this growing acceptance of contraception and relentless 
lobbying by the Family Planning Association (FP A), the state did not take full 
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responsibility for family planning until 1974, seven years after the legalisation of 
abortion, when contraception became free on the NHS (Leathard, 1980). 
Contraception in the UK quickly lost any immoral connotations. Even British Roman 
Catholics defied Vatican disapproval with 74 per cent practising birth control, of 
which 43 per cent used oral contraception in 1971-72 (Peel and Carr, 1975: 83-4). 
Divorce 
In contrast to the debate surrounding divorce in France and Spain, the case of the UK 
does not rely upon the judgements of the Roman Catholic Church. In addition, it is 
also important to distinguish between Scotland on the one hand and England and 
Wales on the other in relation to the development of divorce law. Divorce in Scotland 
was legalised in 1563 in cases of adultery and was reformed to include malicious 
desertion for up to four years in 1573, remaining little changed until 1938 (Phillips, 
1991: 17). 
In England and Wales it is popularly believed that Henry VIIJ divorced some, if not 
all, of his six wives. This is, -according to Roderick PhilJips (1991), erroneous. For any 
number of reasons including adultery and incest, Henry VIIJ chose to annul his 
marriages in spite of the separation of the Anglican Church from papal control, and 
while other reformist countries such as Germany, Switzerland or the Netherlands had 
legalised divorce, the Catholic principle of the indissolubility of marriage was 
maintained in England until 1858 (PhilJips, 1991: 120-7). The divorce law remained 
relatively strict requiring proof of adultery as the sole grounds. The law was gradually 
liberalised to reflect demands of the women's rights movement and later to include 
mutual consent as sufficient grounds for divorce (PhilJips, 1991: 189-95). The 1969 
Divorce Reform Act22 marked a significant point in the development of UK divorce 
laws by introducing irretrievable breakdown as grounds for divorce. Stein Ringen, 
22 The 1969 Act became effective from 1 January 1971. 
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(1997: 41) cites the 1969 Act as having had a profound impact upon UK family 
relations as represented by the increase number of divorce decrees per 1,000 
population from 2.1 in 1961 to 12.7 in 1987. The first section of this chapter 
demonstrated a higher divorce rate in the UK (2.9) than France (2.0) or Spain (0.8). 
The higher divorce rate in the UK has been presented by the parties as a problem and 
has resulted in much political debate on issue of family breakdown and the negative 
consequences of alternative family forms (see Chapter 7). This theme permeates 
much ofThatcherite family ideology. 
Parental authority 
The inherent patriarchy of the Beveridge report was shown above to have 
compounded gender differences in the family sphere. While mothers had long been 
seen as the parent 'naturally' responsible for the up-brining of children, as 
demonstrated in the 1940s child benefit debate (Pedersen, 1993: 345-6), questions of 
parental authority had been largely absent from political debate in the United 
Kingdom. In practice, British parents have exercised equal authority over their 
children since around the second world war, this equality was only given legal status 
in 1973 (Dewar, 1989). As a result, parental authority in the UK case is understood in 
terms of the public/private debate and state intervention in family life, rather .than an 
issue of gender equality. 
Child benefits 
Child benefits were introduced in 1945 based on the recommendations of the 
Beveridge report (Land and Parker, 1978: 345). The child benefits debate in the UK 
began with conflict over the recipient (see Pedersen, 1993: 343-50). Mothers were, 
however designated as the recipient of the benefits after the second reading of the 
White Paper on child benefits on 8 March 1945 (Pedersen, 1993: 349). In spite of 
Beveridge's view that child benefits (payable from the second child) should 
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compensate families, the value of the benefit remained far behind real term 
subsistence levels, and up to 1975 the benefits were increased on only five occasions 
(Land and Parker, 1978: 346). The Child Benefit Act of 1975 reformed the previous 
system most notably with the introduction of benefits for the first child at a lower rate 
and an increase in their value (Ringen, 1997: 64). The principle of child benefits as 
non-contributory, universal, non-means-tested allowance was maintained over this 
period. 
Fiscal Measures 
While child benefits have been criticised for failing to compensate families 
sufficiently (Land and Parker, 1978: 346), fiscal measures were considered in 1978 
(Land and Parker, 1978: 345) as the most generous form of family support, through 
the Child Tax Allowance that considered children in the calculation of income tax 
liability (Ringen, 1997: 60). This system was reformed in 1975 along with child 
benefits, which had been introduced to offset loss of income through the abolition of 
the Child Tax Allowance (Ringen, 1997: 60). This reform was contextualised in 
debate which centred on the recipient of financial transfers as with child benefits. The 
shift from fiscal measures to child benefits resulted in a shift from the 'wallet to 
purse' (Land and Parker, 1978: 347) as male workers were the de facto recipients of 
tax reductions. 
Maternity leave and childcare 
Policies to support working mothers have traditionally been extremely limited in the 
UK in line with limited state intervention in the private family sphere. Maternity leave 
before the case study period was largely neglected in public policies. Rights for 
pregnant workers were introduced by the Labour government of 1975 (Ringen, 1997: 
50). These rights included reinstatement after pregnancy although there was no 
statutory right to paid maternity leave (Ringen, 1997: 51). Childcare provision has 
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also been underdeveloped. While public day nurseries have provided places for the 
under-fives, only 3 per cent ofpre-school children were cared for in nurseries in 1974 
(Land and Parker, 1978: 359). The low provision of support measures for working 
mothers in the UK contrasts with the proliferation of childcare and maternity leave 
measures in France in the 1970s. Married women's employment grew in the 19608 
and 1970s although, perhaps as a result of limited childcare places, part-time 
employment has been much greater than in France. Beveridge's assumptions about 
the role of women may also be considered as having influence in this area. The 
Beveridge Report explicitly encouraged married women's dependency on their 
husbands as an ideal state. This deep core ideology about gender division of work 
may help explain the inactivity of governments in providing support for working 
mothers up to the late 1970s, although it is possible that the national suspicion of state 
intervention in family life also influenced this situation 
Spanish family policies and political conflict 
The political history of twentieth century Spain has been characterised by, often 
traumatic, change. Five political regimes have governed Spain from the Restoration 
Monarchy (1876) to the liberal democracy installed after the death of the dictator 
General Franco in 1975 (Gilmour, 1985). During this period, despite 'varied 
ideological tendencies' (Guillen, 1992: 119), the fundamental institutions and even 
philosophy behind social policy were preserved from one regime to the next (Guillen, 
1992), suggesting homogeneity of political ideology in relation to social questions 
across political left and right. While this may have been true about social policy as a 
whole, radical changes were introduced during the Second Republic (1931-36) and 
their focus was significantly upon the family. The most notable reforms were in 
defiance of the Catholic Church as demonstrated by the introduction of Article 26 
(passed in January of °1932): Article 26, along with Article 323, was the Second 
Republic's attempt at secularisation, and introduced divorce for the first time in 
23The legal separation of Church and State (Jackson, 1972). 
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Spain. Although there is some disagreement among researchers as to the uptake of 
divorce by Spanish couples24, divorce legalisation was, at the very least, a symbolic 
attack on the authority of the Church which saw the Republic move from one 
extreme, 'a marriage which only death could dissolve', to the other, 'one [a marriage] 
which the two conjoints might dissolve by mutual consent after a paltry [sic] two 
years of conjugal experience' (de Madariaga, 1961: 405). Further refonns included 
the highly controversial right to contraception, abortion, the introduction of civil 
marriage and the removal of the distinction between legitimate and iIlegitimate 
children (Iglesisas and Flaquer, 1993). 
While it is not the objective of this chapter to speculate about the reasons for the 
outbreak of the Spanish Civil War (\936-39) it is important to highlight the symbolic 
weight of the 1932 refonns and the speed with which the Catholic Church's authority 
was reinstated after the viCtory of the Francoist forces in March 1939. The significant 
role of the Second Republic social refonns in increasing the conflict which led to the 
Civil War is underlined by Isabel Madruga (1996: 42). 
The importance of the Catholic Church on the family policies of the authoritarian 
period cannot be under-estimated. Franco explicitly declared that his state would 
follow the 'Iey de Dios seg{!n la doctrina de la santa Iglesia Cat6lica, apost61ica y 
romana, unica y verdadera fe inseparable de la conciencia nacional que inspirara su 
legislaci6n', (Law of God, according to the doctrine of the Holy, Roman Catholic and 
Apostolic Church, the one, true and inseparable faith of the national spirit which wiIl 
inspire the country's legislation)25. The mix of Church authority and isolationism of 
Franco's regime has led to his ideology being tenned 'National Catholicism' 
(Madruga, 1996: 42). 
24Gabriel Jackson writes of the 'relative infrequence of divorce (Jackson, 1972: 56) while Salvador de 
Madariaga reports on a 'long line of ill-assorted couples waiting for the day when the courts would at 
least be empowered to grant them their longed-for liberty' (de Madariaga, 1972: 405). 
"Article 2 of the Ley de Principios del Movimiento Nacional. 17 May 1958. 
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The importance Franco placed on support of the family was clear in the amount of 
Social Security spending devoted to it, more than half of the total welfare budget in 
the early 1960s (Meil, 1994). This concern stems from a fundamental belief about 
state intervention the family sphere and its role in Spanish society. Referred to by Ana 
Guillen as 'Social Catholicism' (Guillen, 1992: 122), the Francoist view of the family 
is described in the Law of July 18 1938 as one of the pillars of the regime within a 
'tradition of Christianity, perfect natural society and the cement of the nation' (quoted 
in Gilmour, 1985). The underlying implications of this and other such statements, 
patriarchal ism, pro-natal ism and antifeminism, were enforced in practice with an 
array of Repressive State Apparatuses in the form of civil and criminal laws (Del 
Campo, 1995). Family policy was so important to the Franco regime that it has 
become regarded as one of the regime's defining features, a factor which has been 
central to interpretation of the post-Franco development of both family policies and 
the presentation of the family in party politics (Valiente, 1995). 
The evolution of Spanish family policies 
Intervention in the family sphere was highly visible under the Franco regime. The 
following section focuses on the eight framework measures from the Second Republic 
to the end of the Authoritarian era. 
Abortion 
The influence of the Catholic Church upon Spanish attitudes towards abortion cannot 
be underestimated. Official links between the state and the Church have been openly 
accepted in Spanish political history, most notably during the forty years of General 
Franco's regime. As such canonical law was considered as the inspiration for the 
Spanish law as set out in the law of 12 March 1938 and Article 2 of the law of 17 
May 1958 (Del Campo, 1995: 120). Further to religious and moral concerns, Franco's 
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National Catholicism was explicitly concerned with the fertility of Spain (Valiente, 
1997) to which abortion was clearly seen as a threat. 
Abortion, and contraception had been permitted during the Second Republic (Iglesisas 
and Flaquer, 1993). After the Nationalist victory of Franco's forces in the Civil War 
however, women seeking abortions and abortionists were punishable under section 
VIII Chapter III of the Penal Code of 13 January 1945. The various articles relating to 
abortion recommended a range of custodial sentences for those women who sought 
out abortion, with the heaviest penalties being reserved for abortion practitioners, as 
in France, especially in cases where threats, violence and intimidation were used to 
gain the consent of women (Del Campo, 1995: 144-6). This strict control of abortion 
continued into the 1970s and became a source of ideological conflict in the 
democratic era (Chapter 8). 
Contraception 
In the eyes of the Catholic Church contraception by any means signalled the 
supremacy of pleasure over the sanctity of canonical marriage which considered 
reproduction as the only valid motivation for sexual intercourse (Tarancon, 1958: 29-
30). This position was reflected in Spanish legislation under which no legal 
distinction was made between methods of contraception and methods of abortion. 
Article 416 of the Penal Code of 13 January 1945 outlaws the possession, 
manufacture, sale, demonstration or marketing of methods, drugs or objects which are 
used for abortion or preventing conception (Del Campo, 1995: 139). 
Divorce 
Divorce had been controversially introduced under the Second Republic (1931-36) 
(see de Madariaga, 1961) and was, at that time, the most liberal divorce legislation in 
Europe (Phillips, 1991: 201-2). Attitudes towards divorce were polarised along the 
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lines which separated the two opposing sides of the Civil War which began four years 
later. The divorce .law of the Second Republic was in clear defiance of the Catholic 
Church and the Nationalists of Franco and was quickly repealed at the end of the Civil 
War by the Law of 12 March 1938 which adopted canonical law as the basis of 
Spanish law, there was, thus, no place for divorce during the Franco years (Del 
Campo, 1995: 120). By the beginning of the Transition period political attitudes to 
divorce were changing, although, as with abortion, opposition to divorce remained 
deep core on the right of the Spanish polity. 
Parental authority 
The question of parental authority is intrinsically linked with that of gender equality 
or differentiation and can also be equated to the metaphor of the patriarchal political 
system as expressed by Commaille (199Ib). The patriarchal nature of the Franco 
regime was reflected in the role of the father as jefe de familia, the head of the family 
as analogous with Franco as the father of the nation. Although women were highly 
valued as mothers or potential mothers, authority in family matters clearly rested with 
married, working fathers (Del Campo, 1992; Nash 1991). The institutionalised gender 
differences of the Franco period were to become an important target for left wing 
parties during the Transition and the reform of laws relating to parental authority was 
a priority for the growing women's movement (Threllfall, 1985) which was to play a 
key part in the development ofleft wing social policies in Democratic Spain. 
Child benefits 
Perhaps the key policy instrument for the legitimisation of paternal authority and 
power during Authoritarianism was the system of financial support for families. If 
pro-natal ism' was represented in the regulatory measures intended to banish threat of 
birth-control thus combating declining birth rates, then familism based upon 
patriarchy formed the foundations of support measures. The subsidio familiar (family 
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subsidy or child benefit) was introduced as early as 1938 and was significant in terms 
of the criteria used to select those eligible, the amount paid to beneficiaries and the 
means of payment. Child benefits were highly selective of family types (Nash, 1991; 
Madruga, 1996). Firstly, the benefits were calculated on a sliding scale in relation to 
the number of children in the family and secondly, only legally married couples and 
their legitimate children were targeted by the benefits (Nash, 1991). In addition, 
patriarchy was reinforced as the benefits were paid directly to fathers, as were 
additional family bonuses (plus de cargas familiares) (Del Campo, 1995). Both child 
benefits and family bonuses were thus clear products of Francoist family ideology. 
The beliefs were founded on three objectives of state intervention: strengthening the 
nation through population growth; maintaining social and moral stability through 
support of the family; reinforcing male hierarchy within the family. 
Maternity leave and childcare 
Policies relating to maternity leave and childcare provision were considered 
unnecessary under the Franco regime due to the role assigned to women. Married 
women's participation in the labour market was not only frowned upon, but actively 
discouraged first through legislation relating to child benefits, under which married 
women were not entitled to the bonuses or allowances which were paid to male 
colleagues and second by a number of measures restricting women's labour market 
activity either by the type of employment or the marriage bar by which married 
women were required to seek their husband's permission before taking on 
employment outside the home (Valiente, 1994: 159-64). Again, public intervention in 
the family is the clear ideological foundation for the family policies of 
Authoritarianism. 
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Contextualising changing political ideologies and family policies 
The development of family policies and party political debate up to the late 1970s in 
the three countries reveals certain fundamental beliefs about the role of families, their 
relationship with the state, state intervention and the purpose of family policy 
measures. In political terms, these beliefs can be understood both in relation to 
traditional divisions between left and right and as reflections of the socio-political 
evolution of the three nation states studied. 
French policies over the period examined in this chapter developed in the context of 
the dominant right wing ideology. This position was based upon pro-natal ism and 
neo-natalism with measures to encourage larger families dominating the agenda. 
Significantly policies to protect and support working mothers evolved in the neo-
natalist context which, while accepting the increase in women's employment as an 
irreversible trend, sought to support the dominant right wing ideological position that 
held motherhood and large families in high regard. The family has been highly valued 
and institutionalised in France and the legacy of this ideological position continued to 
be an influential element of the social protection agenda into the period examined in 
the case study (Chapter 6). 
In the UK the family was not presented as a significant target for state intervention 
through social policies. Indeed, in terms of party political ideology, the family has 
rarely had the same impact as in France or Spain. This is not to say, however, that 
families have not been the focus of political intervention. Families have been the 
subject of a number of legislative and political reforms, but where this has taken 
place, politicians and their parties have spoken of individuals as targets for 
intervention as opposed to the family unit even, in some cases, on the right. The 
ideological position of governing parties has been reflected to some extent in policies 
which may be considered as family policies, for example, the development of child 
benefits represented horizontal redistribution as a key element of post-war social 
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msurance. The lack of increases in benefits, however, diminished their impact. In 
terms of family regulation, the UK introduced abortion and relatively liberal divorce 
laws before France and Spain suggesting a more liberal ideological position 
surrounding these issues. Other than through the tax and benefits system, there is little 
to suggest patriarchy as an element of right wing party ideology up to the late 1970s. 
o· 
In terms of the family it appears that the UK has had little ideological polarisation 
across left and right, other than in cases of measure-specific conflict (such as in the 
debate as to whether mothers or fathers should be paid child benefits). 
The evolution of family policies in Spain over the same period is intrinsically linked 
with the political system and its inherent ideological conflicts. Liberal family policy 
reforms introduced under the left wing Second Republic were instrumental in the 
build up of political conflict leading to the Civil War. The right wing ideology of the 
Franco era institutionalised patriarchy, pro-natalism and Catholic family values. The 
symbolic value of the family in National Catholicism was such that it became a 
defining feature of Spain at that time. No opposition to this ideology was tolerated, 
and left wing parties were outlawed. Family policies in Franco's Spain stored up the 
cross-party ideological conflict that emerged when a democratic system was 
reinstated in Spain in the late 1970s. This is examined in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 6 - FRANCE: RE-EV ALUA TING TRADITION 
Two significant programmes of social reform serve as the beginning and the end of 
the time scale covered in the analysis of the relationship between ideology and French 
family policy change presented in this chapter. In each case, the traditions of state 
intervention family in Freance are brought into question. The first came into effect 
shortly after the historic victory of the Socialist party (PS) in 1981; the second, was 
introduced under the right wing Prime Minister, Alain Juppe in 1995. The 1981 
reforms have been identified as marking the end of the political consensus on family 
policies (Commaille and Martin, 1998: 140) and heralded as a new social package, 
accompanied by large public spending increases, most significantly on child benefits. 
In contrast, the 'Juppe Plan' was a programme of far-reaching spending cuts aimed at 
reducing the endemic social security deficit. This chapter examines these reforms, as 
well as those from the intervening period and asks the questions and compares these 
evolutions with the political debate over the period. 
During the sixteen year period covered in this study, family policies continued to be 
an important element of French state intervention (see Chapter 5). However, in the 
context of seemingly insurmountable economic crises and endemic unemployment, 
the French state's commitment to defending the family as a primary group was placed 
under increasing pressure. The extent to which the political parties of France defended 
the family in spite of dwindling resources provides an important indicator of the 
strength of their ideologies in relation to the family. The role of ideology as a 
dynamic factor in policy change, as shown in Chapters 3 and 4 is applied to French 
family policy from 1981 to 1997. By comparing each of the eight family policy 
measures of the parties, as expressed in their election manifestos, with the concrete 
reforms implemented over the same period, this chapter draws conclusions relating to 
the evolution of party political ideologies and the extent to which these have impacted 
upon changing policies (see Chapter 4). 
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By the end of the 1970s, the character of French family policy had begun to change. 
The post-war 'baby boom' had subsided and fertility levels had begun to fall from the 
late 1960s (Ray et al., 1988). While supporters of natalist family policies had 
attributed the 'baby boom' to the success of policy instruments implemented under 
the 1939 Code de la famille and the global family policy of 1946, others (Ray et al., 
1988) have supported the hypothesis that the 'baby boom' was a natural consequence 
of the Liberation and subsequent economic growth, which represented an exception 
rather than a long-term demographic trend. 
The Socialist breakthrough and 'cohabitation' 
Whether natalist policies as supported in the ideology of the right wing parties were, 
in reality, responsible for the growth of the French population or not is not the focus 
of this chapter, nor, it may be argued, is this possible to demonstrate. What is 
significant, however, is the fact that by the mid-I 970s, the burden on all sectors of the 
social security scheme was increasing. Governments were being faced with the need 
to combat the drain on social spending resulting from a rapidly ageing population and 
falling contributions resulting from growing unemployment (Lenoir, 1991 a). 
Consequently all elements of the social security scheme, including the prestations 
familiales. came under increasing scrutiny from the middle of 1982 (Brin, 1991) (see 
Table 6.2). The economic crisis in France continued throughout the case study period 
and, by the early 1990s, economic indicators such as gross domestic product (GDP) 
had fallen four points lower than during the 1960s to 1.2 per cent, with 11.1 per cent 
of women and 14.6 per cent of men unemployed (Eurostat, 1995). The effects of the 
growing economic crisis through the period 1981-97 saw the initial increase in 
spending on family support measures (1981-82) (Table 6.3) quickly abandoned with 
the remainder of the period (1983-97) being characterised by a constant struggle to 
maintain the traditions of the family policy scheme in the face of diminishing 
resources. This fight to maintain support for the instruments of family policy came to 
a head on the return of a right wing government in 1995 (Table 6.1). The Prime 
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Minister, Alain Juppe, introduced sweepmg refonns to the social security system, 
including family policy, over the period 1995-97 (Table 6.3) in an attempt to reduce 
the deficit incurred by social security funds. The so-called' Juppe Plan' (Table 6.3) of 
refonns has been identified (Fagnani, 1996) as a significant shift in French family 
policy under which the founding principles of French public intervention in the family 
were threatened by new ideas of private responsibility. 
Table 6.1: Changing political power in France 1981-97 
10 May 1981: Fran90is Mitterrand elected as the first Socialist President of the Fifth 
Republic 
21 June 1981: Socialists (PS and MRG) gain an absolute majority for the first time in the 
Fifth Republic. Pierre Mauroy becomes Prime Minister 
15 July 1984: Mauroy resigns and is replaced by Laurent Fabius 
16 March 1986: First period of 'cohabitation"·, right (RPRlUDF) wins legislative 
elections; Jaques Chirac is Prime Minister 
8 May 1988: Mitterrand wins.a second term of office 
12 June 1988: The Socialists regain a slender parliamentary majority at the legislative 
elections; Michel Rocard is named Prime Minister 
15 May 1991: Edith Cresson replaces Rocard as Prime Minister 
2 April 1992: Pierre Ben:\govoy replaces Cresson as Prime Minister 
28 March 1993: Right returns to power with a landslide victory with Prime Minister 
Edouard Balladur (2rul cohabitation) 
1 May 1993: Beregovoy commits suicide 
7 May 1995: Jaques Chirac (RPR) is elected President; Balladur is subsequently replaced 
by Alain Juppe 
8 January 1996: Mitterrand dies 
1 June 1997: Socialists return to power in legislative elections after Chirac's failed 
attempt to regain the support of the Assembly by dissolving parliament early; Lionel 
Jospin becomes Prime Minister (3"' cohabitation) 
While it may be argued that the Juppe Plan is of great significance in the history of 
family policy in France (Fagnani, 1996), this chapter demonstrates that, in spite of the 
controversy which came from the plan's introduction, the seeds for such refonns were 
sown during the early days of the first Socialist government (1981-86) and that the 
traditional divide between the French left and right wing parties over family policy 
,. Political cohabitation arises when the President and parliamentary majority are of different political 
wings. A president's period of office lasts seven years 'septenat', whereas new legislative elections 
must be held after five years. 
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diminished over the period as suggested by Commaille and Martin (1998). Policies 
relating to the family, and most notably expensive support measures, have 
consistently been put under increasing pressure since the early I 980s, in spite of five 
swings in parliamentary majority, suggesting the diminishing impact of different party 
political ideologies. 
Changing family policies 
Horizontal redistribution had characterised much of French financial assistance to 
families since the Code de la famille of 1939 (see Chapter 5), and was largely seen as 
being pro-natalist in its objectives. The fact that the system of allowances was more 
generous for couples with two or more children indicates the natalist intentions of the 
allocations familiales, and in spite of the principle of horizontal redistribution, 
allowances were only paid from the second child, even though economists (Ray et al., 
1988) generally agree that the greatest financial costs are incurred with the first child. 
An economic analysis of the family benefits system has identified a shift in policy 
objectives (Ray et al .• 1988) which coincides with the election of the first Socialist 
President and parliamentary majority in 1981 (Table 6.1). Commitment to the family 
had been a prominent element of the 1981 electoral campaign across the parties, with 
the PS and PCF clearly moving towards individuals (women and children) as the 
target of social policies rather than families as the traditional unit of redistribution 
(PS, 1981; PCF, 1981) thus becoming more consistent with ideologies of the left 
outside France. With the first Socialist government of 1981 came reforms to the 
system of French family policy across regulatory and support measures which, 
although initially radical, were quickly reformed (Laroque, 1985). This change 
resulted in the partial return to pre-Socialist family policy, but, according to Ray et al. 
(1988) is attributable to the worsening economic crisis which faced France and thus 
may not be the result of a fundamental change in party ideology. 
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Regulatory measures 
This fight against economic pressures can, thus, be seen to characterise much of the 
family policy change over the period of this study. It is in this context that the ideal of 
family policy in France becomes challenged in the party political arena. The 
following section examines the evolution of those policies which attempt to regulate 
family life (abortion, contraception, divorce and parental authority). 
The question of abortion, in spite of the ratification of the law of 17 Jan 1975 in 1980 
(see Chapter 5), remained problematic during the case study period. The abortion 
debate had been based upon three themes; mothers' health, social morality and 
abortion as birth control. While the first two themes appear common to the abortion 
debates of the three countries examined here (see Chapters 5, 7 and 8), the third has 
been identified (Foumier et al., 1989) as central to the explanation of the intensity of 
the debate in the French context. Natalism, as part of right wing ideology, continued 
to be an important element of family policy debate into the 1980s, but in the context 
of the abortion debate, this argument became increasingly difficult to justify after the 
legislation had been passed. The strongest arguments in favour of the legalisation of 
abortion came from the left in the form of medical and moral arguments and the rights 
of women, particularly after the Bobigny affair of 1973 which saw the acquittal of a 
fourteen year old rape victim who had been put on trial after having had an abortion 
(Association Choisir, 1973). The natalist anti-abortion case was, however, lost given 
the strong medical justification in the 1975 and 1980 laws. Abortion was presented as 
a surgical operation, which could only be practised in hospitals or licensed clinics, 
and as such, was just like any other medical act and therefore ought to have been 
reimbursed under the social security system. This was the position defended by the 
Socialist party, which they implemented under the law of 31 December 1982 (Lenoir, 
1991 ). 
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The abortion debate was thus still a topical issue at the 1981 legislative elections and 
is reflected most notably in the PS manifesto (see Abortion below). After 1982, 
however, the question of abortion disappears from the electoral campaigns of all the 
parties examined below with the exception of the far-right FN who continued to 
oppose abortion'up to the end of the study period. It is important to note that while 
abortion may seem to be a closed question in contemporary France, the law states that 
abortion should remain a last resort. Some authors (Foumier et aI., 1989) have 
interpreted this as a normative position which presents abortion as a last resort not a 
means of birth control. In spite of such 'official' positions, public opinion has 
maintained some measure of objection to the existing abortion legislation (Fagnani, 
1996). On 23 November 1995 over 30,000 representatives of feminist associations 
and trade unions demonstrated against the inadequacies of abortion provision 
(Fagnani, 1996). In contrast, January 1996 saw the imprisonment of anti-abortion 
campaigners who had occupied a hospital (Fagnani, 1996), This appears to indicate 
that in spite of the political parties' (except the FN) abandonment of abortion as an 
electoral theme, such a position does not reflect the beliefs of certain sectors of the 
population. 
Given the underlying ideological conflict surrounding abortion as a means of birth 
control, it is not surprising that parties, in particular those of the right, have been wary 
to oppose contraception as it provides a more acceptable alternative to the termination 
of pregnancy. Indeed, the two major political groups of left and right, the PS and the 
RPRlUDF respectively, have encouraged sex education and free methods of 
contraception (see below). Even the natalist and Catholic elements of FN ideology do 
not go so far as to call for a ban on contraception. Consequently, no significant 
changes to contraceptive legislation were recorded during the case study period. 
A further indicator of social change, which has been contextualised in the denatalite 
obsession of French right wing parties (Collange, 1983), is divorce. Since the 1975 
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refonn to the divorce law (see Chapter 5), the subject of divorce has been absent from 
all but the FN' s manifestos (see Divorce below). Although the FN does not call for 
the abolition of divorce, rising divorce rates are cited as indicative of moral decline 
and as a cause of falling birth rates. While this position may appear justifiable if the 
traditional family is taken as the sole source of family fonnation, Christine Collange 
(1983) speculates about a possible long-tenn rise in birth rates as couples in second 
marriages 'consolidate' their union with children, thus suggesting the possible pro-
family ideological nature of persistent opposition to divorce. 
In spite of the refonns of 1965 and 1970 relating to parental authority and women's 
rights the major parties of both left and right, again with the exception of the FN, have 
sought to appeal to women voters through a commitment to defend women's through 
full gender equality in the public and private domains. As with abortion, however, 
most of the key refonns had already been adopted before the start of the study period, 
although this theme remains prominent suggesting its importance within the parties' 
ideologies. Exceptions include measures to support the parental couple by awarding 
joint custody in divorce settlements (Lenoir, 1991 a). Further, the RPRJUDF 
government of 1986-88 brought in a refonn relating to the rights of unmarried fathers 
who had previously been in a weak legal position given that unmarried mothers had 
primacy of parental authority. The law of 22 July 1987 (loi Malhuret) sought to 
defend the status of unmarried fathers although, according to Sullerot (1992: 130-1) 
this has not happened in practice. The principle of equity in parental authority after 
divorce is reaffinned by the law of 8 January 1993. 
Support measures 
The examination of support measures over the case study period reveals much about 
party ideologies. The necessary financial commitment required by such measures may 
help underline the strength of party political ideology in the light of budgetary 
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constraints. Over the case study period, there has been almost continual reform to the 
package of financial assistance to families, either in the form of financial transfers, tax 
relief or provision of services. The thesis does not examine all such reforms in detail, 
however the more significant reforms (summarised in Table 6.3), in effect those 
which relate to the objective of examining the role of party political ideology in 
family policy change are examined in the remainder of this section. 
Table 6.2: Allowances making up the French system of prestations familiales 
in 1996 
Allocations familiales (AF): paid to families with at least two dependent children with 
higher rates paid for children above 10 years and 15 years 
Complement familial (CFY means-tested benefit paid to families with at least three 
children aged three or more years. 
Allocation de rentree scolaire (ARS): means tested benefits paid annually to support 
back-to-school costs for school children aged 6-18. 
Allocation de soutien familial (ASF): paid to lone parents with one or more children in 
cases where the absent parent does not or is not able to pay maintenance. 
Allocation de parent iso!e (AP!): temporary benefit paid to lone parents or expectant lone 
mothers. 
Allocation de logementfamiliale (ALF): means-tested housing benefit targeting families 
or young couples. 
Allocation pour jeune enfant (APJE): universal benefit paid from the fourth month of 
pregnancy to the third month after the birth or (subject to means test) up to three years for 
the first child. 
Allocation parentale d't!ducation (APE): benefit paid when one parent ceases to work in 
order to care for two or more children one of which is under there years. 
Aide a lafamille pour /'emploi d'une assistante maternelle agreee (AFEAMA): 
allowance and employer's contributions paid in cases where parents employ a registered 
child minder to provide care for a child of under six years outside the home. 
Allocation de garde d'enfant a domicile (AGED): system under which the CAF pays 
employer's contribution for childcare in the home. 
Source: Afsa, 1996: 68 
The first wave of reforms which were brought in by the left wing government were 
presented as targeting individuals (children), thus representing and ideological break 
with the previous administration's neo-natalist policy objectives (Commaille, 1990) 
as well as attempting to stimulate the struggling economy by increasing consumers' 
disposable income (Laroque, 1985). Benefits were increased in order to combat 
discrimination based on family size and income. The ideological shift away from neo-
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natalism was exemplified by increasing the monthly benefit rates for two children 
(from 25.5 per cent to 32 per cent) and cutting the rate for a third child from 46 per 
cent to 40 per cent (Laroque, 1985: 283). 
By the summer of 1982, however, the Socialist government was facing an ever-
worsening economic crisis and sought to inject 10 thousand million Francs into the 
economy, 30 per cent of which was to come from the family fund (Laroque, 1985). 
This financial drain resulted in a major reform of the family benefits system. Child 
benefits were capped in the reform (21 July 1982) (Table 6.3) by an annual increase 
of 6.2 per cent, less than half that of the then retail price index (14.1 per cent) (Ray et 
al., 1988: 91). The increase in housing benefit was limited to 6.8 per cent (Laroque, 
1985). Plans to reform child benefit spending were put on hold until 1983 and from 1 
November 1982 the payment of all new benefits claims were to count from the first 
day of the following month. Further reforms from January 1983 included cutting the 
postnatal benefit for a third child by 50 per cent (Laroque, 1985). In addition, a 
number of reforms initially planned during 1981-82 were dropped by the time the 
completed text was presented to Parliament in 1983: extension of the benefit age of 
the eldest child in two-children families and increases in income tax relief for dual 
earner families (Laroque, 1985). 
Dual-earner cohabiting couples had been seen to fare better than their married 
counterparts under the income tax system which led to growing concern over the 
study period, notably from the RPRlUDF, about discrimination. It was not, however, 
until the Juppe reforms of 1995 that this situation was changed. Cohabiting couples 
effectively became treated as 'married' for tax purposes (Fagnani, 1995). This reform 
is clearly an economic measure as it is based upon the highest common taxation 
denominator thus increasing the amount of income tax paid to the state. This reform 
has also been interpreted as an anti-marriage move by the FN insofar as it makes no 
legal distinction between marriage and cohabitation. 
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From 1985, the most regularly reformed, and often perceived as the most confusing 
(Strobel, 1996), family policy measures have related to childcare. Three major 
childcare reforms were introduced. The first (1981-85) of these sought to assist 
women in gaining employment outside the home. The second (1985-89) wave of 
reforms saw the diversification of childcare. By 1990, however, childcare policies 
began to takc on an employment creation function by making it easier to employ 
nannies or child minders (see Table 6.2). 
Table 6.3: Key French family policy reforms 1981-97 
'Questiaux' reforms May 1981-June 1982: AF increased by au average of 25%; 
housing benefit increased on average by 50%; all other benefits automatically increased 
to 14%; quotientfamiliale capped at 7.500 francs per child. 
'Beregovoy' reforms July 1982: budgetary crisis leads to cutting the base rate for 
benefits calculations to 6.2%; payment of new benefits to start from first day of the month 
following the claim; pre and postnatal benefits are cut; benefits paid upon the birth of the 
third child is cut by half. 
31 December 1982: abortion is reimbursed 100% by social security 
January 1983: postnatal benefit for third child halved 
January 1985: AlE replaces pre and postnatal benefits and CF; APE introduced 
1986: Plan famille includes widening of the APE's scope, transformation of AlE into 
APJE, AGED created for dual-earner parents employing a child minder 
1987: AlE abandoned 
22 July 1987: 'la loi Malhuret' seeks defend the status of unmarried fathers 
April 1990: RMI includes provision for the third; AFEAMA created for dual-earner 
parents paying for outside childcare 
8 January 1993: Equality of parental authority after divorce reaffirmed 
27 Jannary 1993: all persons who are dependent on another party who pays social 
security contributions 
25 July 1994: law relating to the funding of child benefits: any deficit to be made up by 
state budget 
'Juppe' plan November 1995: freezes APJE, CF and ARS, until January 1997; 
cohabiting couples to be treated as married couples for tax purposes from 1996; 
introduction of service vouchers for the full-time employment of child minders, with tax 
reductions to follow in 1996 
Sources: Laroque, 1985; Fagnani, 1996; Math and Renaudat, 1997 
Measures introduced during the early 1980s focused on the creation of municipal 
creches funded by the CNAF. This approach has been identified (Math and Renaudat, 
1997) as prioritising collective childcare. From the mid-1980s these initial policies 
164 
were widened along with new measures such as the reform of maternity leave in 1984 
under which the duration ofleave was extended from 12 months to two years, as well 
as giving the father the option to take leave (Math and Renaudat, 1997). Following 
this, the allocation parentale d 'education (APE) was introduced to provide income 
support for those parents completely or partially giving up work to care for children. 
The APE only concerned families with three or more children ·of which the youngest 
was aged under three years (Afsa, 1996). At this point childcare in France was 
characterised by heteronomy. 
By 1987 the right wing government introduced a shift in the nature of childcare. The 
allocation de garde d'enfants a domicile (AGED, law of 29 December 1986) was a 
scheme under which dual-earner parents received a monthly allowance (in 1987) of 
2,000 francs to meet some of the costs of employing a child minder (Math and 
Renaudat, 1997). The nature of this allowance, combined with increased professional 
status for child minders has been identified as the turning point in French childcare 
policies (Math and Renaudat, 1997), with further reforms including the AFEAMA 
(see table 6.2) and the cheque emploi service (vouchers to pay for domestic help, not 
specifically childcare, which simplified employer's contributions) continuing to 
develop childcare policies as instruments of job creation and encourage autonomy. 
Party Politics 
The major political parties of France can be considered as occupying three categories, 
the left wing parties, Parti socialiste (PS) and Parti communiste fran9ais (PCF) 
(although these parties are not officially allied there has been some cooperation, such 
as ministerial posts for PCF deputes during PS majorities), the centre-right alliance of 
Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR) and Union pour la democratie fran9aise 
(UDF) and the far right, Front National (FN). 
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Since the major breakthrough of the left in 1981, which saw the election of a Socialist 
government and president, Fran90is Mitterrand, control of the majority of the 
Assemblee Nationale (the lower house) has changed hands between left and right on 
five occasions, creating in 1986, 1993 and 1997 the constitutional dilemma known as 
'cohabitation' where the President is obliged to name and 'cohabit' with a Prime 
Minister of a different political party (Table 6.1). Although de Gaulle (Gildea, 1996) 
had suggested that this situation would prove impractical and any President faced 
with a 'hostile' assembly should resign, those politicians who found themselves in the 
reality of the situation (including Gaullists) agreed to cohabit in order to limit any 
possible constitutional crisis (Gildea, 1996). Despite the possible difficulties of such 
an unorthodox situation, government has continued to function without any major 
cnses. 
In tenns of family policy objectives, the political ideologies of the French left and 
right have been categorised by Commaille (1990': 74) who focuses on the key themes 
of state intervention and the relationship between the state and citizens as defining 
elements of party ideology in relation to the family: 
La dominante dans les positions des partis politiques de gauche ou syndicats est bien 
entendu l'accent mis sur ce qu'ils considerent devoir etre la fmalite des transferts 
sociaux: la reduction des inegalites sociales, le soutien materiel, fmancier 
prioritairement aux families en difficulte. La dominante dans les positions courantes 
de droite est l'accent mis sur l'importance de la famille dupoint de vue de l'ordre 
sociale et des interets de la nation. (The predominant feature of the left wing political 
parties or unions is naturally the emphasis on what they consider to be the aim of 
welfare transfers: the reduction of social inequality, material and financial support, 
primarily to families in difficulty. The predominant feature of the right wing political 
movements is the emphasis placed on the importance of the family from the point of 
view of social order and the good of the nation.) (Commaille, 1990: 65) 
While this position was generally representative of the 1980's, parties during the 1990's 
had to address family support measures, whatever their traditional ideological 
position, due to economic pressures upon the social security budget. 
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Parti socialiste 
The left wing of the French political spectrum is primarily represented by the 
Socialists (PS) and the Communists (PCF), both of which have strong Marxist 
traditions. Considered as being, until recently, the most Marxist of Western European 
Socialist parties (Borella, 1990), the PS was the largest single party in France in 1997, 
a year in which it held the majority in the assembly with its leader, Lionel Jospin, 
occupying the post of Prime Minister. In spite of the Socialists' notable impact on 
French politics and policy of the 1980s, the party had been the main party of 
opposition during the first 23 years of the Fifth Republic. 
The historical roots of French socialism can be traced back to the French Revolution, 
an event which Socialists have always considered as foundational, upholding the 
revolutionary principles liberty, equality and fraternity (Hazareesingh, 1994). The 
Socialists, like left wing parties in other countries, have been influenced by the 
writings of Marx and Engels, but also by domestic thinkers such as Proudhon and 
their founding father, Jaures. Social action has been central to Socialist party 
principles, with the party identifYing its central objective as the 'transfer [of] 
resources to the underprivileged sections of the community, and [to 1 create a society 
in which power was exercised in the interests of the working people' (Hazareesingh, 
1994: 232). The PS has, therefore, sought to target individuals, notably the poor, 
women, children, the unemployed as primary groups for its social policies, and has 
maintained an ideological position in which state intervention to assist these groups 
has been considered as legitimate. The family has, traditionally, only been targeted 
indirectly in PS social policies. 
In terms of its organisation, the modem Socialist party was born in 1905 as the 
Section fran'raise de I'Internationale ouvriere (SFIO) under the leadership of Jean 
Jaures and Jules Guesde. Despite early electoral success (1.4 millions votes in 1914) 
the SFIO suffered two serious setbacks: first, Jaures, then leader of the party, was 
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assassinated on 31 July 1914 and second, at the party congress in Tours, 25-30 
December 1920, conflict between the supporters of the Second International and the 
Bolshevik Third International (Komintem) led to a definitive split in the SFIO 
(Borella, 1990: 154). Over a thousand delegates voted to support the original 
principles of the party and remain with Leon Blum. In contrast, 3,208 voted to form a 
new party based on Lenin's 21 principles which became the PCF (Neant, 1991: 62-3). 
Since this split, the French left has seen varying degrees of consensus and conflict 
between the Socialists and the Communists with the share of the left wing vote 
gravitating to one or the other party. Two notable periods of relative consensus in the 
history of the French left have been the 1936 Front populaire alliance government 
which united the left allowing 'the working class to pass from gross exploitation to an 
entirely different social partnership' (Hincker, 1997) and the dominance of the PS as 
the major party of the left from 1981. 
The development of the modem Socialist party, the PS, is intrinsically linked with the 
rise of Fran90is Mitterrand. In disarray, the Socialists were united under the title PS in 
June 1971 with Mitterrand being elected First Secretary on 16 June 1971 (Borella, 
1990). The arrival of Mitterrand as leader of the newly unified Socialists signalled a 
new era of electoral success during which the Socialist vote rose from 16.5 per cent in 
1968 to 20.7 per cent in 1973, which although representing an increase of a little over 
4 per cent, represented a net gain of 45 seats (57 seats in 1968, 102 seats in 1973) 
(Borella, 1990: 248-51). 
The steady rise in Socialist fortunes reached its zenith in 1981 with a double victory 
in the presidential and legislative elections. On the 10 May, Mitterrand was elected as 
the first Socialist President of the French Republic with 51.75 per cent of the vote in 
the second round. This was consolidated on the 21 June when the party gained 285 
seats in the assembly and 37.8 per cent of the vote, the highest result in the party's 
history (Borella, 1990). Mitterrand remained President for the majority of the case 
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study period, occupying the position for two septenats (seven-year terms of office) the 
first from 1981 to 8 May 1988, and the second until 23 April 1995 at which point he 
retired from politics (Gildea, 1996). 
The PS's position in terms of the family is characterised by its support of the rights of 
women and children as individuals (Commaille, 1990: 65) by means of restricted 
intervention, and during the early 1990s the PS moved steadily towards a social 
policy based on reducing inequalities through vertical redistribution, which is shown 
below, and consequently away form the French tradition of horizontal, universal 
family policies. In terms of the thematic classification of party ideologies outlined in 
Chpater 3, the PS sits between the dimensions of public and individual, although, as a 
result of the French context, the party has sought to intervene in the family sphere to a 
greater extent than may be expected of left wing parties in other countries. 
Parti communiste franr;ais 
The PCF has a history which dates back to the Russian revolution of 1917, but 
developed its own identity after a split in the SFIO. Being founded on the Marxist-
Leninist principles of class struggle, the party continued to make explicit reference to 
Marx, Engels and Lenin until 1979 (Borella, 1990: 195-6). While being a constant of 
twentieth century French politics, the PCF has never held an overall majority in the 
Assembly, but has played an important role as part of left wing coalition 
governments, notably the Front populaire (Borella, 1990: 177-8). In recent times, 
however, the PCF has become the 'second' party of the left in coalition with the PS, 
win terms of its number of seats, share of the vote and subsequent influence, which 
has been dwindling since the 1970s. In 1981, the Communists won 35 seats in the 
Assembly to the Socialists' 285, only seven years later, in the second Socialist 
government, the PCF share of the seats had fallen to 27 compared to the PS's 278 
seats (Borella, 1990: 250). 
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In common with the PS, the Communist party over the period 1981-93 was relatively 
stable in terms of it leadership, namely Georges Marchais, being replaced by Robert 
Hue in the 1995 presidential elections. In line with the Communist tradition, .PCF 
social policies have focussed on the worker rather than the family as a primary group. 
PCF political ideology expresses the state in an interventionist role, which targets 
individuals, as in the PS ideology. However, the family is commonly cited as a target 
for social policies in the earlier manifestos, although family policies are targeted at 
the poorest families in society and are thus distinct from the French universalist 
tradition. 
The centre-right alliance 
The two major parties on the right of French politics the RPR and the UDF have, 
unlike the PS and PCF, formed a close political alliance, and shared electoral 
manifestos during the study period. In contrast to the two main parties of the left 
however, the RPR and UDF had a much more even share of the vote and seats in the 
Assembly. In 1981, for example, the share of the vote was 20.9 per cent for the RPR 
(88 seats) and 19.1 per cent for the UDF (63 seats) (Borella, 1990: 250). In 
subsequent years, the RPR have consistently held more seats in the Assembly 
(Borella, 1990: 250). 
The RPRlUDF dominance of the right of French politics has, however, been under 
increasing pressure since the early 80s. The far right, FN has been steadily gaining 
support since its dramatic breakthrough in the European parliamentary elections of 
1984, receiving 10.9 per cent of the vote as opposed to 0.4 per cent in the previous 
general elections in 1981. In 1986, the FN won its first seats in the Assembly 
equalling the 35 seats of the PCF (Borella, 1990: 250). 
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The RPR and the UDF, in spite of their close co-operation, have developed from two, 
distinct political traditions: Gaullism and liberal republicanism. The Gaullist RPR was 
founded in 1976, but had evolved from the Union des democrates pour la Republique 
(UDR) which itself had evolved from earlier Gaullist parties since the creation of the 
(RPF) in 1947 (Petitfils, 1994). As the name suggests, Gaullism is based on the 
political ideology of General de Gaulle, which is itself a notoriously elusive body of 
thought including nationalist, authoritarian tendencies and a traditional view of 
society mixed with strong commitment to modernisation (Hazareesingh, 1994: 261-
3). While de Gaulle saw his politics as corresponding to neither left nor right, indeed 
the early support for de Gaulle transcended class distinctions due to his popular 
appeal, the Gaullist electorate has increasingly come to fit the profile of a 
conservative electorate since the General's death in 1970 (Hazareesingh, 1994: 279-
81). 
The UDF was formed as a union of non-Gaullist centre-right parties in 1978, evolving 
from movements spearheaded by Valery Giscard d'Estaing (President of the Republic 
1974-81). Occupying a centre-right position, the UDF was in fact made up of many 
factions ranging from the Centre des democrates sociaux which had evolved from the 
Catholic centre party, the secular Parti radical (PR) and dissident Socialists who had 
abandoned Mitterrand (Wright, 1994: 200-1). The eclectic makeup of the UDF has 
led to in-fighting such as disputes over abortion, divorce and gender equality (Wright, 
1994: 203). In spite of the non-Gaullist stance of the UDF, the party has formed a 
stable alliance with the RPR, most notably since the PS victory of 1981, with general 
consensus over policy objectives reflected in the publication of joint manifestos and 
co-operation between candidates at election (candidates from either party concede to 
the one with the greatest chance of victory as reflected in the first round of voting) 
(Borella, 1990: 107-8). 
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Given the distinct traditions of the RPRlUDF, they have generally supported a pro-
family or natalist approach to family policies based on the idea of the family as, 'le 
point d'ancrage le plus solide, aussi bien de I'individu que du corps social' (themost 
solid anchorage point for, both, the individual and the social body) (RPRlUDF, 1981: 
9) a sentiment which remained present in 1997: 'la famille est le lieu Oil s'exercent la 
solidarite entre generations, I'autorite et le respect mutuel' (the family is the place 
where support between generations, authority and mutual respected are practised) 
(RPRlUDF, 1997: 3). The family is thus responsible for the transmission of values, 
education and care. In this way the family is considered as being a 'private' concern, a 
position which has increased in importance over the case study period. 
Front national 
Occupying a unique far-right position in French politics, the FN has seen its support 
grow steadily since its leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, first stood for the presidential 
elections in 1974 in which he won less than one percent of the vote, to over 18 per 
cent in the first round of the presidential elections of 1995 (Frerny and Frerny, 1998). 
In the legislative elections, the FN has made slower progress, but consistently 
receives above 10 per cent of the vote and has become the fifth major party in French 
politics achieving similar or better electoral results than the long-established peF. 
Due, in large part, to the spontaneous oratory style of Le Pen, the party has relied 
mainly on speeches and media debates to get across its electoral message, and did not 
publish electoral manifestos before 1985. In all of the party's manifestos, the family is 
of great importance and is considered as having private responsibility for education, 
care and support. The FN makes no secret of its position concerning the family which 
it sees as central to the well-being of the state and in the fight against the decline of 
French morality, national identity and population (Le Pen, 1985; 1993; 1997). 
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The family and party political ideology in the manifestos 
The following analysis examines each party in relation to the policy themes outlined 
in Chapter 4: abortion, contraception, divorce, parental authority, child benefits, fiscal 
measures, maternity leave and childcare. 
Abortion 
By 1979 the issue of abortion had been seemingly settled (see Chapter 5). The 
legalisation of abortion was, however, only the first step. The legislation did nothing 
to erase opposition on moral grounds or the issues of social security reimbursement 
from the agenda of the major political parties. If the legalisation was to be justified on 
grounds of medical necessity, then its reimbursement on the contributions-related was 
the next step. 
In the election manifestos of the 1981 campaIgn, there is little evidence of any 
political debate concerning abortion. The RPRfUDF alliance, while expressing views 
on health and the family, made no mention of abortion (RPRfUDF, 1981). The PS, 
which had supported the pro-abortion lobby during the 1970s, did not express a clear 
position. A significant part of policy relating to the family, however, did show clear 
support for women's rights, one of which being, 'Ieur droit a la maitrise de leur vie 
personnelle', including 'regulation des naissances' (right to control their personal life 
and birth control) (PS, 1981: 3). The term regulation des naissances, although 
standard, was ambiguous insofar as it may have included any method which controls 
birth (as opposed to conception) according to the dictionary definition of the 
contemporary period (Dubois, 1979: 1598). The PS manifesto did not oppose 
abortion, simply stating, 'Ies conditions d'obtention de l'I.V.G. seront revisees' 
(conditions for access to abortion will be reformed) (PS, 1981: 6) although the nature 
or extent of these reforms were not elaborated upon. 
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On the far left, the PCF took a clearly pro-abortion stance, a question contextualised 
within women's' rights, and states its intention to, 'rembourser I'IVG a 100 p. cent' 
(to reimburse 100 per cent of the cost of abortion) (PCF, 1981: 13). 
The 1986 legislative elections saw the first major campaign by the FN. The party had 
been given new legitimacy and impetus at the 1984 European Parliament elections 
with its result of 10.9 per cent (Borella, 1990: 250). The FN programme for the 1986 
legislative elections was overtly natalist in stance, and cited abortion as a major cause 
of France's falling birth rate (Le Pen, 1985: 127). The state was blamed for France's 
demographic problems: 
L'Etat finance la mort. Ille fait doublement: d'abord en remboursant I'avortement, 
ensuite en apportant des moyens de financement considerables aux associations 
malthusiennes comme le 'Planning Familial' qui donne une image negative de la vie, 
de la naisssance' (The State finances death. It does so in two ways: first by paying for 
abortions, second by providing considerable financial resources to groups, such as 
'Family Planning' which presents a negative image of life, of birth). (Le Pen, 1985: 
133) 
Later the programme calls for all of the laws which liberalised abortion from 1975 to 
1982 to be repealed, further underlining the 'injustice' of the state's provision of free 
abortion whilst neglecting the fight against sterility (Le Pen, 1985: 133) 
In contrast with the general nature of the 1981 manifesto of the RPRlUDF, that of 
1986 explicitly addressed France's hiver demographique (demographic winter) 
(RPRlUDF, 1986: 10). Further, the manifesto supported measures to encourage the 
birth of a third child (RPRlUDF, 1986: 10). The manifesto did not, however, address 
the question of abortion. No causes for France's low birth rate were cited, the 
manifesto merely stated that depopulation is an important issue (RPRlUDF, 1986). 
Such a position may suggest an implict anti-abortion stance. However this is unlikely 
as the law was passed by the RPRlUDF government of Chirac. 
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The parties of the left did not mention abortion. It may be assumed that since the 1982 
law making abortion available and free under social security, the question is 
considered as closed. Indeed, since the 31 December 1982 law, only the FN has 
continued to include abortion in their electoral campaigns and remains consistent with 
a pro-natalist.ideology. In 1993, the FN called for the abolition of free abortion and 
sought to implement policies to help and advise those seeking abortion (Le Pen, 1993: 
63-4). It does not, however, go so far as seeking to repeal the legalisation of abortion 
as it did in 1985. The manifesto of 1997 (Le Pen, 1997) while maintaining a pro-life 
stance, was less explicit in its position against abortion than the manifestos of 1985 
and 1993 stating, 'un ensemble de solutions alternatives sera mis en place pour 
decourager le recours a l'avortement' (FN, 1997: 36) (a package of alternative 
solutions will be put in place in order to discourage those seeking abortion) which is 
clearly a less controversial position than in previous manifestos suggesting an relative 
liberalisation of FN position. 
Contraception 
As with the question of abortion, contraception appears within the context of 
women's rights or family health. The 1981 manifestos of the PS and PCF called for 
better sex education, more availability of methods of contraception and for 
contraception to be fully reimbursed through social security (PS, 1981: 6; PCF, 1981: 
13). The RPRlUDF made no reference to contraception in 1981. 
In 1986, the RPRlUD F continued to make no mention of contraception. However, the 
manifesto made a clear commitment to addressing the demographic situation in 
France, notably by encouraging and supporting large families (RPRlUDF, 1986: 10). 
As contraception is in conflict with this pro-natalist position this may suggest the 
RPRlUDF's implicit disapproval of contraception. From the 1986 election campaign 
to the end of the study period, issues surrounding contraception were absent from the 
- ---- ---------
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PS and PCF manifestos. The major objectives of PS and PCF policy towards 
contraception such as free contraception and increased availability of sex education. 
had been implemented in 1982 under Pierre Mauroy's PS and PCF government 
(Fournier et al., 1989). 
The FN's position in relation to contraception was consistent with its stance on the 
family and demography generally, as well as its opposition of abortion. Large families 
were valued over those which, according to the FN, 'choose' to remain small (Le Pen, 
1985: 129-131), and while it did not call for contraception to be outlawed in the same 
way as abortion, it opposed the free provision of contraception (Le Pen, 1985: 133). 
The 1988 PS election campaign rested upon the strength of the re-election of 
Mitterrand as President, as a result the electoral programme took the form of 
Mitterrand's open letter Lettre a taus les Fram;:ais (Mitterrand, 1988). Although the 
family and family policies were given a low profile in the 54-page document, the 
question of population growth, and more significantly, a population based upon 
families, is raised. 'La France sera forte de ses families et s'epanouira· dans ses 
enfants. Les generations nombreuses sont les generations creatrices' (France will find 
strength in her families and fulfilment in her children. Generations with many 
children are creative generations) (Mitterrand, 1988: 45). Such statements may be 
interpreted as containing natalist overtones and, therefore, appear out of step with PS 
ideology. In addition he adds 'Aussi ai-je encourage ... ceux qui ... ont compris 
qu'aimer la famille n'etait pas retrograde' (I have therefore encouraged those who 
have understood that love of the family is not a reactionary position) (Mitterrand, 
1988: 45) a statement which may have been included to combat any possibility of 
criticism of a natalist stance from within the party or elsewhere. It is however 
significant that Mitterrand seems to contradict his party's position in relation to the 
family and may suggest a political' generation gap' on the theme of the family. 
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While in 1985 the FN message relating to contraception was one of disapproval, the 
1993 manifesto declared contraception 'un choix de la vie privee, Oll l'Etat n'a pas it 
entrer' (a private choice in which the State has no right to interfere) (Le Pen, 1993: 
63). This is a clear FN ideological position in relation to the themes of contraception, 
pro-natalism, and, perhaps most significantly, the relationship between the state and 
the family. The FN explicitly sees the family as private and beyond the state. This is 
however inconsistently represented through the eight measures ·(see below). By 1997 
contraception was absent from the FN's manifesto, although it may be one of the 
'alternative solutions' proposed to combat abortions (FN, 1997). 
There is clearly both a correlation between the themes of abortion and contraception 
and the parties' relative ideological positioning. A focus on abortion and 
contraception has revealed the traditional ideological split between left and right in 
relation to family values and population growth. 
On the left, both PS and PCF openly support these measures and seek to maintain and, 
in some cases, extend their availability as part of the social security system. This 
position remains consistent with themes of choice for individuals, in particular 
women, and liberal moral ideology. 
The right wing parties are also consistent in their positions to these two measures. 
There is possible disapproval from the RPRlUDF especially as birth control methods 
conflict with population growth and may be interpreted as threats to the family. The 
centre-right alliance does not, however, openly oppose abortion and contraception 
which may suggest that any opposition would be unpopular with the electorate. More 
significantly, however, is the growth of the theme of private responsibility for 
families in right wing party ideology. This growth can be seen in the types of support 
measures proposed by the RPRlUDF (below). 
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The FN position in relation to these two measures is explicit and consistent with the 
party's right wing, pro-natalist, Catholic ideology. Abortion is clearly unacceptable 
and is perceived as a threat to population growth and morality. Contraception is also 
frowned upon, but by the late 1990s its criticism is less evident suggesting an 
ideological shift in relation to this measure. 
Divorce 
While divorce legislation had been liberalised in 1975 (see Chapter 5), women's 
groups had campaigned for the further simplification of the legal process. In line with 
its pro-family stance, the RPRlUDF manifesto of 1981 did not make a statement on 
divorce, and while it may be inferred from the text that the general position is one of 
moral opposition to divorce, nowhere does it state that the family is founded upon 
marriage, although, again, this appears implicit (RPRlUDF, 1981). 
Both the PS and the PCF called for financial support of lone, divorced mothers 
through specific child benefits and benefits for job seekers or periods of vocational 
training (PS, 1981: 6; PCF, 1981: 9). 
The FN's strong ideological links with Catholicism as shown in the party's position 
on birth control is also evident in its statement about divorce. In 1985 the question of 
divorce was criticised by the FN by constructing its arguments in the context of 
France's 'demographic winter' as well as the decline in France's moral values (Le 
Pen, 1985: 126). The FN clearly valued the married couple as the basis of the family 
and, indeed, society and developed this stance to include measures to support 
'legitimate' couples and encourage marriage through regulatory and support measures 
(Le Pen, 1985: 131-2). Here, it seems that the FN supports state intervention in order 
to support its ideal model of the family. 
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The FN attacked divorce as a cause of society's problems, a phenomenon which 
traumatises children, destabilises the country and leads families into poverty (Le Pen, 
1993: 54). Divorce was further criticised as a manifestation of a moral crisis of 'une 
societe qui n'a pour religion que I'egoiste succes individuel, fonde sur l'argent' (a 
society for which selfish individualism based upon money is the only religion) (Le 
Pen, 1993: 54). In spite of the negative portrayal of divorce, the FN did not propose 
any reforms. By 1997 the theme of divorce was absent from the FN manifesto 
although the family remained highly valued (FN, 1997). 
None of the other parties addressed the issue of divorce during the remainder of the 
study period, although the RPRlUDF alliance (RPRlUDF, 1986: 10) clearly valued 
marriage as demonstrated by its proposals to reform the tax system. 
Parental authority 
Carefully situated within emphatic support for women's rights, both the parties of the 
left seek to, 'etablir la pleine egalite du pere et de la mere' (to establish full equality 
between the father and the mother) (PCF, 1981: 13). The RPRlUDF alliance, while 
less explicit; support the 'Iiberte de choix entre les parents' (parents' freedom of 
choice) (RPRlUDF, 1981: 9) in relation to women's paid work. While not directly 
linked with parental authority, this position may suggest general support for equity 
between mothers and fathers. . 
While in 1986 the parties of the left and the RPRlUDF alliance continued to support 
women's rights in all areas, the FN criticised official and media discourse which 
claims gender equality (Le Pen, 1985: 134) on the grounds that 'cette attitude 
utopique revient it nier la realite biologique et culturelle qui donne it la femme une 
responsabilite particuliere dans la procreation et I'education des enfants' (this utopian 
attitude denies the biological and cultural reality which gives women a special 
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responsibility in procreation and the bringing up of children) (Le Pen, 1985: 134). The 
FN thus proposed ideological measures to encourage mothers to stay at home or 
facilitate part time or temporary work (Le Pen, 1985: 135) which supported its 
position of opposing 'le lobby soi-disant feministe' (the so-called feminist lobby) (Le 
Pen, 1985: 128) and encouraging mothers to reject state childcare provision. From 
1986 the question of equality of parental authority was absent from the manifestos of 
the parties included in this sample thus suggesting the existence of consensus relating 
to this issue or that it was a low priority for parties' election campaigns. 
Child benefits 
While support 0'£ the family was a clearly defined theme of the 1981 RPRlUDF 
manifesto, it did not develop any concrete policies as to how this support could be 
achieved, other than general statements such as, 'tout doit etre fait pour soutenir la 
famille' (everything must be done to support the family) (RPRlUDF, 1981: 9). 
The PS called for the reform of the system of child benefits, through the introduction 
of allowances payable from the first month of pregnancy and, more significantly, 
from the first child, which was against the natalist tradition of only paying child 
benefits from the second child (PS, 1981: 6). In addition, the PS called for the value 
of allowances to be raised by 50 per cent in two stages (PS, 1981: 5). In contrast, the 
PCF supported child benefits as an instrument to combat family poverty thus marking 
a change from the traditional horizontal redistribution to vertical transfers to help the 
poorest families in society (PCF, 1981: 9). In addition, as with the PS, the PCF also 
pledged allowances to be paid from the first child (PCF, 1981: 9). In the French 
context, the payment of benefits from the first child, while clearly in support of the 
family, is considered as a step away from pro-natalism. Within the pro-natalist party 
ideologies of the right, child benefit payments had traditionally only been paid from 
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the second child in the belief that this would discourage couples from having only one 
child (see Chapter 5). 
By the 1986 election campaign, the RPRlUDF manifesto openly proposed child 
benefits as an instrument to meet natalist ends: 'le systeme des prestations doit ainsi 
clairement garantir le libre choix par les familles d'un troisieme enfant' (the benefits 
system must provide families with the guarantee of a free choice to have a third child) 
(RPRlUDF, 1986: 10). In spite of this apparent commitment, the RPRlUDF neo-
liberal economic policy targets the burden of employer contributions to the child 
benefit fund as an obstacle to the economy and to job creation, and called for this 
burden to be lessened (RPRlUDF, 1986: 4). It did not state, however, where the 
shortfall to the family fund was to be found. This demonstrates the beginning of the 
RPRlUDF move towards mere rhetoric in relation to the family, with the traditional 
pro-family/natalist ideology of the right becoming increasingly lost within the parties' 
growing neo-liberal economic policies. It is important to note that under the Chirac 
administration (1986-88) the alliance introduced the allocation parentale d'education 
(APE) which encouraged mothers to stay out of paid employment to bring up 
children. This is a significant reflection of RPRJUDF ideology as it can be linked 
directly with FN policy in this area. 
In line with its strong commitment to the family; the FN saw horizontal redistribution 
towards families as an important policy instrument. The 1985 manifesto 
systematically criticised reforms to the child benefits system and the real-term drop in 
their value since 1959 (Le Pen, 1985: 127). Le Pen calls this 'la politique anti-
familiale dangereuse' (dangerous anti~family policy) (Le Pen, 1985: 127). The 
document went on to propose support measures such as the revenu maternel (maternal 
wage) of 5,000 francs per month (Le Pen, 1985: 137) for mothers choosing to stay at 
home to bring up their children. This wage was, however, dependant on two 
conditions first: in line with natalist objectives, the wage was targeted at those 
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families with three or more children; second, in line with the FN's nationalistlanti-
immigration platform, the wage would only be payable to 'French families' (Le Pen, 
1985: 137). The revenu maternel was seen as an additional support for families, as 
well as child benefits which the FN pledged to re-value (Le Pen, 1985: 137-9) and 
was in direct opposition with the growing range of policies to help pay for child care 
(see Table 6.2, AFEAMA, AGED). 
The PCF's position in relation to child benefits had, by 1986 moved more towards a 
greater level of vertical redistribution, and was further confirmed in the manifesto of 
1988, which proposed a 'treizieme mois d'allocation' (an extra month's benefits per 
year) (PCF, 1988: 11) for families whose income is under three times the monthly 
mmlmum wage. 
The question of child benefits was conspicuous by its absence from the 1986 
manifesto of the PS. Although the party did underline its commitment to social 
protection in general, it did not make clear how this is to be achieved nor does it 
mention child benefits as a part of social protection (PS, 1986). The 1988 Lettre a 
tous les fram;:ais also failed to address explicitly policies for families, preferring to 
make general statements of commitment to the family and to the value of the family 
in French society (Mitterrand, 1988: 45). 
In contrast, the PCF prioritised increasing child benefits from the first child, 
consistent with its aims to target child poverty, as well as supporting the ARS and 
calling for an increase in the API (PCF, 1988: 11), In 1993, the PCF proposed to 
target the poorest families in society although child benefits are not mentioned which, 
given the fact that child benefit was a universal, horizontal benefit, appears 
inconsistent with PCF ideology. The reluctance of the PCF to call for the abolition of 
the universal child benefit in favour of means testing may result from the party shying 
away from what would be highly unpopular with much of the electorate (PCF, 1993: 
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45). In 1997 no explicit statements were made concerning any family policy 
instruments, although the manifesto did call for the 'Juppe Plan' to be repealed (PCF, 
1997: 51). 
In the progranunes of 1993 and 1997 the PS no longer made reference to the family, 
although, as the PCF, the 1997 manifesto criticised the 'Juppe Plan' (PS, 1997: 8). In 
line with measures brought in during the RPRlUDF government of 1986-88, child 
benefits were replaced by proposals to assist dual-earner families further and were 
absent from RPRlUDF manifestos with the exception of the 1997 manifesto which 
proposed raising the maximum age of dependant children for the receipt of child 
benefits (RPRlUDF, 1997). 
The FN in 1993 and 1997 continued to support the principle of universality for child 
benefits and called for them to be increased in order to combat the financial 
disparities between those with and those without children (Le Pen, 1993: 63; 1997: 
36). 
Fiscal measures 
One area in which the RPRlUDF manifesto of 1981 was clear was in its support of 
family policies was in its fiscal measures. The manifesto proposed two reforms of the 
taxation system which directly targeted families. The first of these policy measures 
called for the 'allegement de l'imp6t sur le revenu pour les familles modestes' 
(RPRlUDF, 1981: 8) (income tax burden on less well off families to be lowered), 
which suggests re-distributive objectives. The second tax reform measure called for 
value-added tax to take into account poverty with reference to family policy 
(RPRJUDF, 1981: 8). The objective of both of these proposed reforms is more in line 
with left" wing than right wing ideologies, insofar as they target poorer members of 
society. However, the use of income tax to achieve these aims is questionable as the 
low paid, poorer families pay less tax and therefore would be less likely to feel any 
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financial benefits. For the same reason, income tax relief for poorer families would be 
less likely to have any great impact upon state coffers. It would appear, therefore, that 
RPR/UOF policies to target poorer families are based more in rhetoric than in reality, 
but are a significant indication of a shift towards vertical rather than horizontal 
redistribution. 
In common with its centre-right rivals, the PCF called for the tax burden for the less 
well-off families to be lowered based on deductions in relation to the number of 
children. In addition, the PCF pledged a reduction of the impot local (council tax) for 
families of this category (PCF, 1981: 9). It is important to note that PCF fiscal 
measures are part of a total package including direct financial transfers, and not 'stand 
alone' policies for the poor as in the case of the RPR/UOF. 
The PS took a different stance from the other parties in terms of fiscal measures for 
families. Instead of using taxation to help families, the PS called for the scrapping of 
tax reductions based on number of children (PS, 1981: 5). Such a measures appeared 
in line with the general party position of using family policies to meets re-distributive 
ends. As outlined above, those families which benefit the most from reductions in tax 
bills are, indeed, families which have the highest income, whereas the poorest 
families in society, may not pay income tax and therefore receive no help through 
fiscal measures. By introducing a flat-rate allowance, poorer families would feel the 
greatest benefits in relation to their budget. 
The RPRlUOF manifesto of 1986, however, supported the income tax allowances for 
families, which the PS had failed to reform in spite of their 1981 election promise. In 
line with its general commitment to a liberal economy and lower taxes (RPR/UOF, 
1986: 4), the alliance thus supported a reform of the system under which unmarried 
couples were to pay less income tax than married couples (RPR/UOF, 1986: 10) thus 
somewhat in contradiction with party pro-family ideology. In addition the manifesto 
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outlined plans to lower the burden of employer contributions to the child benefit fund 
(RPRlUDF, 1986: 3). Later manifestos, however, ceased to address fiscal measures 
relating to the family in line with moves towards a position supporting greater private 
responsibility. 
The FN programme of 1986 did not consider tax allowances for families as an 
appropriate measure. Indeed the party called for the complete abolition of income tax 
which it saw as playing a minor role in financing the state (Le Pen, 1985: 81). The 
programmes of 1993 and 1997 made no mention of the CF (Le Pen,1993; FN, 1997). 
The parties of the left, perhaps due to their focus on the poorest families, did not 
mention fiscal policies in the context of providing support for families except for the 
PCF in 1988, which called for the abolition of taxes for families with a budget below 
the minimum wage (PCF, 1988: 14). While this objective was present in later 
manifestos, the term family was no longer used, further indicating a shift towards the 
individual as a target for social assistance and consistent with left wing ideology. The 
PCF manifesto of 1988 (PS, 1988:.14) and the PS manifesto of 1997 proposed the 
abolition/lowering of VAT on basic commodities, such as food, (PS, 1997: 7) which 
can be seen as a measure to target the poorer members of society. 
Maternity leave 
The parties' positions in relation to maternity leave focus on both paid and unpaid 
maternal and paternal leave. The PCF manifesto of 1981 called for maternity leave of 
six months (PCF, 1981: 13), the PS supported maternity leave, and stipulated the 
rights of either mother or father to this leave with guaranteed remuneration and re-
instatement on returning to work (PS, 1981: 6). Without stating explicit policy details, 
the PS continued to support women's work and reiterates its commitment to measures 
enabling women to reconcile family life and paid employment (PS, 1986). From 1988 
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the question of maternity leave was absent from PS manifestos. The PCF continued to 
call for six-month maternal leave in 1988 (PCF, 1988: 24) in spite of a change in 
legislation in 1984, this theme was not, however, included in later manifestos. The 
general position on the left was in support of both gender equality and women's right 
to paid employment. 
Without stating any explicit policy intentions, the 1981 RPRlUDF manifesto 
supported measures to reconcile work and family life as well as the social status of' la 
mere defamille' (RPRlUDF, 1981: 10) (literally, 'mother of the family') the use of 
which suggests the symbolic image of women in right wing party ideology at that 
time. In the 1986 manifesto, the natalistlpro-family stance supported parents to choose 
a larger family but did not outline any specific policies relating to maternity leave. In 
later manifestos, no explicit maternity leave policies were outlined although the 
support of policies to assist dual-earner families were prioritised In line with 
RPRlUDF concerns with the economy and moves towards neo-liberalism. 
The FN's position in relation to maternity leave for the 1986 elections fell within the 
party's general ideological vision of family life: notably that it is preferable for 
mothers not to work outside the home while bringing up children, a situation for 
which there was provision in the proposed revenu materne! (Le Pen, 1985). The 
objective of encouraging mothers to remain at home through the provision of a 
maternal wage and rights to social protection and pensions is maintained in 1993 (Le 
Pen 1993: 61-2). By 1997, however, the party changed its position and proposed a 
parental wage, which while functioning in the same manner as the maternal wage, and 
seeking to meet the same objectives, was open to either parent rather than only the 
mother (Le Pen 1997: 36). While this may be understood as a shift towards gender 
equality, it is important to note that within FN party ideology, any policy relating to 
maternity leave was considered as being redundant ,as parents (de facto mothers) 
would be given the full status of worker. It is possible that this shift in rhetoric may be 
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an attempt to render FN policies more popular with the electorate in the late 1990s. 
This does not, however, bring the fundamental nature of FN pro-family intervention 
into question. 
Childcare 
A further policy instrument which features in statements relating to the themes of 
reconciliation of work and family life and gender equality, is childcare provision. The 
campaign manifestos of 1981 for the RPRJUDF and the PCF did not include explicit 
measures relating to childcare, but they did make general statements relating to the 
support of mothers who choose to seek employment outside the home (RPRJUDF, 
1981: 9; PCF, 1981: 13). In addition, the PS made clear its commitment to 'un vaste 
programme d'equipements collectifs' (a vast programme of state provision) (PS, 
1981: 6) which included the prioritisation of 300,000 places in creches (PS, 1981: 6). 
The 1986 manifesto stated its opposition to the maternal wage schemes proposed by 
the right, notably the FN, and affirmed its support of women's right to work. No 
childcare policies were proposed, although such measures may have been considered 
as instruments for the support of mothers' right to employment (PS, 1986: 2). From 
1988, no policies relating to childcare/women's work were presented in the PS 
manifestos, although this was an area of wide reform at the time (see Table 6.2). 
Childcare provision was a major theme of the 1986 RPRJUDF manifesto. A 
significant element of its family policy was dedicated to the reconciliation of work 
and family life, and the manifesto expressed its commitment to providing the choice 
for working parents to either state or municipal childcare in creches of the expansion 
of the APE (Table 6.2), which is an allowance for mother who choose to bring up 
their own children rather than seeking paid employment (RPRJUDF, 1986: 10). 
Future provision of state-run creches and other childcare measures was also a key 
theme in 1988, 1993 and 1997 and represented the most significant objective of the 
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alliance in terms of family policy. Indeed the reconciliation 0'£ employment and 
family life was the sole focus of family policies outlined in 1993 (RPRlUDF, 1993: 
18). These later measures were distinctive as they enabled families to make private 
decisions about childcare requirements. 
As with maternity leave, state provision of childcare was not an objective for the FN. 
Indeed, state childcare was cited as having a negative effect on the development of 
children who, according to the FN (Le Pen, 1985) rely on their mother for their future 
development and well-being (Le Pen, 1985: 128-9). The FN's position relating to 
state provision of childcare is maintained through the study period with the 
maternal/parental wage policy taking the place of maternity leave (Le Pen, 1993; 
1997). 
Conclusions 
Family policy has clearly been a central feature of post-war French politics. A well-
established group of policy measures were in place by the time of the landmark 
election victory of the Socialists in 1981. This chapter has shown that, in spite of 
initial reforms to the system of child benefits by the PS, they were soon dropped with 
a return to traditional French family policies. Economic constraints forced the 
Socialists to abandon their plan of targeting the needs of poorer families resulting in a 
return to the previous administration's inherently neo-natalist, allowances. During the 
remainder of the study period, child benefits became increasingly threatened in the 
face of growing moves towards privatisation of the family from the RPRlUDF. This 
came to a head in 1995 with the implementation of the Juppe Plan. 
From 1981-97, family policy in France appears to have changed. However, these 
changes have taken place to different extents in relation to each of the eight family 
policy measures examined here. The regulatory measures (abortion, contraception, 
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divorce and parental authority) were shown to have been largely established by 1981, 
and thus did not feature prominently in the party manifestos. 
To some extent this is true for the PS, PCF and RPRlUDF manifestos, with the 
exception of 1981, due to proposed changes in the funding of abortion. The wider 
exception to this trend has been shown to come from the FN, which has shown great 
resistance in its opposition to abortion and has criticised free contraception and 
divorce. Taking Sabatier's (1988) classification of beliefs (Chapter 3), the FN's party 
ideological position in relation to these regulatory measures, can be described as deep 
core as it has been demonstrated to be highly resistant to change. However, even the 
FN's position on abortion is made less explicit in 1997, which suggests that even such 
a deep core ideology may be susceptible to change in the context of a state which has 
supported free abortion for almost two decades. Although it is probable that the FN 
has simply watered down its expression in order to achieve broader electoral appeal, 
while retaining an implicit core party ideological position. 
Little ideological conflict has been found between the left and the RPRlUDF in 
relation to regulatory measures, which, combined with the very limited legislative 
reforms in these areas, suggests their broad acceptance and stability. Such stability 
and consensus may also be interpreted as representing a common ideology of French 
family policy insofar as these measures are not questioned and are consequently not 
the subject of reform. In such cases, deep core party ideologies are based upon 
women's rights to have an abortion, freedom of choice in family planning and the 
right to divorce (based upon the Revolutionary principle of 'contract'). 
It may thus be possible to conclude that the stability and relative cross-party 
consensus surrounding regulatory measures results from their being based upon deep 
core party political ideologies and that even deep core ideologies in opposition, such 
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as those of the FN, may decline, change or even converge with that of the dominant 
political parties, over time if such a strong consensus is maintained. 
The central deep core belief in the French polity has long been the legitimacy of the 
family as a primary group in terms of state intervention, most notably horizontal child 
benefits. It is, however, in this area that the greatest transformations have been 
identified. By 1997 family policies were barely present in the party manifestos (with 
the exception of the FN see Table 6.4). The PS manifesto did not even contain the 
word 'family' which is in stark contrast to its 1981 manifesto (see Table 6.4) but is 
consistent with left wing party ideologies outside of France. In the same way, the PCF 
had totally abandoned a family dimension to its social policies, which, while perhaps 
not surprising for a Communist party in another country, indicates a significant shift 
in policy for the French Communists. This PCF shift may also result from a general 
move away from the family as a primary group within French social policy. 
Support measures for the RPRlUDF have been significant of a changing ideological 
position. While traditionally, French right wing ideology has strongly supported 
universal child benefits with natalist objectives, the RPRlUDF of the 1980s and 1990s 
has scarcely mentioned this theme. In its place the RPRlUDF have developed 
childcare policies which serve two principal objectives: first, these policies seek to 
encourage mothers to take employment outside of the home, thus increasing the 
family budget; second, they serve a job creation function as they create posts in the 
childcare sector. This results from economic pressures felt by policy makers during 
the study period, which is further reflected in the RPRlUDF's reform of income tax 
which did not benefit dual-earner families as may have been expected in the light of 
the above initiatives. In addition, a general ideological shift towards neo-liberal 
economic policies has also brought state intervention and redistributive policies into 
conflict with the theme of privatisation. 
190 
While by 1997 family policies appear to have been abandoned in the ideologies of the 
two major parties (Table 6.4), the majority of measures were still functioning as part 
of French social welfare. 
Table 6.4: Family policy measures in French election manifestos 1981-1997 
i I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 , I 
PS 11981 x x x x x x 
11986 x 
11988 1 x I 
11993 1 , 
11997 1 1 1 x 1 1 
PCF 1981 x I x x I x x 1 I 1986 I x 1 i , 
11988 1 1 I x x x 1 1 
9 
1993 1 1 x 1-+---11997 1 I 
RPRJ 1981 I x I 
x 
UDF I 
1986 I x i x x x 
1988 1 I x 
1993 I I 1 x 
11997 1 1 x 1 x 1 
FN 1985 I x x x x 
, 
x x 1 
1993 I x x x x I 
1997 i x x 1 
Key: I abortion; 2 contraception; 3 divorce; 4 parental authority; 5 child benefits; 6 
fiscal measures; 7 matemity leave; 8 childcare; 9 pro-family statement 
It is significant, that while the parties did not pledge any new' measures, neither did 
they seek to abolish those that were already in place. In this case, what the parties do 
not say is perhaps more significant than what is said. This possible reluctance to 
reform costly measures such as the CF or abolishing horizontal benefits in favour of 
means-tested, vertical ones, may indicate the strength of deep core family ideology in 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
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the French polity. It also certain that threats to the traditional child benefit system 
would be perceived as highly unpopular with the electorate. 
Family policies in France have changed. This change has concentrated on the support 
measures studied. The extent of this change, however, may not be as great as the 
economic climate may have suggested. Where changes have taken place, they appear 
to have been incremental. Two attempts at far-reaching changes in 1981 and 1995 
were highly controversial and resulted in a U-turn in the first instance, and the 
collapse of the Juppe government in the latter. In these examples, it appears that 
legislative change which may, in theory, be economically justifiable, comes under 
fire, because it threatens deep core ideology. 
Returning to the concept of ideology discussed in Chapter 3, the case of French 
family policy demonstrates clear examples of dynamic change between party political 
ideology and family policies. The impact of left wing ideology on family policies 
during the first half of the case ,study period may have been limited by traditional deep 
core family ideology. However, change was demonstrated over the period which may 
have resulted from the increased influence of the left while in government. The result 
of this change has seen not only the PS and PCF rejecting the family as a primary 
group for state intervention in policies presented at elections, but also, and more 
significantly, the RPRlUDF. Only the FN has maintained its traditional family 
ideology, although there is evidence to suggest the beginnings of change, notably in 
relation to contraception and di vorce. 
In the French case, however, this change in party ideology is not conclusive. When 
the regulatory measures are examined, notably abortion, which is by far the most 
controversial theme of deep core ideology examined here, there is some evidence to 
suggest that a legislative change may also precede an ideological change. This may be 
seen in the FN's 'liberalisation' of its anti-abortion position. Indeed, the FN's position 
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in relation to all of the regulatory measures is less outspoken in 1997 than in 1985. 
While it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to establish whether this change is the result 
of deep core ideologies being transformed over time, it does suggest a strong 
relationship between policy change and shifts in party political ideology. 
A further significant finding from the French case relates back to the concept of 
explicit family policy and Ideological State Apparatuses. While change in family 
policies and political ideologies has been demonstrated, it is important to underline 
the institutional visibility of the family in France. The Ideological State Apparatus, 
the CNAF, has not been qu(!stioned or threatened by any of the parties, and as long as 
this situation is maintained, the national character of French social policy will include 
a strong family focus. 
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Chapter 7 - THE UNITED KINGDOM: PRIVATISING THE F AMIL Y 
The election victory of the Conservative party in 1979 did not only mark the coming 
to power of the first female Prime Minister (PM) in British history, it also heralded 
the arrival of new body of political thought and the end of the post-war consensus 
which was built upon the foundations of Beveridge's welfare state (see Chapter 5). 
From the end of the second world war to the late 1970s. Beveridge's vision of the 
family had become increasingly challenged by the economic effects of successive 
governments' failure to maintain the pre-requisite of full-employment. On a social 
level traditional conceptions of the family were questioned in the face of evolutions in 
social mores reflected in the diversification of family types as demonstrated in 
Chapter 5. 
The arrival of Margaret Thatcher as leader of the Conservative party in 1975 signalled 
a challenge to the system of social policy based upon the Beveridge Report (1942). 
Thatcher's predecessor, Edward Heath (PM 1970-74) had represented the left wing or 
'wet' branch of the Conservative party and had developed policies in tune with the 
ideals of the consensus era such as limited interventionism and state welfare 
provision. Thatcher and her supporters, notably Sir Keith Joseph, saw Heath and the 
'Wets' as having abandoned all true Conservative beliefs and sought to redress the 
balance by returning to what she saw as true Conservative values. In so doing, 
however, Thatcher' Conservatism came to embody a number of paradoxes in both her 
political thought and its application to family policies in the UK. 
Thatcherism and the 'sea-change' in British politics 
Thatcherism is based upon the twin foundations of the neo-liberal economic ideology 
of Milton Friedman and Freidrich Hayek, monetarism, (Goodwin, 1992: 175-6) and 
'traditional' family values (Gittins, 1988). The economic basis of monetarism requires 
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the liberalisation of monetary control and reducing state intervention which led to the 
systematic privatisation of the nationalised industries including such sectors as heavy 
industry, mining, energy production and finance. This move towards privatisation also 
included social assistance, and over the two decades of the study period people 
became increasingly dependent on private pension and health insurance schemes 
(Muncie and Wetherell, 1995: 60-1). With the diminishing role of the state in social 
welfare, Conservative party ideology encouraged families and individuals to take 
responsibility for themselves thus increasing the importance of private networks of 
support (Ringen, 1997: 91). 
The paradox of Thatcherism arises in this latter element. If a monetarist policy is 
pursued, then state intervention must be limited to a minimum. However, encouraging 
families to take responsibility for themselves requires a given level of state coercion 
in order to influence practices. Thus government policies became normative in intent, 
families and individuals were encouraged to provide certain services for themselves 
resulting in the privatisation of families. In order to minimise the influence of the state 
at the level ofthe economy, it thus became necessary to expand state action in another 
area, social policy (Goodwin, 1992: 175-7). In addition to the purely economic 
reasons for encouraging the privatisation of care, the normative objectives of 
Conservative family policy may have broader implications about 'ideal' family types. 
The objectives of social policy within the Thatcherite or 'New Right' ideology were 
to reduce or limit benefits expenditure, particularly on universal benefits, thus 
reducing dependency on state provision of benefits and services and encouraging 
private welfare scheme (notably through private and occupational pensions). These 
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objectives were put into operation over the first ten years of Thatcher's premiership 
and culminated in the Children Act of 1989. 
While a focus on family policy has long been the source of epistemological debate in 
relation to the UK (Wynn, 1970; Land and Parker, 1978; Wicks and Chester, 1990; 
Cronin et al .. 1996; Ringen, 1997), public policies do have an impact on family life in 
the UK. While some authors, such as Land and Parker (1978) have referred to UK 
family policy as being 'implicit', the present study's focus on the eight regulatory and 
support measures: abortion, contraception, divorce, parental authority, child benefits, 
fiscal measures, childcare and matemity leave, reduces the need for distinctions 
between 'implicit' and 'explicit' notions of family policy, although this distinction 
can be used as a useful reference point in the comparison of the three countries. 
Indeed, the British ideological suspicion of state intervention may be an explanatory 
factor in the implicit nature of family policies. 
While no government or party in the UK used the term 'family policy' during the 
study period, these eight measures are collectively referred to in this chapter as 
'family policy' or 'family policies', in the interests of brevity and for the purposes of 
cross-national comparison (see Chapter 4). The following section presents the 
Conservative, Labour and Liberal (Liberal Democrats from 1989) parties in terms of 
their electoral impact on government, the place of families and social policy within 
their respective ideologies and their position in relation to the thematics public/private 
and family/individual. The final section contains the analysis of the party ideologies 
in the manifestos for the general elections from 1979-97, a period dominated by the 
Conservative Prime Ministers Thatcher (79-90) and lohn Major (90-97). 
196 
Evolving family policies 
In spite of the argument that the UK lacks coherent family policy (Wynn, 1970; Land 
and Parker, 1978) the framework of eight family policy measures, as examined in the 
thesis, are present in UK legislation during the study period. At the beginning of the 
study period the majority of legislation relating to regulatory measures (abortion, 
contraception, divorce and parental authority) had been in place for a decade or more, 
which suggests these elements of UK family policy were pioneering at the time, 
notably on issues such as abortion, in relation to France and Spain, which may also 
result from the more liberal religious attitudes in the UK. Given this factor, any 
developments in regulatory measures over the study period may prove significant 
indicators of any possible evolution of party political ideologies, in particular 
resulting from the influence of Thatcherite thought. 
In contrast, support measures have undergone considerable change since the electoral 
victory of Thatcher and the Conservatives in 1979. Two key factors in this evolution 
can be identified: first, the impact of the paradoxes of Thatcherite economic 
liberalisation and social control; and second, the influence of the EU social chapter 
during the 1990s, notably in relation to maternity leave. The significance of 
regulatory legislation cannot be underestimated in the context of the relationship 
between party political ideology and family policy given the explicit intentions of 
such measures to provide the framework for family life. Abortion and contraception 
legislation have a direct impact upon issues of population, gender equality and 
moral/religious attitudes. In a similar way, divorce legislation may embody certain 
normative attitudes towards the value of family life, economic dependency and 
parental/custody rights. In some countries legislation relating to parental authority has 
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been the locus for shifting attitudes about gender equality. This is, however, only a 
secondary element of such legislation in the UK case study. The question of the limits 
of state intervention into the family sphere provided the dominant focus for debate in 
the UK. The following section thus provides the context for the analysis of the 
electoral manifestos by presenting the major reforms to the four regulatory family 
policy measures: abortion, contraception, divorce and parental authority. 
Regulatory measures 
Abortion in Britain up to the time of writing had been set within the framework of the 
1967 Abortion Act. The most significant element of the Abortion Act (1967) in terms 
of political ideologies is the centrality of medical justification which, as in the other 
countries examined in the thesis (Chapters 6 and 8), can serve as a means to counter 
moral or religious arguments. Abortions in Britain require a medical judgement, 'to 
the effect that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk of life, physical or 
mental health of the pregnant woman greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, 
or that there is a 'substantial risk' that the child will be born handicapped' (Dewar, 
1989: 44) and is clearly not expressed as a means family planning. Concordant with 
its primary medical justification, abortion is freely available on the National Health 
Service (NHS), it may be paid for in private clinics, but continues to be a source of 
controversy on moral grounds with the maximum number of weeks of pregnancy 
providing the main focus of concern for religious and pro-life groups. In contrast to 
other countries examined in the thesis any objection to abortion is solely 
contextualised in relation to the rights of the unborn child rather than pro-natalist 
objections. Indeed it has been suggested (Wicks and Chester, 1990) that 'no-one 
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argues III the UK that abortions are wrong because they decrease the potential 
population' (Wicks and Chester, 1990: 110). 
As with abortion, the· relative lack of pro-natalist arguments in Britain has seen 
contraception become widely acceptable from the 1960s in particular since its free 
introduction on the NHS under the Family Planning Act (1967) (Ringen, 1997). No 
reforms affecting contraception were introduced during the study period suggesting 
stability and political consensus in this area. Given the relative stability of both 
abortion and contraception in legislation, there is little ground upon which to defend 
the existence of a pro-natalist stance during the study period, indeed the opposite may 
be argued in relation to 'New Right' thinking on eugenics. 
Table 7.1 Developments in UK family policy 1979-97 
1980: Social Security Act 
1984: Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 
1985: Family Law (Scotland) Act 
1986: Social Security Act; Family Law Act; Law Refonn (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 
1987: Family Law Review Act 
1988: Finance Act 
1989: Social Security Act; Children Act 
1990: Social Security Act 
1991: Child Support Act 
1995: Children (Scotland) Bill 
As with abortion and contraception, divorce had been legalised before the study 
period (in 1858) with the legislation being further liberalised in 1969 (see Chapter 5). 
However, the relatively, liberal legislation was reformed further in the Matrimonial 
and Family Proceedings Act of 1984. The 1984 reforms to the divorce law saw the 
reduction of the minimum period of marriage before the filing of divorce proceedings 
from three years to one (Ringen, 1997: 36). In addition, the notion of a 'clean break' 
199 
was introduced, which resulted in long-term income transfers becoming rarer 
breaking with the common law tradition of husband's eligibility to maintain their 
wives (Land, 1995). A consequence of the clean break was that in cases where 
children were involved, maintenance settlements were inconsistent and difficult to 
enforce (Ringen, 1997: 42) which had significant effects on the lone-parent, often 
resulting in increased benefit dependency and poverty. Such increasing pressure on 
state welfare was an important motor in the development of perhaps the most 
significant family policy reform since the Beveridge report (1942): the Child Support 
Act (1991). 
Perhaps the single most significant and controversial legislative development during 
the study period came in the form of the 1991 Child Support Act (Millar and 
Warman, 1995). As a consequence of the growing trend in divorces, which resulted in 
the highest proportion of lone parent families in the EU at that time (Roll, 1992, see 
also Table 5.9), the Conservative government sought to shift the financial burden of 
supporting lone parent families from the state (public) to 'absent fathers' (private) 
(Lister, 1996a) in line with Thatcherite ideology. The seeds of the Child Support Act 
had been sown in the 1990 White Paper Children Come First in which it was argued 
that parents would be responsible for the maintenance of their children, incentives to 
work would be maintained and benefit dependency would be reduced (Department of 
Social Security, 1990). These aims became effective under the Child Support Act 
(1991) and were implemented from April 1993 by the Child Support Agency (CSA) 
which was given· responsibility for calculating and collecting private maintenance 
payments (Lister, 1994). From its introduction the Child Support Act was highly 
controversial with over a thousand absent fathers joining an action group in the first 
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six months after its implementation (Lister, 1994: 211), with controversy continuing 
under the Labour Government at the time of writing. Criticism centred on the 
calculation of the amount of maintenance to be paid by absent fathers. If payments 
were not forthcoming, the CSA had powers to seize assets or take further legal 
proceedings that, in theory, could lead to imprisonment (Millar and Warman, 1995: 
391). 
A further criticism of the Child Support Act has focused on the effectiveness of the 
maintenance payments in combating poverty for lone parent families, given that any 
such payments are tax deductible resulting in 'benefit penalties' (Lister, 1994: 220). 
The Act also prioritises the 'first' family over a 'second' family which suggests a 
normative element which considers 'first' families as more 'valuable' or socially 
desirable than second families which may be considered negatively within Thatcherite 
thought. The financial impact of CSA calculated maintenance payments may, in some 
cases, lead to incidences of poverty in 'second' families (Lister, 1994: 220). The 
apparent priority of first families in maintenance payments may result from the value 
the Conservatives have placed upon the stability of the traditional family and may be 
further considered as a means of discouraging the formation of second marriages, 
although this is not expressed explicitly 
A further, normative element of the Child Support Act, which has been noted by Ruth 
Lister (1994; 1995), is also linked with the primacy of the first family. Lister has 
pointed to the possible reinforcement of women's economic dependency upon the 
absent father as a result the maintenance payment's inclusion of an allowance for the 
mother and the subsequent necessity of maintaining contact between the lone-parent 
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and the absent parent which may not always be appropriate27• Although this aspect of 
the Child Support Act has been a lesser source of criticism (Lister, 1994: 220) than 
the financial impact on fathers, it corresponds to the traditional, patriarchal family 
model within Thatcherite ideology and is a result of the increase in private 
responsibility in family life. 
The Child Support Act has thus embodied in the 1990s the principle of transferring 
support of the family from the state to individuals in line with the dominant theme of 
socio-economic rhetoric of 1980s Thatcherism, namely 'responsibility'. In addition, 
by prioritising 'first' families over the second ones, and increasing women's 
dependence of the absent fathers of their children, it contains normative elements of 
Thatcherite family values ideology, women's role as carers and negative portrayal of 
alternatives to the 'traditional' breadwinner family model. 
In 1995 the divorce law was reformed further under the Family Law Bill (1995) 
which dispensed with the need for spouses to provide proof of irretrievable 
breakdown, replacing it with a period of reflection to last eighteen months from the 
initial statement of marriage breakdown (Cronin et al., 1995: 173). While this 
measure clearly facilitated the initial filing of divorce proceedings, the inclusion of 
the period of reflection may be interpreted as an attempt to reconcile couples and 
therefore families. 
27 In cases where there is a history of abuse or domestic violence the lone Parent may object to such 
contact but it is not possible to object on grounds of 'personal choice' as the absent parent has a legal 
duty to maintain hislher children within the terms of the Act. 
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The fourth regulatory measure analysed in this study, parental authority28, is closely 
linked with divorce, the relationship between state and citizen and issues of women's 
rights. Any controversy which has evolved in the area of parental authority has arisen 
in relation to two situations: first, custody cases in which the parents are unmarried 
(with mothers most commonly receiving sole guardianship) and second, in relation to 
. the state's role when acting as guardian (Dewar, 1993) in the context of the 
public/private debate on state intervention in family matters. While some gender 
issues are present in UK parental authority legislation, such as prioritising the 
mother's right to custody, the question of enforcing patriarchal authority is not a 
significant issue during the study period. Some aspects of maternity leave and 
childcare legislation may be interpreted as reinforcing the 'breadwinner' family 
model favoured in Conservative ideology of the period. 
Support measures 
In contrast to the relative stability of regulatory family legislation during the study 
period, support measures were under constant evolution. While this is largely the 
result of the economic objectives of Thatcherism, some elements of these policy 
measures (for example tax reforms for poorer families examined below) may also be 
considered as having evolved in line with socio-economic trends during the period. 
The British 'child benefit' replaced 'family allowances' in 1977 (Chapter 5) but 
continued to be a universal, non-contributory benefits for parents with children 
(Ringen, 1997: 63-9). Initially the benefit was paid at a lower rate for the first child 
and a higher rate for subsequent children. From 1978-91, child benefit was a flat-rate 
28ln the British case it is more common to use the term 'parental rights' (Dewar, 1993: 66-76), thus 
suggesting a slightly different relationship between parents, children and the state than the term 
'parental authority', In the interests of cross-national comparison, the tenn 'parental authority' is taken 
as a defacto synonym of 'parental rights'. 
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payment for all children (Ringen, 1997: 64). In 1984 three methods for receiving child 
benefits payments became available: weekly payment book, four weekly payment 
book or four weekly direct payment into a bank account by Automatic Credit Transfer 
(ACT) (Bradshaw and Stimson, 1997). Since 1991, however, the 1977 payment rate 
was reversed, with the first child becoming eligible for a higher rate than any 
subsequent children (£8.25 for eldest child, £7.25 for further children per week in 
1991) a measure which was maintained by the Labour government from 1997 and 
continues at the time of writing (£14.40 and £9.60 respectively from April 1999). 
Child benefit is paid on a weekly basis (although it may also be collected in four 
weekly intervals) to the parent with care of the child, in the majority of cases the 
mother (Bradshaw and Stimson, 1997). In addition, the 'One Parent Benefit' is a top-
up of child benefit paid to lone parents, which stood at £6.50 at the end of the study 
period, but is considered as taxable income if further means-tested benefits are 
claimed. For the purposes of Child Benefit children are considered as 'dependent' up 
to the age of 16 if working or 19 if in secondary or equivalent education. In a 
Department of Social Security commissioned review of twenty years of Child Benefit, 
10nathan Bradshaw and Carol Stimson (\ 997) conclude that, whatever criticisms may 
be levelled against the rate of Child Benefit, it remains a vital addition to the family 
budget. 
Under Thatcher's Conservative party the tax reforms relating to the separate' 
assessment for married couple's earnings in the early 1970s (see Chapter 5) became 
increasingly criticised (Ringen, 1997: 60-2) on the grounds of lack of privacy for. 
women and discrimination against marriage. In 1988 the Finance Act abolished the 
aggregation of married couple's incomes and allowed dual-earner couple to be taxed 
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as individuals (Millar and Warman, 1995: 380-1). Further reforms saw the Married 
Man's Allowance (MMA) replaced by the Married Couple's Allowance (MCA) (in 
1990) although this was de facto set against the earnings of the husband. In 1992, the 
option. of allocating the MCA to either partner was introduced, although the personal 
allowance for a non-earning partner was not transferable, an aspect which is criticised 
by Stein Ringen (1997: 62) as failing to live up to the rhetoric of the Thatcher 
governments. Both Ringen (1997) and Jane MilIar and Andrea Warman (1995) point 
to the significance of the MCA since it has not been increased in line with inflation 
since the early 1990s. MilIar and Warman have suggested that it is likely to be phased 
out (1995: 381), although minor increases have' been made to the allowance since the 
Labour election victory of 1997 (approx. £70 per annum) (Inland Revenue, 1999). 
Over the study period, the Conservative government amended maternity rights in 
1980, 1982 and 1986. These amendments allowed employers to require women to 
provide written confirmation of their intention to return to work after giving birth. 
Failure to comply could endanger their right to return. In, addition, women in firms 
with six or more employees could be given posts other than those which were 
occupied before maternity leave at the employers discretion. On the implementation 
of the EC Pregnant Worker's Directive of 1994 (92/85), the rights of pregnant women 
in the UK were among the worst in the EU (Ringen, 1997: 50). Up to 1994, no 
statutory maternity leave existed in the UK, although in practice contracts between 
employers and employees contained provision for maternity leave. 
Since 1994, however, pregnant employees have a right to a minimum of 14 weeks' 
paid maternity leave (Ditch et al., 1996: 45) and those with 6 months service are 
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entitled to Statutory Maternity Pay (SMP) payable at 90 per cent of earnings for full-
time employee with a minimum of 26 week's service for the first 6 weeks and a 
further (up to) 18 weeks of lower rate SMP are payable (DSS, 1999). For unemployed 
or self-employed mothers SMP at the lower rate for up to 18 weeks (DSS, 1999). The 
UK does not, however, have statutory maternity leave (Ditch et al., 1996) although 
this has since been changed in line with EU directives to become effective from 
October 1999. This shift results from the direct influence of supra-national institutions 
on party ideologies within a national context. It may also signal the beginnings of 
convergence based upon the implementation of supra-national legislation. 
Education in the UK is free and compulsory from the age of 5. The care of children 
under 5 years of age is thus provided by parents if they are not working, or by 
relatives and public or private childcare facilities if parents are working. Public 
provision of childcare has traditionally been low in the UK, in 1985, for example, less 
than I per cent of pre-school children were in Local Authority day nurseries (Ringen, 
1997: 70). In line with the Thatcher era ideology of diminishing state intervention in 
the family sphere, childcare provision since the late 1980s has become the private 
responsibility· of parents. In addition, Conservative governments have pursued 
policies to encourage private employers to provide childcare in the form of creches, 
although in 19903,000 children received workplace nursery care (Ringen, 1997: 71) a 
low figure when compared to France. The British Social Attitudes Survey of 1990 
revealed that relatives (notably grandmothers) were the dominant providers of pre-
school chi1dcare at 64 per cent, compared to 17 per cent for day nurseries 
(Witherspoon and Prior, 1991: 139). In the mid-90s the Conservative government 
moved towards a scheme of childcare vouchers to help parents pay for private 
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childcare for four year-olds, the scheme however (implemented in February 1997) has 
been identified as tailing to cover the average cost of one year's private pre-school 
care (Cronin et al., 1996: 177). 
The family in party politics 
The following section presents the three main political parties of the UK. Each is 
considered in relation to its evolution, electoral results, and ideological 
representations of the family and the relationship between the state and citizens based 
upon the thematics of public/private and family/individual. 
The Conservatives 
From her victory in the Conservative party leadership elections in 1976, Margaret 
Thatcher used her image as a housewife for political campaigning purposes, and her 
concern with the family resulted in a change of direction in party political ideology . 
. Having been heavily influenced by Keith Joseph, who caused controversy in his 
highly ideological 'Edgebaston' attack on single mothers during the 1970s which 
resulted in him being infamously labelled a 'mad eugenicist' (Thatcher, 1995: 262), it 
is not surprising that the views expressed by Mrs Thatcher and her advisors were, if 
less extreme, particularly reactionary in the context of UK social debate: '[The 
family 1 possesses strength and resilience, not least in adversity. Loyalty to the family 
ranks highest of all, higher even than loyalty to the State. It is no accident that 
dictatorships, whether of the Left. or the Right, seek first to devalue and then to 
destroy the family.' (Jenkin, 1977 quoted in Coote, et al., 1990: 4). Such statements 
clearly situate the family in relation to the state within Conservative party ideology. In 
the same year Mrs Thatcher proclaimed, 'we are the party of the family,' a statement 
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that, according to Malcolm Wicks was ' ... echoed across the political spectrum' 
(Wicks, 1987: 78). Thatcherism thus contained the paradox of increasing the visibility 
of the family within UK party politics while, at the same time, decreasing political 
intervention and encouraging private responsibility for families. The family was 
predominantly a symbolic element of UK right wing party ideology during the 1980s 
and 1990s. 
The most significant step towards the symbolic politicisation of the family by the 
Conservatives took place during the government of Thatcher's successor, John major 
(PM 1990-97). For the first time the Conservatives appeared to provide substance to 
the family rhetoric when Virginia Bottomley was named as Minister for the Family in 
December 1994 (Jones and Millar, 1996). In reality however, the Minister for the 
Family (Stephen Dorrell in 1995) was merely an advocate of increased private 
responsibility supported only by residual state intervention when absolutely necessary 
(Jones and Millar, 1996: 1) as exemplified in legislation such as the Child Support 
Act. 
The overt politicisation of the family during Major's leadership can also been seen in 
the election manifesto of 1997 which states that, 'the family is the most important 
institution in our lives. It offers security and stability in a fast changing world' 
(Conservative, 1997: 30). It is significant that the family is equated to social stability 
given that ideology is a means of maintaining status quo. The Conservative ideology 
thus links protection of the breadwinner family with the protection of its ideal of 
society as a whole. 
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By overtly politicising the family, it can be said that debate surrounding the family in 
British politics of the 1980s and 1990s was instigated by Mrs Thatcher, and it is 
important to be aware of the extent to which policy, proposed policy and cross-party 
political ideology have been shaped by the ideologies· of Thatcherism and the 'New 
Right'. 
Table 7.2 Major political events-UK 1979-1997 
3 May 1979: 
26 March 1981: 
9 June 1983: 
11 June 1987: 
3 March 1988: 
22 Nov. 1990: 
27 Nov. 1990: 
9 April 1992: 
21 July 1994: 
1995: 
1 May 1997: 
The Labour Party 
Conservatives make significant gains and see Margaret Thatcher 
become first female Prime Minister of the UK 
A number of Liberal and Labour MPs break away to form SDP 
Thatcher and Conservatives win general election but with weakened 
majority 
Third consecutive Conservative electoral victory, this time with a 
strong majority 
Liberal Party and SDP merge as the Social and Liberal Democrats, 
becoming the Liberal Democratic Party (Lib Dem) from Oct 1989 
Margaret Thatcher steps down as PM and leader of the Conservative 
party after failing to secure an overall majority in a party leadership 
election 
John Major wins Conservative party ballot becoming leader of the 
party and PM 
Narrow Conservative election victory, Major returned as Prime 
Minister 
Tony Blair becomes Leader of the Labour Party following the death 
of John Smith 
Major challenged as leader, eventually winning a vote of confidence 
New Labour wins a general election landslide, Tony Blair becomes 
Prime Minister 
Despite the fact that, traditionally, Labour voters and members were most likely to be 
found in strong working class communities (Kavanagh, 1990: 122-3) which were, in 
themselves, held together by family ties, the party has rarely looked to family issues 
in order to gain support. Provision of welfare and social protection have, of course, 
been high on the agenda, but direct appeal to the family did not appear to be 
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necessary, perhaps due to the Beveridgian assumption that appealing to the 
breadwinner was appealing to the family as a whole (see Chapter 5) or the left wing 
ideological focus on individuals as primary groups rather than families. However, due 
to the various factions within the Labour party, the lack of rhetoric concerning the 
family may also stern from conflict based upon interpretations of the family such as 
the Marxist critique of the nuclear family as a tool of Capitalist oppression or the 
Feminist view that the family isthe locus of the subordination of women (Elshtain, 
1982: 7). Though the reasons may be varied, it remains the case that Labour had made 
little use of the family in political rhetoric before the 1990s. Exceptions can, however, 
be discovered, such as the significant statements dating back to the last Labour Term 
of office when Prime Minister Callaghan spoke of the family as being ' .. .the most 
important part of our community ... that is why for the first time in our country, our 
Government is putting together what amounts to a national family policy' (Callaghan, 
1977: cited in Coote et al., 1990: 4). The explicit use of 'family', however, is perhaps 
better seen in this case as a defensive reaction to the growing usage of the therne in 
the Conservative ideology at that time. 
Throughout the 1980s, Labour party ideology had little recourse to the family, and it 
was only towards the end of the decade and Mrs Thatcher's decline, that the theme 
makes a strong renaissance in the discourse of the left. For example a 1989 Labour 
policy review placed the emphasis on facilitating work with family life, giving 
women the chance to work and have a family thanks to 'career breaks' and 'returner 
programmes'. The fact that the family was a low priority for Labour during the 1980s 
may also be the result of the party's seemingly permanent position in opposition and 
the relative instability of its leadership. 
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By the early I 990s, possibly as a result of sustained use of the family in Conservative 
rhetoric, the Labour party began to propose family-oriented policies. In 1990 the 
Left's strongest statement to date on the family was published under the title The 
Family Way: a new approach to policy"making (Coote et al., 1990). One of its 
authors, Harriet Harman was named Secretary of State for Social Security in the first 
Blair cabinet. The Family Way (Coote et al., 1990) was highly critical of the 
normative elements of Conservative policies for families and proposed measures to 
address diversification of family forms, family poverty and the reconciliation of 
women's employment and family life. The 1990s later saw 'New' Labour, 
particularly after the election of Tony Blair as party leader, increasingly voicing its 
support for the family. 
This increased concern for family issues is demonstrated in the 1997 manifesto which 
outlines Labour's opinion of the family as follows: 
We will uphold family life as the most secure means of bringing up our children. 
Families are the core of our society. Tbey should teach right from wrong. They 
should be the first defence against anti-social behaviour. The breakdown of family 
life damages the fabric of our society (Labour, 1997: 13) 
Such explicit support for the family and its role in society is similar to much of the 
Conservative party's ideological presentation of the family during the 1980s 
containing elements of private family responsibility. When this is compared to the 
Conservative manifesto's statement (see above) on the family of the same year, there 
appears little difference between to two parties. If this statement, however, is 
compared to the Labour party of 1979, it is almost unrecognisable as the same party 
suggesting a major ideological shift on the British left. 
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Differences appear, however, in relation to deep core beliefs about the relationship 
between the state and the family. Significantly this statement is followed by a clear 
assertion that families and the state are not rival providers of social services (Labour, 
1997: 13), suggesting a partnership between the two rather than the Conservative's 
commitment to privatisation and responsibility. 
The Liberal Democrats 
As the third party of British politics, the Liberals have had varying electoral fortunes 
over the study period, and, in spite of good percentage results (for example 25.4 per 
cent in 1983) have failed to turn this into seats (Kavanagh, 1990). The liberals have 
played a minor role in policy formation over the period, although their ideological 
position in relation to family policies has often been distinct from either the Labour or 
Conservative parties with a greater emphasis on gender equality and combating 
poverty more traditionally associated with the left. 
As with both the Conservatives and Labour, the Lib Dem's 1997 manifesto is their 
most explicit in terms of the family during the study period. Their statement is distinct 
from the other parties in its acknowledgement of family diversity: 
Families, in all their fonns, are a basic building block of society. But the nature of 
families is changing. This has brought new stresses which must be addressed. But it 
has also brought new attitudes, such as the sharing of family responsibilities, which 
should be encouraged (Lib Dem, 1997: 55). 
Thus all three parties gave a high priority to the family and it social function during 
the 1997 election campaign. This open support for the family came after almost two 
decades of Thatcherite rhetoric and is significant in relation to the evolution of the 
place of the family within British political ideologies over the study period. 
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The family in the manifestos 
The following analysis examines the party electoral manifestos of the Conservative, 
Labour and Liberal Democratic parties for the elections 1979-199729. As with the 
other case studies in the thesis, the analysis is structured in relation to the four 
regulatory (abortion, contraception, divorce, parental authority) and four support 
measures (child benefits, fiscal measures, maternity leave, childcare) as well as pro-
family statements and the position of the parties in relation to the thematics of 
public/private and family/individual. 
Abortion 
The question of abortion had been largely resolved before the start of the study period 
and is consequently absent from most of the manifestos analysed, the theme is almost 
completely absent from the election manifestos, suggesting that the parties either 
supported the existing legislation or did not see it as a priority issue. Where abortion 
is mentioned (Labour, 1983: 2) the position is for further liberalisation of the abortion 
laws. In the sections concerning women's rights and health care the Labour Party 
pledged to remove any barriers which existed in the abortion legislation, although the 
manifesto did not state what these barriers were. In addition the manifesto proposed 
increased counselling for women seeking a termination (Labour, 1983: 2). 
Contraception 
Contraception had been liberalised and freely available on the NHS since the 1970s 
and was consequently a low priority for the parties during the study period. The 
Conservatives party made no references to contraception or family planning in the 
study sample. Labour, however, pledged to support NHS provision of family planning 
29 UK manifesto page numbers refer to scanned documents due to inaccuracies in the originals. 
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in both its manifestos of 1979 and 1983, no further references are made in later 
manifestos. The Liberal Democrats pledged to improve family planning services as 
part of its programme to support women's choice (Lib Dem, 1997: 50). In all cases 
where contraception is mentioned it is a measure which is supported, contraception is 
not opposed on either moral or pro-natalist grounds remaining consistent with party 
political ideology in those areas during the UK study period. 
Divorce 
One of the major areas of concern in Conservative party ideology during the study 
period is the notion of family breakdown and the possibility of an increased number 
of poor, lone-parent families and the subsequent negative impact upon society as a 
whole. As a consequence, it may be expected that the Conservative party should 
reform divorce legislation as an obstacle to family breakdown. The debate 
surrounding divorce has continued over the study period in spite of the approval of 
the Divorce Act of 1969 (see Chapter 5). The major issues arising in the debate 
surrounding divorce related to custody, maintenance and pension rights. Indeed, 
according to Lister (1995) the theme of the 'breakdown of the family' has provided a 
significant focal point for Conservative family politics, rhetoric and legislation during 
the 1980s and 1990s (Lister, 1995). In spite of a 'moral panic' (Lister, 1994: 214) 
concerning the longer term effects of increasing numbers of lone parent families, 
divorce legislation has in fact been liberalised. 
Despite the significance of family breakdown to the family debate during the study 
period, the theme of divorce is barely addressed in the party manifestos. Labour made 
only two references to divorce over the period. In the 1983 manifesto, Labour pledged 
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to 'review the whole question of divorce and maintenance' (Labour, 1983: 4) 
although it did not state in which direction reform may be envisaged. Divorce 
reappeared in the Labour manifesto of 1997 in relation to pension splitting reforms 
after divorce (Labour, 1997: 17). 
Given the Conservatives normative rhetoric relating to lone-parent families and 
family breakdown, it is perhaps surprising that that pledges to reform divorce 
legislation appear only once in the study period, although the planned reform seeks to, 
'offer further protection to children, and to secure fairer financial arrangements when 
a marriage breaks down' (Conservative, 1983: 22). Such a statement seems 
paradoxical in the light of Conservative 'family breakdown' rhetoric, as it appears to 
clarifY the framework for divorce proceedings rather than introducing stricter 
legislation to discourage marriage breakdown. Reference to increasing lone parent 
benefits also appeared in 1983 (Conservative, 1983) but this theme was absent in 
1987 and 1992. In 1997 the Conservatives outlined plans to support lone parents, 
notably in their search for work (Conseivative, 1997). In addition, the manifesto 
included a normative reference to the value of marriage; 'Good preparation for 
marriage can be an important aid to a successful family.' (Conservative, 1997: 34) 
and a pledge to allow pensions to be split as part of divorce settlements (Conservative, 
1997: 37). As the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats made no reference to any 
reform of the divorce laws, although all of the manifestos from 1979-97 call for lone-
parent benefits and support measures to be increased and improved. 
Given the high visibility of divorce reform and family breakdown as an element of 
UK family policy of the 1980s and I 990s, the subject was barely touched upon by the 
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parties In their campaign manifestos which, gIven the gradual liberalisation of 
legislation over the period, may suggest that Thatcherite/'Back to Basics' ideology is 
considered out of step with the expectations of the electorate by the parties 
themselves. However, where divorce is mentioned, it is firmly situated in the context 
of private responsibility. 
Parental authority 
Full equality of parental authority was formalised by legislation in 1973 (Chapter 5). 
Given this, the parental authority/responsibility debate over the study period has been 
less one based upon gender equality than one of the limits of state intervention in 
questions relating to responsibility for children and is thus revelatory of party political 
ideology. As has been shown above, the limits of state intervention has been a 
dominant theme of post-l 970s Conservative ideology, a position clearly expressed in 
the 1979 manifesto: 'the balance of our society has been increasingly tilted in favour 
of the state' (Conservative, 1979: 19). Parents responsibilities were seen as their 
having a right to choose in matters of the education of their children (Conservative, 
1979: 19), although in reality this claim sought to defend 'public' (independent, 
privately-funded) schools as part of the party's aim of diminishing state intervention, 
although this may also be interpreted as apologia for elitism in the British education 
system. 
The Conservative manifesto of 1983 made no explicit references to parental authority, 
although reference is made to legal protection of children in cases of divorce, 
suggesting possible, last resort, state intervention or more stringent guidelines for 
custody allocation (Conservative, 1983: 22). 
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References to the family in the 1987 manifesto were solely limited to the area of 
benefit payments and, therefore, questions of parental authority are not addressed 
other than through explicit support for the direct payment of child benefit to the 
mother (Conservative, 1987: 24). Privatisation of social policy re-appeared in the 
1992 manifesto with a clear statement of Conservative ideology: 'Conservatives 
believe that a healthy society encourages people to accept responsibility for their own 
lives. A heavy-handed and intrusive state can do enormous damage' (Conservative, 
1992: 28). Significantly such Thatcherite sentiment was expressed more explicitly 
under the leadership of John Major than under that of Margaret Thatcher herself, 
which may suggest that this element of Thatcherite ideology required time in order to 
become accepted, and has had a lasting impact upon post-Thatcher Conservatives. In 
spite of this opening comment, the manifesto went on to state that 'some families 
need help to cope with their responsibilities. For them, Social Services play a vital 
role. They help with children where parental care has failed' (Conservative, 1992: 
28), suggesting that in some cases it is preferable for the state to take responsibility 
for children, although this again is seen as a last resort. In all cases the defence of the 
rights of the child remains the dominant concern (Conservative, 1992: 28-9). 
The theme of responsibility and diminishing state intervention in family life is 
unequivocally expressed in the 1997 manifesto: 'the family is undermined if 
governments take decisions which families ought to take for themselves. Self-reliance 
underpins freedom and choice' (Conservative, 1997: 30). In addition, in the 
paragraphs relating to the limits of state intervention where parents fail, the statement 
cited above - 'Conservatives believe that a healthy society encourages people to 
accept responsibility for their own lives. A heavy-handed and intrusive state can do 
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enormous damage' (Conservative, 1992: 28) - appears word for word (Conservative, 
1997: 32) further underlining the significance of this theme in Conservative social 
thought. 
Support for parents was also developed in the 1997 manifesto which warns that 'when 
the state goes too far, it is often the children who suffer. They become victims of the 
worst sort of political correctness' (Conservative, 1997: 34). This was bolstered by 
ideological statements relating to the value of marriage, further underlining the 
Conservative belief that parental authority and responsibility ought to lay in the hands 
of parents. State intervention in this 'private' sphere is, thus, only considered as a last 
resort measure for the protection of children. 
The Labour manifestos examined for the period 1979-97 contained no explicit 
references to policies relating to parental authority although during the early period 
(the manifestos of 1983 and 1987). The manifestos supported women's equal rights in 
the family sphere. In the manifestos of 1992 and 1997 a shift takes place which sees 
the Labour party supporting 'parent's', rather than women's, freedom of choice in 
family matters. 
The Liberal Democrats' manifestos for the study period included no statements 
relating to parental authority, although there is a clear and consistent commitment to 
defending women's rights in all walks of life throughout the study period (Lib Dem, 
1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1997). 
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Child benefits 
The tenn 'family allowances' meaning a non-contributory, universal benefit paid with 
the objective of compensating for the financial disadvantages of raising a family does 
not appear in the policy terminology of the study period. The family allowance was 
replaced by the Labour government of 1978 by 'child benefits', signifYing a move 
towards individuals. 
Child benefit is addressed by all of the parties in each on the manifestos examined in 
this case study and as such represent an important element of UK family policy 
during the study period. The Conservatives, although largely seeking to diminish state 
spending on cash benefits, support child benefits in the majority of their electoral 
manifestos, a seemingly paradoxical stance which may be explained by the 
Conservative desire to support all families with children or a 'traditional' family 
model. In 1979 the Conservatives noted the difficulties of the future expense of the 
child benefits scheme while supporting the objectives of the benefit (Conservative, 
1979: 20), thus expressing the key paradox of Conservative family policy in the 1980s 
and 1990s. By 1983, Conservative support of child benefits appeared stronger with 
pledges to raise the value of the benefit to its highest ever in real terms (Conservative, 
1983: 21-22). In addition, the manifesto also pledged to provide further financial 
assistance to lone parent and poorer families (Conservative, 1983: 21-22) thus 
including vertical redistribution as an element of family policy, which, while 
seemingly contradicting monetarist objectives of reducing benefit dependency, may 
result from a desire to reduce poverty which is expressed as a factor leading to crime 
and juvenile delinquency (Conservative, 1983) and thus remains consistent with 
Conservative normative views of society and commitment to law and order. 
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Child benefits continued to receive support in the Conservative Party manifesto of 
1987, although no pledge to increase the benefit was made (Conservative, 1987: 24). 
In contrast, benefits targeting poorer families and lone parents are given strong 
support although the proposed introduction of the 'family credit' scheme suggests that 
the party sought to move away from cash benefits as a means of tackling family 
poverty (Conservative, 1987: 24) and thus the 1987 manifesto appeared to support the 
economic aim of reducing expenditure on benefits. 
Child benefit is a theme which is conspicuous by its absence from the 1992 manifesto, 
although in 1997 the Conservatives pledged to 'protect the value of Child Benefit and 
Family Credit which help with the cost of bringing up children' (Conservative, 1997: 
35). By 1997 however, support of lone parent families had become 'privatised' 
through the Child Support Act and as a consequence, the high profile of lone parent 
benefits in the Conservative manifestos of the 1980s was absent (Conservative, 1997). 
Thus the objective reducing child/lone parent benefits which had been expressed 
during Mrs Thatcher's governments became translated into policies during the five 
years of Major's leadership further suggesting that Thatcher's objectives required 
over a decade of incremental change before they became accepted even within the 
Conservative party. 
Having introduced the child benefits system in 1978, the Labour manifesto of 1979 
pledged to support the system it had introduced (Labour, 1979: I). Child benefit was 
further given a high profile in the 1983 manifesto which pledged to increase it by £2 
per week, link it to inflation and support its real term value for the future (Labour, 
1983: 6). In addition, the 1983 manifesto pledged: 'extra help for families with 
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children' (Labour, 1983: 8) and marked the beginning of Labour's move towards 
vertical redistribution. While child benefit was absent from the 1987 manifesto, the 
theme returned in 1992: 'we will increase child benefit for seven million families' 
(Labour, 1992: 11). The manifesto went on to state 'The most effective way to reduce 
poverty is to increase child benefit' (Labour, 1992: 12), although the benefit was a 
flat-rate universal benefit which did not specifically target poor families. The support 
for child benefit is maintained in 1997: 'we are committed to retain universal child 
benefit where it is universal today - from birth to age 16 - and to up-rate it at least in 
line with prices' (Labour, 1997: 14). 
The Lib Dems also show consistent strong support for child benefits, prioritising 
increases in child benefits in 1979 (Lib Dem, 1979: 40), and further still in 1983 
promising 'help for families with children by increasing child benefit by £1.50 per 
week; increasing the child allowance in supplementary benefit...and ... extra child 
allowance for one parent families' (Lib Dem, 1983: 42), thus targeting poorer families 
as well as all families through the universal benefit. 
The 1987 Lib Dem manifesto contained a whole subsection devoted to child benefit in 
which the party pledged to 'increase child benefit by £1 per child a week in the first 
year and by a further £1 per child a week in the second year' (Lib Dem, 1987: 47) 
thus maintaining support for the universal benefit, although increases for those 
receiving income support with dependent children, and lone parents were also 
outlined (Lib Dem, 1987: 48). The 1992 and 1997 manifestos made no pledges 
relating to child benefit, although the 1997 manifesto expressed commitment to 
supporting the family (Lib Dem, 1997: 55). 
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Fiscal measures 
From the 1979 election manifesto, the Conservative party gave a high profile to tax 
reduction measures for families such as the 'tax credit scheme' (Conservative, 1979: 
20), which aimed to end cases where poorer families have their benefits included in 
income tax. This scheme is not, however, linked to the number of dependent children 
in the family and can thus be interpreted as an instrument to combat poverty rather 
than a pro-family measure. In the 1983 manifesto, however, the Conservatives 
proposed 'improving the tax treatment of married women, whether or not they go out 
to work' (Conservative, 1983: 22) suggesting fiscal measures as family support 
instruments. 
Fiscal measures for families are absent from the manifestos of 1987 and 1992. In 
1997, however, the Conservative pledge major reform of the way the income tax 
system treats families: 'The next Conservative government intends to reform the tax 
system so that it gives substantially more help to families' (Conservative, 1997: 30). 
This statement was backed up by plans to allow single taxpayer families with 
dependent children or care responsibilities to benefit from the transference of personal 
tax allowance. As with proposed fiscal reforms in 1983, this plan did not consider the 
number of dependent children and was a further step towards the privatisation of care 
responsibility commensurate with Conservative party objectives over the study 
period. In addition, tax incentives are seen as an alternative to chiIdcare provision: 
'For those who wish to be full-time parents, our proposals to transfer their unused 
personal allowance to their spouse will be worth up to an extra £17.50 a week' 
(Conservative, 1997: 20). Being related to income tax, however, such a measure 
provides little real incentive for low-earning families. 
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While the Labour manifesto of 1979 did not include taxation in its family support 
measures, it did appear in all other manifestos taken from the study period. In 1983, 
Labour saw reform of the tax system as an integral part of assisting poorer families 
and included the phasing out of the married man's tax allowance (Labour, 1983: 6). 
While tax policies for families were absent in 1987, the 1992 manifesto contained 
detailed pledges to reform taxation and its effects on the family budget. The major 
objective of the reforms was to raise tax allowance thresholds in order to help low-
income families who may be taxed on benefits (Labour, 1992: 13). In addition plans 
to allow married couples to split the married person's allowancc as they chose, thus 
allowing single-earner families to benefit, or dual earner families to maximise the 
allowance for person earning the greater wage (Labour, 1992: 13). While fiscal family 
support measures were not given the same high profile in the 1997 manifesto, the 
party continued to support taxation as a means of combating poverty (Labour, 1997: 
14). 
As with the Labour party, the Lib Dems did not include taxation in their family 
support measures in 1979 (Lib Dem, 1979) and the theme was also absent in 1992 
with only a passing mention in 1997, although this relates to childcare. During the 
1980s, however, taxation was given a high profile in the context of family support. 
The 1983 manifesto pledged to phase out the 'married man's tax allowance' (Lib 
Dem, 1983: 43-44). In 1987 the Lib Dems pledged to restructure the tax system (Lib 
Dem, 1987: 47) and introduce independent tax allowances for married women (Lib 
Dem, 1987: 48). In 1992 no specific tax reforms targeted towards the family (Lib 
Dem, 1992), although in 1997 tax reform was supported as an instrument to combat 
families in poverty (Lib Dem, 1997: 55). 
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Although fiscal measures were supported relatively consistently by all three parties, 
the policies were aimed at combating situations in which poorer families are taxed 
upon the benefits they receive, as opposed to on the number of dependent children in 
the family. This position is thus consistent with family policies as vertical re-
distributive measures rather than pro-natalist measures. 
Maternity leave 
No policies relating to parental or maternity leave (paid or unpaid) were included in 
the Conservative party sample (Conservative, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1997), which 
is consistent with the party's limited action in this area whilst in government and 
supports the ideological view of individual responsibility in family matters. Any 
policies relating to maternity leave would contradict the deep core ideological 
position which portrays the family as 'private'. The lack of Conservative action in this 
area may equally be interpreted as stemming from fiscal prudence and liberal 
economic policies. Maternity leave therein would be interpreted as both costly for 
government and disruptive to industry and the free market. 
The first references to maternity leave in the Labour sample came in 1983 although 
these are not explicit: 'The Conservatives refuse to accept the wide variety in the type 
and size of families. Their policies restrict the choice for members of families - in 
particular they reduce freedom for men and women to choose whether to work or to 
stay at home and look after their families' (Labour, 1983: 4). Maternity leave was an 
explicit objective in the 1987 manifesto as expressed in the pledge to 'provide better-
paid leave for parents when their child is born' (Labour, 1987: 11) a statement which 
was significant in its use of 'parents' as opposed to solely 'mothers' given that the 
legislation at the time related to 'maternity' leave. The theme returned to the Labour 
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manifesto in 1997, although in this example the maternity leave is unpaid and is seen 
as providing 'a valuable underpinning to family life' (Labour 1997: 14), a statement 
which clearly demonstrates the new found position of the family as part of 'New 
Labour' ideology and points to a greater acceptance of state intervention than in 
Conservative ideology. 
Support for maternity leave in the Lib Dem sample was only explicitly outlined in the 
1987 and 1997 manifestos, although support for women's employment is a strong 
theme in all manifestos in the sample. In 1987 the Lib Dems pledged 'to promote 
measures that give employees with family responsibilities rights to parental and 
family leave' (Lib Dem, 1987: 46). Additionally the manifesto proposes maternity 
grants. In 1997 the Lib Dems called for the introduction of statutory maternity leave 
and maternity benefits (Lib Dem, 1997: 55) which were also largely in line with the 
party's support for women's equal rights both in the home and the workplace as 
expressed in all manifestos of the Lib Dem sample, and echoed Labour objectives at 
that time. 
Childcare 
The Conservative manifestos did not include childcare policies up to 1997, although 
in 1992 reference was made to social security vouchers for the purchase of 'certain 
services' (Conservative, 1992: 29) which may have include pre-school childcare, 
although such vouchers were solely aimed at poorer families. The Conservative 
manifesto of 1997 expressed strong support for women's equality in the work place, 
and their right to work, identifYing some problems: 
many women, and some men, face a particular problem: how to juggle job and 
family. For those who need or want to work, we will seek further ways to minimise 
barriers to affordable, high quality childcare (Conservative, 1997: 20). 
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The above statement is vague in tenns of whether the provision of childcare is a 
public or private sector responsibility, although a pledge to 'minimise barriers to 
affordable childcare' suggests state regulation of the private sector rather than state 
provision of services, therefore remaining consistent with Conservative ideology. The 
1997 manifesto thus made the most explicit pledges to help working mothers in the 
Conservative sample, although proposed policies are far from actively encouraging 
mothers to work outside the home. Indeed, the same paragraph offered tax incentives 
for those who wished to be full-time parents (Conservative, 1997: 20). 
Labour party commitment to providing childcare is limited to the 1983 and 1997 
manifestos. The former pledged 'an integrated system of childcare with priority for 
children in the most deprived areas. Our aim will be to introduce, as soon as possible, 
a statutory duty on local authorities to provide education for all pre-school children 
whose parents wish it' (Labour, 1983: 4). By prioritising children in deprived areas 
Labour's objective may have been to allow mothers to take on full-time employment 
thus reducing the burden on the benefits system. However, the latter half of the 
statement suggests that all families should have the choice of pre-school childcare. In 
the 1997 manifesto childcare was presented as part of 'welfare to work', which sought 
to reduce benefit dependency by providing the services to allow mothers to take on 
full-time employment: 'Labour's national childcare strategy will plan provision to 
match the requirements of the modem labour market and help parent, especially 
women, to balance family and working life' (Labour, 1997: 14), echoing the 
objectives of the 1983 manifesto's childcare plan and maintaining the high profile of 
the family through targeted state intervention. 
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The Lib Dem's consistent support of women's right to work is also reflected in its 
childcare policies. Although childcare was not explicitly addressed in 1979, the 
manifesto did pledge support for working mothers (Lib Dem, 1979). In the 1983 
manifesto, the party proposed two childcare measures: 'We will encourage the 
development of supportive care in the community for children through a wide range 
of facilities including pre-school play schemes and nursery centres, and will support 
training for child-minders' (Lib Dem, 1983: 45). A different measure was proposed in 
1987: 'We will offer a tax allowance to help with the costs of childcare and remove 
the tax on the use of nurseries in the workplace' (Lib Dem, 1987: 46), suggesting a 
possible shift towards a privatisation of childcare facilities as advocated by the 
Conservatives. 
Less detailed statements relating to childcare policies appeared in the 1992 manifesto 
which simply pledged to 'improve childcare' (Lib Dem, 1992: 51) and in 1997 the 
Lib Dems proposed to 'extend tax relief on workplace nurseries to other forms of day 
nursery care. We will develop a national childcare strategy, drawing on public and 
private provision' (Lib Dem, 1997: 55). In common with the Labour party, the Lib 
Dems proposed state childcare and were thus not totally committed to private 
responsibility in family issues. 
Conclusions 
On I May 1997, 18 years of Conservative government in the UK came to an end. 
Tony Blair's New Labour won the British General Election with a majority of 179 
seats, a result which represented a bigger electoral shift than that of Labour's 1945 
landslide. Such an emphatic victory appeared to express a loss of confidence in the 
Conservative leadership of the previous two decades, but to what extent had New 
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Labour's position on the family developed over that time, and what was this position 
relative to that of the Conservatives? 
The thesis argues that party political ideology and incrementalism are significant 
elements of policy change. Further, it is argued that for policies to become an 
accepted part of legislative framework of society, the party political ideologies which 
inform or shape those policies must also become accepted. From 1979-97, the family 
became an increasingly high profile theme of ThatcheritelNew Right rhetoric on both 
economic liberalisation and social freedom. In order to judge the extent of the impact 
of such thought and policies, it is necessary to examine the extent to which Labour 
and Liberal Democrat family policy converged towards ·that of the Conservative party 
in relation to the eight family policy measures examined above. 
While is not possible to conclude from the present study that, from 1979-97, UK 
family policy as a whole underwent a significant transformation: indeed certain 
family policy measures, abortion and contraception, did not change at all, notable 
transformations did take place in relation to six of the eight policy measures examined 
above. That six measures were subject to change and two were not provides a 
significant indicator of both the character and extent to which Thatcherite ideology 
came to shape UK family policy of that time. 
Table 7.3 shows which of the policy measures are addressed by each party in their 
election manifestos, as well as highlighting the appearance of significant pro-family 
statements. Out of the 15 manifestos examined in this study, only one, Labour 1983, 
contains references to all eight policy measures, whereas 10 out of 15 contain three or 
fewer references to the eight policy measures. Such a limited representation appears 
to indicate a low priority of family policy issues in UK party manifestos. However, 
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what is significant is not whether all of the measures are addressed by the parties, but 
which measures have received the most consistent coverage over the period. 
The most common theme in the manifestos is child benefits, which appears in 11 
manifestos and it is only absent from one Conservative manifesto (1992) and one 
Labour manifesto (1987) (Table 7.3). 
Table 7.3 Family policy measures in UK election manifestos 1979-97' 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 ! 8 9 
Labour 1979 x x 
1983 x x x x x x x x 
1987 x x 1 
1992 x I x X I 
1997 x x 1 x x x 1 x x 
Conservative 1979 x i x x 1 
1983 x i x x 1 
1987 i x 
1992 x I x 
1997 x x I X x 1 x X I 
Lib Dem 1 1979 x 
1983 1 x x x 
1987 x x x x 
1992 x 1 
1997 x ! x x x 1 x 
Key: I abortion; 2 contraception; 3 divorce; 4 parental authority; 5 child benefits; 6 
fiscal measures; 7 maternity leave; 8 childcare, 9 pro-family statement. 
The second most common policy measure is fiscal policy (Table 7.3). This is perhaps 
not surprising in light of the strength of neo-liberal economic thought as part of the 
Conservative party ideology of the period. The consistent appearance of these two 
support measures suggests the relative importance of family support measures in the 
UK during the study period, although there has been resistance to both maternity 
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leave and childcare by the Conservative party. Where changes can be identified they 
have been largely influenced by Thatcherite objectives of encouraging 
individual/family responsibility and the privatisation of care, most significantly with 
the introduction of the Child Support Act. 
The most significant result of the party manifesto analysis is, however, the appearance 
of pro-family statements in all of the 1997 manifestos. At the beginning of the study 
period commentators (Land and Parker, 1978: 331) had noted the difficulties of 
studying family policy in the UK, the family was not seen as a legitimate target for 
state intervention before the arrival of Mrs Thatcher. This did not, however, change 
significantly during the case study period. Where change is demonstrated, it is within 
party political ideologies. During the three Thatcher governments, however, the 
manifestos do not make explicit pro-family statements. It is only after almost two 
decades of consistent family-oriented rhetoric that the parties openly express their 
view of the family as a basic or central unit of society. Consequently, the 1997 
manifestos contain the most detailed proposals in terms of family policy of the 
sample. 
The case study has revealed growth in the use of the family as a component of party 
political ideology, the gradual politicisation of the theme over the 1980s and 1990s, 
the increased number of family policy proposals from all parties in the 1990s, and 
even the growth in UK family policy research in the 1990s (for example Coote et al., 
1990; see also Chapter 2). Conclusions could be drawn that in UK party political 
ideologies, indeed deep core ideologies about the family, have changed significantly 
during the case study period. It appears that these ideological changes have preceded 
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or family policy change. Perhaps' the most conclusive indication of this can been seen 
in the Child Support Act, which came to embody the ideology of the Conservative 
party in its vision of the private responsibility of families (and therefore state/citizen 
relations), normative ideas about the nature of the family (as the' traditional 
marriedlbreadwinner model) and neo-liberal economics. This change can also be seen 
in relation to the implicit description of family policies in the late 1970s becoming far 
more explicit, in party political ideologies at least, by 1997. 
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Chapter 8 - SPAIN: NEW DEMOCRACY, OLD IDEOLOGIES 
(> 
The case of Spain occupies a unique position among the countries examined in the 
thesis. Whereas French and British politicians were acting within a situation of 
relative political continuity and stability, their Spanish counterparts were faced, not 
only with the challenges of social modernisation, but more significantly with the task 
of constructing a new democracy after the death of General Franco. The transition to 
democracy is central to the evolution of family policies in Spain and is examined in 
relation to the emergence of new political parties and ideologies, conflict with the past 
and the creation or development of policies for families. 
The present chapter introduces the political climate and ideological positions of the 
major post-authoritarian political parties. This is followed by an examination of 
family policy evolution in relation to the eight key family policy dimensions 
examined in Chapter 4 and the French and UK case studies (Chapters 6 and 7). The 
manifestos of Spain's political parties are then analysed in relation to these eight 
measures and the variable of pro-family statements in order to develop a greater 
understanding of the evolution of political ideologies from the first elections, of 
democratic Spain in 1977 to 1996, the date of the last general elections at the time of 
writing (Table 8.1). 
Political transition: denial versus pragmatism 
General Franco died on 20 November 1975 after a lengthy illness. Like Franco the 
man, his regime had also been in its death throes for some time (Garcia Parody, 
1990). His death, however, was the event which gave rise the dawn of the transition to 
democracy. Although the moves to democracy began in late 1975 (Table 8.1), it took 
three years of negotiation before the Spanish Constitution, approved by referendum 
on 6 December 1978, marked the official end of Authoritarianism with its disposici6n 
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derogatoria, a clause revoking the Fundamental Laws of the prevIOus regtme, 
significantly including those relating to abortion, contraception, divorce, 
differentiation between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' children, 'parental authority', 
and wives' right to paid employment (Gomez, 1990; del Campo, 1992; see also 
Chapter 5)30. 
Table 8.1: Major political events in Spain 1975-96 
20 Nov. 1975: 
15 Dec. 1976: 
4 Jan. 1977: 
15 June 1977: 
4 July 1977: 
25 Oct. 1977: 
6 Dec. 1978: 
1 March 1979: 
9 May 1979: 
23 Feb. 1981: 
28 Oct. 1982: 
18 Feb. 1983: 
12 June 1985: 
22 Juue 1986: 
29 Oct. 1989: 
6 June 1993: 
3 March 1996: 
General Franco dies 
Political reform law is ratificd by referendum 
The laws relating to democratisation are passed 
The first general election is held 
Adolfo Smlrez (UCD) forms the first government 
Signing of the Moncloa Pacts 
The Constitution is approved by referendum 
General elections are held, Smlrez returns as Prime Minister 
The Constitution is inaugurated by King Juan Carlos I 
Following a period of instability Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo replaces 
Smlrez. Attempted coup d·etal lead by Lieutenant Colonel Tejero 
The PSOE wins and overall majority in the general electionOs under 
the leadership of Felipe Gouzalez (named Prime Minister I Dec. 
1982) 
The UCD is dissolved 
Spain signs treaty to become a member of the EEC becoming a full 
member on 30 October 1985 
PSOE wins an overall majority in the general elections Gouzalez 
remains as Prime Minister 
PSOE under Gouzalez wins its third successive general election with 
a majority of one seat 
General elections. PSOE victory but needs support of Basque and 
Catalan nationalists 
PP wins largest share of vote but needs support of minority parties to 
form government. Jose Maria Aznar invested as Prime Minister in 
May 
The basis of Spain's public life is laid down in its Constitution. Given the earlier high 
profile of the family Francoist ideology, the Constitution is analysed in order to 
")Notably Article 32: equality between men and women and Article 39 addressing more general aspects 
offamily law and the protection of children (see Alberdi, 1995). 
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examine the extent to which it can be considered as marking a turning point in official 
representation of the family. 
The Spanish Constitution was drafted following the first, post-Franco, democratic 
election in 1977 by 'the fathers of the Constitution', an all-male, cross-party 
committee of seven. The aims of the Constitution were to set out the basis for the 
future of Spanish democracy. It is, therefore, not surprising that the emphasis was 
placed on the establishment of the institutional framework for smooth transition. 
During the period of transition (1977-82) many of the newly elected deputies were 
anxious to ensure that nothing should jeopardise the political process and, as a result, 
consensus became the order of the day (Heywood, 1995). While the constitution pays 
little attention to the family when compared to its previous high visibility in 
foundational documents (Chapter 5), the two articles which are directed towards the 
family are significant in terms of their ideological impact (G6mez, 1990). 
Perhaps the most overt break with Francoist control of the family in the 1978 
Constitution is set out in article 32 (out of a total of 169): 'El hombre y la mujer 
tienen derecho a contraer matrimonio en plena igualdad juridica' (men and women 
have the right to marriage in full, legal equality). This first treatment of family issues 
in the Constitution brought an official end to the anti-feminist nature of the marriage 
contract of Authoritarianism, under which wives were allowed few civil rights, being, 
for example, obliged to 'obey' their husbands or requiring their permission to sign an 
employment contract, known as the 'marriage bar' (Valiente, 1994: 158-63). 
Whilst article 32 appears to be based on the principle of gender equality, the fine 
details of the 'rights and obligations' of spouses, as well as other regulations 
concerning eligibility to engage in a marriage contract, are not developed. However 
the statement that these, 'will be regulated by law' is included. The regulation of 
marriage by law effectively brought an end to the canonical control of marriage, as 
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had been the case under Franco. The statement in article 16, allowing 'ideological and 
religious freedom', further reinforces the break from the dominance of Catholicism 
and the obligation for those baptised as Catholics to marry in the Catholic Church 
whether they still considered themselves as Catholics or not. According to lnes 
Alberdi, (\995: 378), the Constitution established a marital system 'governed by 
pluralism, freedom and respect for the religious and ideological privacy of the 
individual' . 
However, the appearance of support for equality between the sexes in the body of a 
Constitution drawn up by men, the majority having held posts under Franco (Preston, 
1986), may be the result of a desire to avoid controversial issues, which could 
possibly jeopardise both the transition and the credibility of individuals, rather than 
being the product of a radical, ideological break with the past. This is demonstrated 
by the examination of conflict within the parties (see UCD below), which suggests 
that, in spite of the Constitution, deep core Francoist beliefs about the family 
continued to find political support well into the democracy. The extent to which 
parties of all persuasions outline issues of gender equality prior to the publication of 
the Constitution helps shed some light on this theme, although the principles of article 
32 remain highly significant in the political and social development of official 
Spanish treatment of the family. 
The second of the Constitution's articles which target the family is largely made up of 
generic statements about the protection of the family and children. The article is 
subdivided into four statements outlining the major concerns: 
I. Los poderes publicos aseguran la proteccion social, econornica y juridica de la 
familia. (The public authorities will guarantee the social, economic and legal 
protection of the family.) 
2. Los podreres publicos aseguran, asimismo, la proteccion integral de los hijos, 
iguales estos ante la ley con independencia de su filiaci6n, y de las madres, 
cualquiera que sea su estado civil. La ley posibilitara la investigaci6n de la 
paternidad. (The public authorities will likewise guarantee the full protection 
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of children, who are to be considered equally regardless of their filiation, and 
the protection of mothers whatever their marital status. The public authorities 
will make provision for investigation of paternity.} 
3. Los padres deben prestar asistencia de todo orden a los hijos habidos dentro 0 
fuera del matrimonio, durante su minoria de edad y en los demas casos en que 
legalmente proeda. (Parents must give all types of assistance to their children, 
regardless of marital status, as long as they are legally minors.) 
4. Los ninos gozaran de la protecci6n prevista en los acuerdos internacionales 
que valen por sus derechos. (Children will be granted the protection afforded 
them in international treaties which aim to support their rights.) 
Statement one is perhaps the vaguest of the four, and is open to a wide range of 
interpretation. While it may be interpreted as a step towards greater social protection, 
it still focuses clearly on the family. Although removed from the family ideology of 
Authoritarianism, the high visibility accorded the family suggests the continuance of 
beliefs which hold the family as one of the 'pillars' by which society is supported. 
The inclusion of such terms as 'economic protection' may signal a desire to shift from 
the universality of child benefits towards a re-distributive system more in line with a 
social democratic approach. Statements two and three point towards what may be a 
development in the official perception of the family. The Franco regime supported the 
model of a patriarchal, married (canonically), heterosexual couple and their 
(numerous) biological children. The Constitution, however, sets out what may be 
considered a clear break with the previous family model. 
First, statement two assumes state intervention in the family domain by guaranteeing 
the protection of children and mothers. Whilst this notion of state intervention is in 
common with aspects of Francoist ideology, rather than being legitimised by a pro-
natalist and anti-feminist ideologies, intervention targets all children and mothers in 
need, whether they are 'legitimate' or 'illegitimate' married or unmarried, suggesting 
principles of social protection based on equity. 
A key feature of statement two is the clause concerning the investigation of paternity. 
Again, the relative blandness of the clause leaves it open to a range of interpretations. 
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In stating that the law will allow the investigation of paternity, support for the 
primacy of the biological family may be inferred, again suggesting that total denial of 
the past may not have taken place. Equally, the role of the father in the upbringing of 
children may be emphasised, as proof of paternity may inevitably lead the pursuit of 
the absent father (statement 3), this may also result in regular contact with the mother 
raising questions of choice and independence for women. Furthermore, this may be 
evidence that, despite legal developments, the social perception of 'fatherless' 
children may continue to carry a stigma. 
Statement three reinforces the end of distinctions between 'legitimate' or 
'illegitimate' and married or unmarried mothers in the eyes of the law. In this case, 
however, it is done in the context of the rights and obligations of both children and 
parents. Parents are obliged to 'assist' all of their children, which further underlines 
the primacy not only of the two parent, but also the biological family in the well-
being and upbringing of children. 
Statement four is official recognition of supra-national treaties such as article 16 of 
the International Declaration of Human Rights (Paris, 1948) or articles 16 and 17 of 
the European Social Charter (Turin, 1961). The inclusion of statement four is also 
significant insofar as the Spanish Constitution puts an end to the isolationist trend in 
the National Catholicism of Franco. Whatever conclusions are drawn from articles 32 
and 39, it is clear that the family and family policy are considered of sufficient 
importance to be included in the founding document of Spain's democracy. This is 
given extra credence considering the possibility for conflict in the transition process 
(and the possible confrontational issue of the family) and the overwhelming desire by 
all parties to establish the institutions of democracy first, and address policy issues 
later. 
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The Civil Code and the new framework for family policy 
The fundamental breaks with Francoist family policies laid down in the 1978 
Constitution. This break was reinforced with the reform of the Civil Code in 1981 
(Table 8.1) which included the liberalisation of divorce. Abortion was decriminalised 
in 1985. Both of these reforms represented important ideological breaks with the 
previous regime3l and echoed, to some extent, the reforms introduced by the Second 
Republic in the early 1930s (see Chapter 5). In spite of these reforms, Spanish family 
policies maintained a low profile during the Transition and successive governments, 
which according to Celia Valiente (1995: 92) can be attributed to 'historical 
memories' and the desire for actors 'at any price, to be seen as distant and opposed to 
the pro-natalist and anti-feminist Francoist family policies'. Such was the symbolic 
value of the family that measures which target the 'family' as an explicit recipient of 
support, were open to interpretation as reactionary, an element which may explain a 
trend, most notably on the left, towards the individualisation of social policies to 
target primary groups such as children, women or the poor. 
The remainder of this section examines the major developments in the Civil Code and 
family policies, from the Transition to the 1996 general election, which impacted 
upon the ideologically charged areas identified in the Constitution covering rights and 
obligations of spouses, equal civil rights for women, rights and obligations of parents 
and the primacy of the biological family (legal separation, divorce and paternity 
investigation). 
Regulatory measures 
The criminal law governing abortion was abolished in 1983, although this was, and 
remains, a highly controversial area. Despite the liberalisation of abortion, the law 
was not applied for a further two years and was surrounded by emotive debate at both 
J lA thorough analysis of the Civil Code can be found in Alberdi, (1995) and Picazo and Gu1l6n (1997). 
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ends of the spectrum. First, the Catholic Church filed immediate protests on the 
grounds that abortion was the legalised 'killing of innocents' (Del Campo, 1995: 
160). Second, feminist groups objected to the restrictive number of 'conditions' under 
which abortion could be authorised: danger to the life or health of women, pregnancy 
as a result of rape or cases of foetal 'malformation'. The abortion bill had been 
referred to the Constitutional Court after an appeal by the right wing AP. The Court 
eventually agreed that the bill was constitutional but stipulated conditions. Abortion 
was to be permitted under one of three conditions which had been in the original 
proposal; therapeutic, ethical and eugenic. In addition, the court specified further 
conditions: a doctor must assess the consequence of completion of pregnancy. This 
assessment should take place before any operation and abortions could only be carried 
out in state licensed clini.cs or hospitals (Barreiro, 1999). While these objections to the 
abortion legislation received some support, Centra de Investigaciones Sociol6gicas 
(CIS) polls suggested that the law largely reflected public opinion on the matter in 
1983 with 62 per cent in favour of abortion for reasons of safety of women and in 
cases of foetal malformation, 56 per cent in favour in cases of pregnancy following 
rape, whereas 27 per cent of men and only 21 per cent of women were in favour of 
voluntary abortion (Alberdi and Del Campo, 1986: 76). These statistics suggest that, 
while attitudes seemed to have changed, abortion remained an issue where the 
traditional Catholic/right wing ideologies held sway with large sections of the 
population, particularly in cases where there is no medical justification for 
termination. 
The abortion legislation had remained unchanged for a decade when, in 1995, the 
PSOE government proposed a further liberalisation. The proposed amendment sought 
to introduce abortion for social reasons, in cases of personal, family or social conflict. 
The most up to date contributions (Barreiro, 1999) underline the highly controversial 
nature of the abortion debate. Juan Antonio .Femandez Cordon (1996: 56) has 
suggested that conflict over the proposed abortion reform led to the PSOE losing the 
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support of the Catalan nationalists, thus necessitating the general elections of 1996 
which resulted in victory for the right (PP) and signalled the end of 14 years of 
Socialist government. No element of family policy, it seems, is more representative of 
conflict in family ideology in Spain than abortion. 
Improvements in the freedom of choice for women were introduced even before the 
Constitution or the Civil Code. Article 316 of the Francoist Penal Code banning the 
use, sale and distribution of methods of contraception was repealed under the 
disposocion derogatoria, although sterilisation remained a criminal offence until 1983 
(art. 418). 
Articles 66-68 of the Civil Code set out the basic rights and obligations of spouses, 
guaranteeing equality of partners before the law as stated in the Constitution. The 
Civil Code, however, provided for the 'regulation by law' of marriage referred to in 
article 32 of the Constitution. Article 66 reinforced the constitutional principle of 
equality stating, 'the husband and wife have equal rights and obligations'. These 
equal rights and obligations were developed in articles 67 and 68 and included the 
obligation to live together in the domicilio conyugal (marital home), to remain 
faithful, to assist each other and 'act in the interest of the family'. Acting in the 
'interest' of the family was not, however, fully developed and is open to interpretation 
as to what a family is as well as what its interests are. The family remained, as 
implied in its the usage in the context of article 67, based on the marriage of a 
heterosexual couple. Despite the development of the civil rights of wives (equality, 
the right to freely partake in paid employment), the perception of what a family is 
appears to have changed little since the death of Franco: a married couple and their 
children. 
Divorce had already existed in Spain during the Second Republic (\931-36) but was 
abolished by Franco at the end of the Civil war in 1936. However the possibility of 
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se para cion legal was available. Up to 1981 separacion legal was based on blame and 
the concept of 'guilt'. The admission or attribution of 'guilt' carried with it the 
consequence of losing the right to receive custody of children or alimony (Alberdi, 
1979). Act number 30 (7 July 1981) established divorce in Spain and put an end to the 
use of the concept of 'guilt' as grounds for either separacion legal or divorce. The 
consequences of the reform on the role of both parents and their obligations as stated 
in article 154 of the Civil Code and article 39-2 and 3 of the Constitution is treated in 
article 92 of the Civil code: 'la separacion, nulidad 0 divorcio no eximen a sus padres 
de las obligaciones con los hijos' (separation, nullity or divorce do not exempt parents 
from their obligations towards their children). This position concerns what may be 
considered 'true' parental authority, such as legal representation or the taking of 
major legal decisions, as opposed to 'guard and custody', in effect, making the day-
to-day material and care decisions. The partner who does not live with the child(ren}, 
is, generally, required to pay child support (established by the courts according to the 
needs of children and the capacity of the parent without custody to make 
contributions). A failure to maintain payments is punishable under criminal law in the 
form of a fine or imprisonment. The latter is, however, very rare with only two fathers 
being imprisoned on those grounds between 1981 and 1995 (El Pais. 1995: 32). 
It is also important to note that, in order for a divorce to be granted by the family 
courts, at least one year must have passed since the deposition of legal separation 
(Alberdi, 1995: 385-92). This two-stage divorce proceeding has been identified as the 
major explanatory factor in the low divorce rate in Spain, notably as a result of the 
financial implications of a drawn out legal process (Del Campo, 1990; 1992). 
Rights and obligations towards children are established through biological parenthood 
and through legal adoption in article 108 of the Civil Code. As a result of this link, 
differences between what were, under Franco, termed 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' 
children were abolished (Del Campo, 1992). The exact nature of the rights and 
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obligations of parents towards their children, patria potestad (paternal authority) is 
outlined in article 154 of the 1982 Civil Code: to look after children to the best of 
their ability; to provide material support according to the abilities and means of 
parents, not merely the minimum for subsistence; to provide them with an education. 
Parents are obliged to provide children with mandatory education at least between the 
ages of 6-16, and to represent them legally. Whereas article 154 heralded no real 
changes from the parent/child relationship in pre-democratic Spain, the authority is 
clearly 'parental' as opposed to 'paternal' and is thus a significant ideological change 
in relation to gender equality. 
The articles of the Constitution and Civil Code examined above do not clarifY the 
consequences of remarriage on the administration of patria potestad. It is, therefore, 
implied that the absent, biological parent retains parental authority except in cases 
where step-parents legally adopt children thus entailing a transference of parental 
obligations as stated in article 108 of the Civil Code (Diez-Picazo and Gullon, 1997: 
284). 
Support measures 
A significant aspect of Spanish family policy is the relatively low level of child 
benefits. In spite of the Constitution's aim to 'guarantee the ... economic ... protection of 
the family' (Art. 39), child benefits have had negligible economic effects on the 
family budget, with the annual allowance per child remaining frozen at 3,000 
(approximately £12) Pesetas from 1971-1990 (Fernimdez Cordon, 1996: 52). A long 
over-due increase in child benefits was introduced in 1990. The benefit was increased 
to 36,000 Pesetas (approximately £142) per annum, an increase of twelve times, but 
this was still considered too low to compensate for the reduction in the value of the 
allowance since 1971 (Femimdez Cordon, 1996: 52). In addition to the low value of 
the allowance, it was frozen on its introduction, and by the end of 1995 had lost 27 
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per cent of its real-term purchasing power (Femandez Cordon, 1996: 52). In addition, 
the allowances had also been subject to means-testing since 1990 (Valiente, 1997) in 
line with the Socialist party's objective of targeting poorer families. 
Table 8.2: Evolution offamily policies in post-Transition Spain 
6 Dec. 1978: 
20 July 1981: 
1982: 
30 Nov. 1983: 
10 Dec. 1983: 
28 May 1985: 
1990: 
1994: 
1995: 
Constitution guarantees equality between spouses and state support 
for the family (Articles 32 and 39) 
Divorce is legalised 
Civil Code refonns 
Abortion is legalised 
Abortion legislation is suspended pending an appeal lodged with the 
Constitutional Court 
The abortion law is passed after the inclusion of modifications 
recommended by the Constitutional Court (published as article 417 
bis of the Penal code 12 July 1985) 
Child benefit re-valued for first time since 1971 
Child benefits to be up-graded annually, definition of 'large family' 
changes from four or more to three or more children 
Refonn of maternity leave, becoming 'parental' leave; government 
proposes controversial amendment to abortion law 
While child benefits have had a limited impact on the economic situation of families 
in Spain, some commentators (Femandez Cordon, 1996; Valiente, 1997) point to 
fiscal measures as a more significant instrument of family support. Tax relief for 
families was based upon the number of children and, before 1987, also required 
parents to be married in order to receive the tax relief (Valiente, 1997). The state 
budget law of 1995 introduced progressive tax deductions relative to the number of 
children, with the rate remaining unchanged for two children but being increased for 
the third child and further still for the fourth and subsequent children (Femandez 
Cordon, 1996: 51). This reform favoured large families, and was not to be unexpected 
given the resurgence in political concern with very low fertility (see Table 5.3) as 
expressed by both right and left in their 1996 manifestos (PP, 1996: 5.5; PSOE, 1996: 
78) (see below). 
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The law relating to maternity leave in Spain was reformed in March 1990 and 
extended the statutory period ofleave from 14 to 16 weeks (Del Campo, 1990: 344). 
From 1994 maternity leave became considered under the Social Security system in 
the same way as any other temporary employment break, such as sick leave, and 
during the leave payments of 75 per cent of the base reguladora (the base rate for 
benefit calculation). Up to 1995 parents had been entitled to unpaid maternity leave of 
up to one year (only one parent may take the leave if both are employed) with a right 
to return to the same position under the same contractual terms. Since March 1995, 
however, when the law was reformed in line with the EU Pregnant Worker's 
directive, maternity leave became available for up to three years. However employers 
may fill any vacancies created with short-term contracts which benefit from reduced 
employers' contributions. The objective of this reform sought to combat any 
objections employers may have had to hiring married women of childbearing age 
(Fernandez Cordon, 1996: 54). 
It is perhaps significant to note that the extension of maternity leave to three years 
(unpaid) is in a context where public provision of childcare for 0-3 year olds is almost 
non-existent. While post-authoritarian Spain has seen an total increase in women's 
work, from 17.7 per cent in 1970 to 33.1 per cent in 1991 (although the increase has 
been up to three times as much for women of child bearing age) (Alberdi, 1995: 137), 
very little has been done to help young mother's in terms of childcare. Constanza 
Tobio (1994) suggests that this may result form the continuing implicit belief that 
domestic work, including childcare, is the responsibility of women. This lack of state 
childcare is also coupled with limited regulation of expensive private sector nurseries 
(Escobedo, 1998). Some parents are, however, eligible for a means tested tax 
allowance to help with childcare, but this remains limited measure and given the 
relatively high costs of a largely unregulated childcare sector has had little impact 
(Escobedo, 1998). 
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According to Celia Valiente (1995) the relative lack of public intervention in family 
policy since the death of Franco can be attributed to 'historical memories' and the 
desire for actors 'at any price, to be seen as distant and opposed to the pro-natalist and 
anti-feminist Francoist family policies' (Valiente 1995: 92). This conclusion is 
reached after the examination of the significance of family policy measures and 
statements. However, the existence of certain specific elements of family policy 
outlined above suggests greater continuity than Valiente (1995) appears to argue, thus 
requiring closer examination of the influence of party political ideologies in order to 
establish the extent to which the political rejection of Francoist family ideology 
shaped Transition and post-transition family policies in Spain. It is clear, given the 
radical break in political continuity, that no assumptions about the national context for 
ideologies should be made in relation to Spain. The following section, therefore, 
considers the ideological position of each party in relation to the new democracy. The 
potential impact of historical memories as described above is, however, central to the 
discussion. 
The political parties of Democracy 
The legacy of the ideology of Francoist dictatorship is central to the understanding of 
contemporary right wing parties in Spain. The wider implications of this legacy on 
Spanish politics can provide an important line of enquiry, especially in terms of its 
effect on family policy. However, many political taboos arose from the all-consuming 
desire, at least amongst the political elite, to appear completely disassociated from the 
previous regime and as a result, the right wing parties which did gain ground in the 
democratic era, were more 'centrist' in approach, either from a genuine rejection of 
the past, or a reluctance to develop fully their stance for fear of being branded 
apologists for Franco (Valiente, 1995). 
The political parties of Spain are a clear product of the political and social 
development of the nation since the 1930s, but particularly since the end of 
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Authoritarianism and the Transition to democracy when political parties became legal 
(Martinez, 1990). While the ideologies of the individual parties can be understood in 
terms of right and left, along with other parties in Europe, the continuing effects of the . 
dictatorship on the party political ideologies of Spain cannot be underestimated 
(Valiente, 1995). 
Union de Centro Democrtitico and Centro Democrcitico y Social 
A centrist position was initially highly popular with the electorate, and played a key 
role, in the form of Union de Centro Democnitico (UCD), as the cornerstone of the 
new democracy (Table 8.1). Like the other Spanish Parties, UCD emerged from the 
general confusion caused by Franco's death, and was made up of many small, 
factionalised groups. Despite the unstable base of the party, the desire to carry Spain 
through the delicate process of transition provided initial unity, and consensus became 
the order of the day. Under the leadership of Adolfo Suarez, UCD won the first two 
elections in 1977 and 1979 with 36.4 per cent and 35.0 per cent of the vote, 
respectively (Table 8.1). Although these victories did not provide an overall majority, 
they did allow UCD to control the early years of modern Spain. Perhaps more 
important was the majority which UCD members had on the committee which drew 
up the constitution (three out of seven members). 
The collapse of UCD came about largely because the unifying force of the party and 
the desire for a smooth transition without the dominance of the left had dissolved by 
1980. It was then that a rift between 'the party's four main ideological factions' began 
to impose itself (Ross, 1997: 54). The factions which began to appear at the heart of 
UCD can be classified into the following categories: 
• Christian Democrats: this group, while advocating a German-style 'social market 
economy' had close links with the Catholic Church and consequently proved to be 
conservative on issues of social reform; 
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• Liberals: advocated a greater degree of social change, which orought them into 
conflict with the Church; 
• Social Democrats: in broad agreement with the· Liberals on social change, but 
sought a greater degree of economic planning; 
• ex-Francoist Bureaucrats: this was largely a group of personalities, including 
Smirez, for whom the sole aim was a peaceful transition, avoiding any potentially 
volatile reforms. 
The final breakdown of UCD resulted from disagreement in the area of the family, 
notably during the negotiations in the regulation of a divorce law which was contested 
by the Christian Democratic and Francoist elements of the party. After the disastrous 
result of the 1982 election UCD became a minor party overnight. Smirez's splinter 
party, the right-of-centre Centro Democrtitico y Social (COS), only took two seats 
and so was by no means a beneficiary ofUCD ideological in-fighting. 
Alianza Popular 
The most notable success at the cost ofUCD's demise was demonstrated in the results 
of Alianza Popular (AP). Over the period 1977-82, the party developed from a cluster 
of tiny right wing groups, which advocated the transition to democracy along the lines 
of ideologically charged incremental change, to a fully fledged voice for the political 
right. The year 1982 signalled what was effectively the birth of the right as a force in 
Spanish democracy and began a period during which AP became the 'natural' party of 
opposition. Helped by defections from the crumbling UCD, AP went on to increase its 
share of the vote from 6.0 per cent in 1979 to 26.5 per cent in 1982, effectively 
transforming AP into the major voice of the Spanish right (Heywood, 1995). 
The poor, early election results (8.3 per cent in 77 and 6.0 per cent in 79) show that 
the original, implicitly anti-democratic image of AP was out of line with the vast 
majority of the electorate, and the party, under the leadership Manuel Fraga lribame, 
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set about modelling itself on the ideologies of more moderate right wing parties, most 
notably the British Conservative party. This is reflected in its view of family matters 
as the private responsibility of families. It was Fraga's wish to see AP become the 
'natural' party of govemment32. 
Whilst the parties of the right were at great pains to find a voice within the new 
democracy, the left, thanks to their 'outlaw' status during Authoritarianism, were not 
under such pressure to show their commitment to the Transition. There were, 
however, doubts about the Communists' support of a peaceful transition (Gilmour, 
1985). Despite having held strong electoral appeal in the industrial regions of Spain 
during the 1920s and 1930s, the Socialist and Communist parties had suffered the loss 
of organisational structure and experience during the 40 years they spent as banned 
organisations. Rather than operating on a national level, the underground parties of 
the left functioned as factionalised, secret cells. 
Partido Socialista Obrero Espaiiol 
Unlike its right wing and centre-right competitors at the first elections, the Partido 
Socialista Obrero Espaiiol (PSOE), had solid historical roots, having been founded in 
1879 upon the rigid Marxism of the founder Pablo Iglesias. During the Franco era, the 
PSOE was driven underground, where, unlike the Communists, its leadership did little 
to oppose the dictatorship actively. This stance became the focus of discontent for a 
growing number of its younger, better-educated members. In 1974 a change of 
leadership was to transform the party and, eventually, Spain itself. Felipe Gonzalez 
was elected as leader at the Party's 25th congress. The role of Gonzalez in Spanish 
politics of the 1980s and early 1990s can be compared with that Fran~ois Mitterrand 
or Margaret Thatcher in France and the UK respectively, insofar as his personality 
became synonymous with his party and its policies. 
32 [n the analysis of the manifestos the Coa[icon Democmtica (CD), A[ianza Popular (AP) and Partido 
Popular (PP) are all different names for the same party as it evolved. 
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In tenns of the PSOE's approach to family policy, the election manifestos from 1977-
96 are consistent in tenns of policies and position. The tenn 'familia' rarely appears 
as a major concern in PSOE manifestos as the party remains consistent with 
traditional Socialist conceptions of state support for the needs and rights of 
individuals. When the framework family policy measures are mentioned, they are 
most commonly be found under general social security or welfare headings, or 
headings which refer specifically to women and women's rights. The PSOE is thus 
situated in close relation to the thematics of public and individual. 
Partido Comunista de Espana/lzquierda Unida 
Izquierda Vnida (IV) is the third largest party in Spain and is an alliance of smaller 
left wing parties and independents, its largest component is the Communist party 
(PCE). The most characteristic element ofthe PCE/IV has been its failure to live up to 
general expectations. The PCE was a powerful and unified body of resistance through 
the Franco regime with strong support from both the largest worker's union 
(Comisiones Obreras-CCOO) and many young educated Spaniards who supported its 
opposition to Authoritarianism. Observers and PCE members believed that the party 
would prove the major post-Franco political force. However, this optimism was not 
reflected at the ballot for three possible reasons: first, internal divisions had begun to 
become apparent between traditionalists and the advocates of Euro-communism; 
second, once considered as the strongest opponent of Franco, the PCE lost some of its 
appeal in the democracy, with many supporters of the left opting for the more 
moderate (or even 'democratic') pledges of the PSOE; third, the PCE also suffered 
from the effects of political legacy as the Communists had been blamed for many 
atrocities during the Civil War (1936-39) in Francoist propaganda. These claims were 
not entirely unfounded and some on the left were damning of Communist 
participation in the war. Whatever the reasons, the PCE and its later incarnation, IV, 
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have remained little more than the largest of the minor parties with its share of the 
vote barely making double figures, suggesting an electoral ceiling (Amodia, 1993). 
In keeping with the low profile of PSOE family policies, the PCE/IU manifestos make 
few explicit references to the family, with policy measures targeting social 
inequalities based on individuals rather than on the family unit. This latter fact, 
combined with the relatively limited influence of the PCE/IU at government level, 
diminishes the party's impact on the general area offamily policy in Spain. 
The family in the party manifestos 
The following section analyses the eight policy measures, abortion, contraception, 
divorce, parental authority, child benefits, fiscal measures, maternity leave, childcare 
and pro-family statements as they appear in the party election manifestos of the major 
national parties of Spain from 1977-1993. 
Abortion 
Abortion had been the single most contentious element of family policy since the 
1930s. With the Transition came the desire on behalf of the more radical left to 
introduce measures that would bring Spain into line with its European neighbours. In 
addition, the growing women's movement on the left became an important pro-
abortion lobby. Given the power of the Catholic Church and the pro-natalist ideology 
of Franco, the first years of the Transition did not herald a radical break in political 
attitudes towards abortion from the parties of the right. 
The UCD manifesto of 1977 was unequivocal in its position on abortion. Although 
the family was only treated in a short paragraph, the UCD states, '[el partido] es 
contrario al aborto y postulauna protecci6n suficiente a la madre soltera' ([the party] 
opposes abortion and demands sufficient protection for lone mothers) (UCD, 1977: 
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13). The UCD is clearly in line with the family interventionist and anti-abortion 
position of right wing political ideologies by offering support for lone mothers who 
are discouraged from seeking abortions. In the same year the PSOE did not mention 
abortion, or indeed the family in any way, but strongly advocated an improvement in 
women's rights (PSOE, 1977). 
In spite of a clear anti-abortion stance in 1977, no mention of abortion was made in 
1979 after the first UCD government. The question was not, however, completely 
abandoned by the right. The democratic coalition of Alianza Popular and Partido 
Democratico Popular set out a 'right to life' position based upon 'el desarollo de la 
Constituci6n en defensa de los principios cristianos' (the evolution of the Constitution 
in line with the defence of Christian principles) (CD, 1979), an ideological position 
which summed up the delicate balance of the Transition and the potential for conflict 
over deep core beliefs on questions of family regulation and especially abortion. 
On the left, while the PSOE continued to leave abortion out of its electoral 
programme, the PCE addressed the possibility of its legalisation (PCE, 1979). The 
Communists pledged the introduction of abortion legislation similar to that of other 
European countries, as a measure to combat what it estimated as 300,000 'back-street' 
abortions per year, thus situating the abortion debate firmly within the context of 
women's health (PCE, 1979). 
The elections of 1982 resulted in a PSOE majority and government and the first steps 
towards the legalisation of abortion. In spite of the importance of the proposed bill, 
the question of abortion, including the nature of future legislation remained absent in 
the PSOE manifesto of 1982 (PSOE, 1982). Equally abortion had disappeared from 
the text of the PCE manifesto (PCE, 1982). On the right, AP made no mention of a 
position in relation to abortion, although it did recommend measures to protect lone 
mothers and the introduction of 'family centres' to 'ilustrar a la familia sobre las 
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consequencias de sus decisiones' (illustrate to the family the consequences of their 
decisions) (AP, 1982: 136) which may have been intended as an anti-abortion 
strategy. In contrast with all of the above parties, the centre-right COS took an 
explicit anti-abortion stance (COS, 1982: 63). Indeed, rather than calling for the 
relaxation of the law, the COS proposed reforms to the penal system to take into 
account different types of abortion based upon the circumstances of indi vidual cases 
(CDS, 1982: 63-4). Thus, the year before the introduction of the abortion bill, only 
one of the four major parties stated a clear position, an anti-abortion position. 
By the time of the 1986 elections, the abortion law had been in force for a little over a 
year. The law was based upon strict criteria for which an abortion could be performed 
and the control of establishments where operations could be carried out. The 
governing party, the PSOE, stood by its legislation, and explicitly addressed abortion 
for the first time in its manifestos (PSOE, 1986). In addition the PSOE proposed 
better education about abortion as well an increase the number of clinics authorised to 
carry out the operation (PSOE, 1986: 84). The Communists (now Izquierda Unida 
(IU)) attacked the government and the abortion bill suggesting that the law was 
merely a means of appeasing its opponents rather than a modern abortion bill (IU, 
1986: 27). AP had lodged the appeal against the abortion bill which resulted in the 
legislation being delayed by over a year and a half, and continued to defend the rights 
of the unborn child by advocating a pro-life stance in its 1986 manifesto (AP, 1986: 
100-10 I). The renamed Partido Popular (PP) manifesto for the 1989 general election 
contained no references to abortion. Indeed, relative to the previous high profile, the 
family in general was virtually absent as a general party focus on neo-liberal 
economic policies came to the fore in a similar way as in France and the UK. 
Perhaps as a reaction to the governing party's seemingly increasingly liberal attitude 
towards abortion, the theme reappeared in the PP manifesto of 1993. A full subsection 
is dedicated to 'Defensa de la Vida' (defence of life) (PP, 1993: 75-6) in which the PP 
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outlined moral and philosophical arguments stating why abortion is unnecessary in a 
modem society. Alternatives to abortion were supported and included sex education, 
the creation of advice centres for women, labour reforms, adoption reforms and other 
alternatives to abortion (PP, 1993: 75). In addition, the manifesto states that 'la 
solucion no esta solo en la legislacion penal, sino en la educacion en el respeto y 
proteccion de la vida' (penal reform is not the only solution, but also education about 
the respect and protection of life) (PP, 1993: 76). In stark contrast to the previous 
ideologically charged manifesto, that of 1996 made no references to abortion at all. 
There are no clear reasons as to why the theme absent in 1996. However the 
liberalisation of social attitudes in the electorate may have been an influential factor. 
As with other parties, ideological issues that may be damaging to electoral campaigns 
are ignored. This does not represent conclusive proof of a shift in PP ideology. 
On the centre-right, the CDS, although it did not openly support abortion, ceased to 
oppose it in its electoral manifestos from 1986. In contrast to earlier manifestos, a 
high profile is accorded to gender equality (CDS, 1989; 1993). In both of the PSOE 
manifestos of 1989 and 1993, the party calls for the broadening of the terms of the 
abortion law notably relating to the freedom to choose to have an abortion (PSOE, 
1993: 59). As discussed earlier, the question of abortion has been highly controversial 
in spite of the modernisation of Spanish society. Abortion became absent from the 
manifestos of the right in the late I 980s, as the left moved towards further 
liberalisation. In the 1990s there was a return to the old distinctions between the pro-
abortion left and the pro-life right. A further indicator of this split can be seen in the 
importance PSOE moves towards liberalisation played in bringing about the 
dissolution of parliament in 1995 which led to the electoral victory of the Partido 
Popular and Jose Maria Aznar (Fernandez Cordon, 1996: 57-8). In 1996, however, the 
PSOE continued to defend its pro-abortion position and openly blamed the right for 
the failure to introduce the reforms: 
proposimos una despenalizaci6n mas amplia de la interrupci6n voluntaria del 
embarazo a traves de une Ley que contempla diversos aspectos sanitarios, sociales y 
---------
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juridicos. Esta Ley no ha podido ser aprobada por la actitud obstruccionista de los 
partidos que representan a la derecha de nuesto pais. Entendemos que la mujer debe 
decidir de manera aut6noma y responsible sobre su maternidad. (we propose further 
liberalisation of voluntary termination of pregnancy through a Law which considers a 
number of health, social and legal aspects. This Law has not been introduced as a 
result of the obstructionist attitude of the right in our country. We understand that 
women have the right to make individual and responsible choices about their 
maternity.) (PSOE, 1996: 64). 
The explicit pro-abortion ideology of the PSOE, most notably in 1996, represents 
strong commitment. The deep controversy surrounding abortion made it politically 
sensitive for parties to take a clear stance, even as late as 1996. Indeed the PP, whose 
opposition led to the collapse of the 1995 reform bill, did not make any references to 
divorce in their 1996 manifesto. The defence of the liberalisation of abortion laws by 
both parties of the left suggests the importance of this issue and women's rights 
within their political ideologies. 
Contraception 
During Authoritarianism, the penal code made little or no distinction between 
abortion and contraception (see Chapter 5). Since the death of General Franco, 
however, a distinction has become clear, indeed after the disposicion derogatoria of 
the 1978 Constitution, the ban on contraceptives was effectively lifted. Thus it may 
have been expected that the parties of the right in particular would have seized upon 
contraception as a tool with which to fight the pro-abortion lobby. This did not 
happen. 
Neither the UCD nor AP mentioned family planning in their manifestos before 1982, 
the year that saw the PSOE abortion bill gaining impetus. AP called tor the creation 
ofa network 'family orientation centres' in 1982 (AP, 1982: 136), although it was not 
until 1993 that the party openly advocated alternatives to abortion, but even then it did 
not explicitly advocate the use contraceptive methods (PP, 1993: 75). In the same 
way, contraception is not addressed in any of the COS manifestos during the study 
period. 
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In contrast, the PCE manifesto of 1979 promoted contraception, through improved 
sex education and family planning centres, as an alternative to abortion (PCE, 1979: 
12), although in later manifestos its more radical pro-abortion stance took precedence. 
In the same year the PSOE called for family planning centres to be set up for the 
distribution of contraceptives (PSOE, 1979: 21), a theme that was maintained in later 
manifestos (PSOE, 1982: 29, 1986: 82-3, 1989: 66, 1993: 59, 1996: 64) and was 
developed along with support for abortion. 
Explaining right wing ideologies' apparent reluctance to address contraception is less 
evident than in the case of abortion. However, given that both abortion and 
contraception may be categorised together within ideologies of the Catholic Church, 
pro-natalism or apologists for Franco, it may be that what the right wing parties do 
not say about contraception may prove as significant as what is said by those on the 
left. Indeed it may be that the right did not wish to alienate themselves from an 
electorate which had clearly become favourable to contraception, the liberalisation of 
which, as John Hooper (1993) argues, had a far reaching impact on post-authoritarian 
Spanish social attitudes as represented in the growth of women's movements and 
sexual liberalisation in the media. 
Divorce 
The first major legislative changes to have immediate impact on the family came in 
1981 with the introduction of the divorce law. As with abortion and contraception, 
marriage, particularly religious marriage, had been one of the cornerstones of the 
family ideology of Franco. Divorce had been introduced during the Second Republic 
(see Chapter 5) and had been a highly controversial measure. With the Transition, 
however, and the desire to modernise Spain, it was perhaps inevitable that a divorce 
law would be passed. 
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The first governing party, the UCD, did not mention divorce in its 1977 manifesto, 
although it did support the introduction of civil marriage within the secular state 
(UCD, 1977: 13). By 1979, however, it was clear that the UCD sought to introduce 
divorce legislation but under strict conditions, 'no se admitini divorcio por mero 
acuerdo de los conyuges. Las causas de separacion y disolucion a efectos civiles han 
de ser tasadas y graves para los supuestos en que los matrimonios esten 
definativamente rotos y en todo caso se protgenin especialmente los intereses de los 
hijos' (Divorce by mere mutual consent of the partners will not be allowed. The 
reasons for separation and civil dissolution of marriage must be restricted and serious, 
based on the assumption the marriage has broken down definitively, and in all cases 
the interests of the children will be especially protected) (UCD, 1979: 27). Such strict 
conditions reflect the deep-rooted opposition to divorce that had dominated Spanish 
family ideology during Authoritarianism. 
The PCE, in contrast, called for the introduction of divorce by mutual consent in 1979 
(PCE, 1979: 11). Although, in the manifesto following the introduction of divorce, the 
question was completely absent (PCE, 1982) which is perhaps surprising given the 
parallel high profile moves towards divorce legislation by the party. By 1986, IU 
called for the reform of divorce laws and, notably, the abolition of the statutory period 
of legal separation as well as the inclusion of tighter controls of maintenance 
payments (IU, 1986: 28). After this date, however, the question disappeared from IU 
manifestos in spite of the lack of divorce law reform. As with the PSOE manifesto, it 
is difficult to explain the absence of divorce measures in the IU manifestos especially 
given the central role the measure plays within left wing and feminist ideologies 
associated with the party. 
The theme of divorce was almost entirely absent from PSOE manifestos during the 
study period (PSOE 1977, 1979, 1982, 1989, 1993, 1996) with only the 1986 
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manifesto proposing laws to guarantee maintenance payments and just inheritance to 
divorced women (PSOE, 1986: 85). No statements to either reform or support of the 
contemporary legislation were present. In the same way, the centre-right CDS did not 
address the question of divorce in its manifestos (CDS, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993). 
The only party which stood out against divorce was the right wing AP/PP. The CD 
manifesto of 1979 made clear its support of Christian values and the indissolubility of 
marriage (CD, 1979) as central to the political ideology of the party. After the 
introduction of the divorce law, the party did not propose to repeal any divorce 
legislation, although it did make promises to support the family and 'separated 
women' (as opposed, significantly, to divorced women) (AP, 1982: 136-38). Indeed 
in 1986 a clear pro-marriage position was defended, in which marriage was presented 
as the foundation of the family suggesting a negative opinion of alternative family 
forms (AP, 1986: 99). In contrast, the pp manifestos of 1993 and 1996 proposed 
measures for divorced women by setting up a special fund to support lone mothers 
(PP, 1993: 74,1996: 5.5). 
While the majority of the parties' ideologies appear to support divorce, only the UCD 
(the party under which the law was introduced) and the Communists make explicit 
pro-divorce references in their manifestos. The low visibility of divorce in PSOE 
manifestos, notably during the late 1970s, seems a curious omission from a 
progressive party. The PP's original negative view of divorce changed slightly into 
one of tolerance as demonstrated by the proposition of support measures for divorced 
women in the 1990s. The changes in the PP position shows a shift in the party's 
political ideology about divorce, a theme which became more socially acceptable 
after the introduction of the law. 
While the AP/PP openly spoke out against divorce before the legislation was 
introduced, the party has maintained a pro-family/marriage position which suggests 
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that divorce continues to be viewed negatively in Spanish right wing party political 
ideology. The PSOE's lack of propositions to reform the two-tier Spanish divorce 
laws seems out ofline with its liberal, pro-abortion and feminist ideological stance. 
Parental authority 
In Francoist ideology, parental authority was synonymous with paternal authority, and 
was expressed as such in law (see Chapter 5). The dominance of the patriarchal 
family model has been commented on as an important defining factor of Spanish 
culture by outside observers such as Ian Gibson (1992) and John Hooper (1993). 
Challenging such a deeply entrenched ideology became a major objective for the 
parties of the left in democratic Spain. This objective is reflected in the high visibility 
of policies for women and equality in the manifestos examined here which generally 
greatly outnumber strictly family policy questions or substitute the 'family' as the 
heading under which family policy instruments are presented. 
Across the time period, there appears to be a broad consensus relating to the equality 
of partners in the application of parental authority. The first and most explicit comes, 
perhaps surprisingly from the right. The CD manifesto of 1977 set out its support 
equal rights between parents, although parental authority was phrased as the Spanish 
patria potestad that in literal translation relates primarily to the father (as represented 
by the etymology of the term patria, from 'father') (CD, 1977). The only other party 
that addressed this theme in 1977 was the PSOE, although its statement generally 
called for legal equality between men and women (PSOE, 1977: 20). In spite of the 
message in the 1977 CD manifesto, AP/PP barely addressed the theme of parental 
authority or equality in the family environment with the exception of vague, almost 
cursory, statements relating to gender equality in 1982 (AP, 1982: 137-38) and 1993 
(PP, 1993: 74). 
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The UCO manifesto of 1979 supported 'la igualdad juridica entre los conyuges' (legal 
equality between spouses) (UCO, 1979: 25) and equality in the exercising of 'patria 
potestad sobre los hijos al padre y a la madre' (parental authority between the father 
and the mother) (UCO, 1979: 26), again the ideologically loaded term patria potestad 
was used. The term patria potestad was also used by the Communists in 1979 relating 
to equality in parental authority (PCE, 1979: 11), although this notion was opposed, in 
line with PCE ideology, in the 1982 manifesto in the 'supression del concepto de 
cabeza de familia y de clausulas discriminatorias por cuestion del sexo en los 
convenios' (abolition of the concept of head of the family and of clauses which 
discriminate between the sexes) (PCE, 1982: 21). In 1986 the Communists attacked 
patriarchalism, and called for no legal loss of parental authority or custody for 
mothers in cases of adultery or lesbianism (IU, 1986: 28), as had previously been the 
case. 
The COS before 1986 made no reference to equal parental rights. In the 1986 
manifesto, however, the COS called for joint responsibility between men and women 
in the education and development of their children in accordance with UN directives 
relating gender discrimination (COS, 1986: 92-3). The party underlined the fact that 
women were still unequal in family life in spite of the changes that had taken place 
since 1977. Thus suggesting that statutory anti-discriminatory measures were 
insufficient (COS, 1989: 57) although this was later dropped from the 1993 electoral 
programme (COS, 1993). 
Undoubtedly the most consistent support for gender equality in the family comes 
from the PSOE. The 1979 programme calls for true equality of opportunity, rights and 
responsibilities in family life (PSOE, 1979: 29). In 1982 the Socialists continued to 
demonstrate their ideological position through support for equality III 
'responsabilidades cotidianas de la vida familiar' (daily responsibilities of family life) 
(PSOE, 1982: 29). In 1986 there were no specific family measures, but the party 
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supported gender equality in all areas (PSOE, 1986: 81-5). In 1989 the PSOE raised 
themes such as difficulties of equality in family life (PSOE, 1989: 65) and addressed 
attitudes towards equality through education policies from early age (PSOE , 1989: 
66). Both of the latter were present in 1993 (PSOE, 1993: 58-9) and 1996 (PSOE, 
1996: 66-7) and represented the commitment of the PSOE to the rights of women. 
Child benefits 
The ideologies of the parties of the right and centre-right examined in this chapter 
have made clear their support of the family which they see as 'una de las 
institutciones mas basicas de la sociedad' (one of the most basic institutions of 
society) (AP, 1982: 135), 'la instituci6n basica del conjunto' (the basic institution of 
the community) (UCD, 1977: 13) or 'el principal soporte afectivo de las personas' 
(the principal source of emotional support for people) (CDS, 1982: 62). For these and 
other reasons the parties have defended policies to support the family. Perhaps the 
clearest indicator of commitment to families is the amount of financial resources that 
are directed towards them. During the study period Spain spent relatively little, in fact 
the lowest in the EU according to Eurostat (I998: 68), on family policy. Child 
benefits were not increased in line with inflation between 1971 and 1990 and thus had 
a negligible impact on family budgets for the greater part of this study. 
The relatively low impact of child benefits is reflected in the party mani"festos. None 
of the parties included child benefit pledges in the 1977 manifestos. In 1979, child 
benefits were proposed by the UCD and the left as a means of vertical redistribution. 
The UCD outlined proposals for benefits targeting the most needy (UCD, 1979: 25), 
which was echoed by the PCE 1979, and sought to assist poor families (PCE, 1979). 
In addition to targeting the poorest families, the PSOE further pledged allowances for 
single mothers (PSOE, 1979: 29), commensurate with left wing concepts of state 
intervention. 
260 
This aim of combating poverty through child benefits was maintained by the PSOE in 
1982 in a pledge to reform the child benefits, notably as a means of assistance for the 
unemployed with dependant children (PSOE, 1982: 23). The COS manifesto of 1982 
also pledged reforms to the child benefit system, but, whist it sought to assist poorer 
families, it also focused on large families which may suggest pro-natalist objectives 
(COS, 1982: 63). Prior to the re-valuation of child benefits in 1991, the then party of 
government, the PSOE, outlined. their intention to reform allowances, 
'incrementandola significamente' (increasing them significantly) (PSOE, 1989: 27). 
In 1993, after the allowances were increased, the theme returned to the party agenda 
of the COS and the PP. Whereas the COS called for benefits to paid from the first 
child (COS, 1993: 5), a measure which in France (see Chapter 6) may be considered 
as a demonstration of opposition to pro-natalism, the PP explicitly defines its pro-
natalist objectives: 'En funci6n de la politica demognifica, el establecimiento de 
ayudas econ6micos directas alas familias con tres 0 mas hijos' (in line with 
demographic policy, the establishment of economic assistance for families with three 
or more children) (PP, 1993: 74). Although it is later added that this assistance will be 
based upon the level of family income (PP, 1993) it is still clear that pro-natalism 
continues to play a central role in PP ideology. In 1996, however, neither the PP nor 
the PSOE addressed child benefits. 
There appears to be general consensus among the Spanish parties that direct financial 
transfers ought to be targeted towards poorer families, even for the parties of the right, 
which, whilst favouring large families, clearly do not defend benefits for all large 
families irrespective of income as may be expected of right wing pro-family 
ideologies, notably in France. This picture of the parties contrasts with the universal 
nature of child benefits in Spain. It may be argued that these allowances have a 
relatively limited impact on the family budgets of wealthier families on the one hand, 
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and on the other hand they fail to meet the aim of sufficiently assisting poorer 
families. 
Fiscal measures 
Tax relief for families, either based upon number of children (cuota familiar) or 
indirectly (or implicitly) through mortgage relief, have perhaps had more impact on 
family budgets than any other policy measure examined here (Fernimdez Cordon, 
1996: 51). Since 1992 the economic impact of tax relief has had a greater effect on 
family budgets than other transfers, although in an economic study of the relative 
impact of these measures, Gerardo Meil (1994: 976-79) concluded that, even taking 
tax relief into consideration, financial support of the family in Spain fell behind that 
of other EU countries. 
The analysis of tax relief in the party manifestos reveals an ideological split across 
left and right. The PSOE made no reference to tax relief for families during the study 
period before 1996. This was reflected in the analysis of the Communist party 
programmes with only the exception of 1986 manifesto calling for the reform of the 
system of joint declarations that effectively discriminated against married, dual-earner 
fiscal households (PCE, 1986: 28). This latter objective was also addressed by the 
CDS (1982: 62) although tax relief appeared a low priority in 1986 and 1989. In the 
1993 manifesto, the only reference made to tax measures concerned the reduction of 
the definition of large families from four to three or more children (CDS, 1993: 5). 
The reluctance of the left to use fiscal measures as a means of redistribution is directly 
linked with the concept of targeting state intervention at poorer individuals who 
would be less likely to feel the impact of tax relief on household budgets. 
On the right, the UCD pledged to increase fiscal benefits for families (UCD, 1979: 
25), although it was APIPP which prioritised fiscal measures as a means of assistance 
to families. In 1977 the CD manifesto stated, 'las leyes fiscales deben ser modificadas 
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si se qui ere proteger verdaderamente a la familia' (fiscal laws must be reform in order 
to provide tangible protection of the family) (CD, 1977) and called for dual earner 
couples to be considered separately for tax declaration purposes (CD, 1977). This 
theme is presented consistently in later manifestos with the addition, in 1993 and 
1996, of greater family tax deductions for families with three or more children (PP, 
1993: 74) which was ideologically consistent with the demographic policy objectives 
presented in the 1993 and 1996 manifestos (see child benefits above). This position is 
consistent with right wing ideological support for neo-liberalism as well as privacy 
and responsibility. 
Unlike the uniformity of parties' positions in relation to child benefits, there is a clear 
commitment on the right, notably APIPP, to tax relief as a means offamily support. In 
spite of the complete absence of family tax reductions as a part of PSOE family/social 
policy elections pledges. It is significant to note that the reforms sought by the other 
parties were implemented by the Socialist government over the study period. 
Maternity leave 
A further split between left and right party ideologies can be observed in maternity 
leave policies. Maternity leave is an important policy instrument for the reconciliation 
of family and employment commitments and consequently figures prominently in the 
left's drive towards combating gender discrimination. In spite of the high visibility of 
gender equality/employment policies, the PSOE did not outline any measures relating 
to parental/maternity leave until 1989. Even the 1989 manifesto only made vague 
statements relating to assisting mothers to reconcile work and family life (PSOE, 
1989: 66). In 1993, however, a clear commitment was made, with a pledge for 
maternity leave to be considered as any other sick leave and eligible for full salary 
(PSOE, 1993: 59), a policy which was introduced by the Gonzalez government in 
1994. 
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The Communists also supported maternity leave within a package to encourage 
women into the labour market and thus went further than proposing maternity leave. 
Their pledges included a yearly quota of leave, for either parent, to care for young or 
sick children (PCE, 1982: 21). The 1986 PCE manifesto called for the full 
reinstatement on the return to work of either parent taking paid leave for the care of 
young children (PCE, 1986: 28). Later manifestos did not mention maternity leave 
largely as a result of the 1994 reform. 
While the CDS made general statements about reconciling employment and family 
life (CDS, 1989: 57), none of the parties of the right specifically addressed maternity 
leave policies in their manifestos, although this may result from the prioritisation of 
childcare measures, notably a maternal wage and social security contributions for 
mothers who choose to bring up their children. It may, however, result from the 
ideological underpinning of patriarchalism which assumes mothers would remain as 
housewives or, in the context of private responsibility, within the family sphere. 
Childcare 
The provision of childcare is also a significant indicator of both support for the family 
and commitment to encouraging women to enter the labour market. In spite of the 
great amount of rhetoric related to encouraging female participation in the work place, 
particularly, although not exclusively, from the Socialists and Communists, childcare 
has remained underdeveloped, provided largely by the private sector and unregulated. 
The theme of childcare is relatively visible in the manifestos of all of the parties 
during the first half of the study, although there is a clear distinction between public 
and private care for young children between the left and right wing ideologies 
respectively. With the exception of the PSOE, none of the parties included policies 
directed at the care of pre-school children after 1986. 
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Childcare provision by the state was advocated by the parties of the left, consistent 
with left wing interventionist ideology. The PSOE pledged the creation of nurseries to 
help encourage mother into the labour marke~ (PSOE, 1982: 29). The PCE also 
expressed commitment to public sector childcare as a measure to encourage mothers 
in to the work place (PCE, 1979: 12, 1982: 21). The CDS manifestos of 1982 and 
1986 outlined plans to develop nurseries and pre-school places with assistance for 
working mothers (CDS, 1982: 63, 1986: 92) thus echoing both the Socialists and 
Communists. In 1989 no specific mention was made of pre-school places, although a 
general commitment to assisting mothers and to reconciling employment and family 
life was included (CDS, 1989: 57). In addition to the further development of pre-
school places the PSOE manifesto of 1993 pledged the introduction of measures to 
help working mothers to pay for childcare (PSOE, 1993: 59). Although this is not 
developed further, this may suggest a move towards the French AGED or UK 
childcare vouchers system (see Chapter 6) which would suggest a break with 
traditional state intervention policies. In 1996 childcare measures are absent form the 
PSOE manifesto. 
On the right, the AP/PP echoed the left's policy of creation of nursery places to assist 
working mothers (AP, 1982: 136), as a distinct policy instrument which was outlined 
by both AP/PP and the UCD. In support of mothers choosing to stay at home to bring 
up their children, both APIPP and the UCD called for the 'ama de casa' (housewife) 
to be granted a social status to include a maternal wage equivalent to the minimum 
salary and social security and pensions contributions (UCD, 1979: 26; AP, 1982: 
138). These measures can be criticised as anti-feminist, being reminiscent of the 
housewife's status under the Franco regime (see Chapter 5). The 1986 manifesto 
proved an exception by pledging pre-school grants to assist parents with young 
parents (AP, 1986: 101). In contrast to the other manifestos in the sample, the pp 
manifesto of 1996 outlined policies to develop day care centres (\996: 5.7). In the 
case of childcare, the right is clearly in favour of public policies for families, which 
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contrasts with the theme of privacy in other areas. This is likely to be a result of the 
persistence of pro-family ideology on the Spanish right. 
Conclusions 
The Transition to Democracy brought about many changes in Spanish party political 
ideology that had impacts upon both politics and daily life in Spain. The family was a 
highly potent symbol of Spanish identity during the time of Franco, and consequently 
ideology surrounding the family must be considered as being highly resistant to 
change, and with a potential for not only political conflict in cross-party debate, but 
also physical conflict, as happened during the Civil War (see Chapter 5). 
The regulatory measures examined above are, perhaps, the most indicative of the 
strength of family ideologies at the Transition. Of these, abortion and divorce have 
been shown to be on-going sources of party political conflict. The legalisation of 
divorce and abortion was orchestrated by the left wing PSOE, the party which 
dominated the study period. While the PSOE can be seen as being progressive, the 
reforms have been criticised by IU as not having gone far enough. Divorce legislation 
has also been slower in its liberalisation than may be expected in a state dominated by 
progressive left wing ideology and continues, at the time of writing, to be an 
expensive and time-consuming two-stage process. Abortion continues to be highly 
regulated and is still the source of controversy, exemplified by the PP's renewal of its 
opposition to abortion based upon its right wing ideology. Given the continued 
controversy surrounding many aspects of regulatory reform, it is possible to conclude 
that, in spite of the legislative changes, family ideology, notably in relation to 
questions which have been condemned by Franco and the Catholic Church, has 
remained strong in Spain. 
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Table 8.3 Family policy measures in Spanish election manifestos 1977-1993 
I I 2 3 4 I 5 6 7 8 I 9 I 
PSOE 1977 I x I I ! 
1979 I x x I x I 
1982 I x x I X x I I 
1986 I x x x I I 
1989 I x x I x x I 
1993 x x I x x I 
1996 x x I x x I 
PCE/IU 1977 I ! 
1979 x x x x x x I 
1982 x x x I I 
1986 x x x [ x x I 
1989 I x I 
1993 I x I 
1 
I 
1996 I I I I 
PP/AP 1977 x I x I I x 
1979 x x x I I x 
1982 x x I x I x I x 
1986 x x ! I x 
1989 I x j x 
1993 x x x x I x X I 
1996 x x x I x j x 
1
1977 
1 x 1979 
x 
COS 1982 x x x I x i 
1986 x I x I I 
1989 x I I 
1993 I I x I x I , I 
Key: I abortion; 2 contraception; 3 divorce; 4 parental authority; 5 child benefits; 6 
fiscal measures; 7 maternity leave; 8 childcare, 9 pro-family statement. 
A characteristic of the Socialist era of Spanish politics has been the limited 
expenditure on support measures. Little has been spent on child benefits or childcare, 
in spite of rhetoric to the contrary, most notably in relation to assisting mothers to find 
employment. Valiente (1995) argues that this may result from the Socialists wishing 
to avoid intervention in the family sphere, which it considers as being inherently 
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linked with the ideology of Francoism, although this contrasts sharply with the basic 
premise of state intervention in the ideology of the left. 
However, had the PSOE explicitly targeted child benefits at poorer families and 
abandoned universal child benefits, such criticism could have been contested. It is, 
therefore, possible that by failing to increase the value of allowances while doing little 
to provide financial support for poorer families, the PSOE government was following 
financial prudence in relation to family policies. 
While the family has not been a totally absent theme in the party manifestos (Table 
8.3), it has become less common over the study period, significantly since the 1982 
Civil Code reforms. The greatest changes have been in the regulatory measures which 
because of their links with deep core ideology, had to change as fundamentally as 
Spain's political institutions if Spain were to become a modern democracy. The fact 
there is still the potential for conflict may indicate that deep core ideology about the 
family is not as potent as that relating to the stability of Spanish democracy. 
At the beginning of this chapter, the definition of a national context for family 
ideology was avoided. This was justified by the break in the political (ideological) 
continuity of the state. The national ideological context was developed in this context 
througb the analysis of the parties. The key elements of this context have been found 
to be disparate and contradictory. The left wing parties have given much rhetorical 
significance to a public/individual position, but in real policies, these parties, notably 
the PSOE, are limited by the strength of traditional Spanish family values. 
Interestingly, the right has not been able to pursue policies based upon these family 
values for fear of being associated with the Authoritarian past. Consequently, the 
impact of the past and the Transition on party political ideology and family policy has 
been such that both left and rigbt wing parties have not been able to develop their full, 
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potential ideological position. This lack of a definite position has also resulted in the 
disparate and implicit nature offarnily policies. 
Chapter 9 - CONCLUSIONS: THE DYNAMICS OF IDEOLOGY AND 
CHANGING FAMILY POLICIES 
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The present chapter brings together the results of the national case studies and 
compares them cross-nationally. The chapter is structured so as to address each of the 
seven core research questions: 
• To what extent have family policies changed? 
• To what extent have family policies converged! diverged across the 
countries? 
• To what extent have political ideologies relating to the family changed? 
• To what extent have political ideologies relating to the family evolved in 
terms of the political left and right and across the countries? 
• Has the relationship between family policies and political ideologies 
evolved along similar lines? 
• Is it possible to demonstrate a causal relationship between changing 
political ideologies and family policies? 
• Do changes in family policies result from changes in political ideologies, 
does the reverse relationship exist or do both processes act 
interdependently? 
The first stage of the comparison focuses on the dimension of family policy change 
across France, the UK and Spain. Following this, political ideologies of left and right 
are examined through the comparison of the parties across national boundaries. The 
purpose of these two dimensions of comparison is to demonstrate the extent to which 
first, national family policies and, second, political ideologies have been evolving 
along similar lines across France, the UK and Spain. Further conclusions relating to 
the concept of ideology are drawn based upon the comparison of these two 
dimensions. Although neither the family policies nor party political ideologies studied 
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in the thesis have evolved in direct parallel for the three countries, the direction of 
change can be considered as being similar. Thus the present chapter concludes by 
analysing the results of the cross-national analysis within the theoretical framework, 
in relation to the thematics of public/private and family/individual and returns to the 
hypothesis asking the question: to what extent have changes in political ideologies 
impacted upon changes in family policies? In addition, this chapter re-examines the 
exploratory objectives of the thesis and addresses questions which have remained 
unanswered, the limitations of the methods employed and the possibilities for future 
research in this area from a methodological and thematic perspective. 
Comparing changing family policies 
Chapter 5 examined the eight policy measures of which four (abortion, contraception, 
divorce and parental authority) were conceptualised as sharing the common objective 
of regulating family life and four (child benefits, fiscal measures, maternity leave and 
childcare) as providing material support for families. It was argued in Chapter 4 that 
regulatory measures were linked with deep core political ideologies and were 
therefore expected to prove highly resistant to change. Support measures were 
identified as being more likely to be based upon near core beliefs and secondary 
aspects, thus less resistant to change. Secondary aspects relating to support measures, 
such as financial prudence, were identified as being particularly susceptible to change. 
It was therefore argued that greater changes were to be expected in support measures 
than in regulatory ones because of the relative resistance to change in the political 
ideologies which informed them. The following section seeks to answer the key 
research questions: To what extent have family policies changed and, to what extent 
have family policies converged/diverged across the countries? 
Changing trends in regulatory measures 
By the end of the 1970s, the regulatory measures of France and the UK were largely 
in place. Over the study period these measures, with the exception of abortion in 
271 
France, which was reformed in 1981 to resemble closely the UK legislation, were 
identified as having undergone little or no change. Abortion, and to a lesser extent 
divorce, continued to prove ideologically controversial on the French far right, but by 
the end of the study period regulatory measures were characterised by a general 
consensus across the main parties in both France and the UK. Thus changes in 
policies relating to abortion, contraception, divorce and parental authority have 
evolved along similar lines in France and the UK. Equally, the legislation relating to 
these measures demonstrates general converging trends over the study period. 
At thc beginning of the Spanish case study, regulatory measures were shown to be 
sources of controversy and political conflict. Measures such as abortion, 
contraception and divorce had previously been illegal and legislation relating to 
parental authority had been inherently anti-feminist. During the Transition to 
Democracy, however, the regulatory measures of Authoritarianism were rejected by 
changcs to the Constitution and thc Civil Code, although this was not without its 
difficulties (see Chapters 5 and 8). A growing political desire from the left to pursue 
policies based on the rights of women resulted in transformations in parental authority 
legislation and the liberalisation of contraception in the early 1980s. Right wing 
opposition to abortion and divorce continued to be strong, as represented in the court 
cases brought against the government during the early 1980s (see Chapter 8). 
However, largely as a result of left wing persistence, a desire to modernise Spanish 
society and PSOE dominance, first divorce and then abortion were legalised in spite 
of the opposition. Both of these measures, however, remain more tightly regulated 
than in either France or the UK. Although explicit political criticism of abortion and 
divorce dwindled during the I 990s, failure to liberalise them further in line with 
France and the UK may indicate an underlying deep core objection, possibly 
stemming from the strength of the right wing ideology of National Catholicism, to 
abortion and divorce in the Spanish polity. 
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In spite of the controversy surrounding regulatory measures in Spain, the potential for 
deep core ideologies to change over time may lead to future liberalisation. A possible 
condition for this may come in the form of greater EU harmonisation and integration 
of these measures. Although a backlash in right wing party political ideology may 
occur, it is unlikely that the measures will be repealed for fear of comparisons with 
the authoritarian regime, as has argued Valiente (Chapter 8). 
ComparingJamity support 
Family support measures in the three countries have evolved at a different pace and in 
different ways to the end of the study period. Support measures in the three countries 
can be considered as having undergone incremental changes over the period as a 
whole. In the French case, attempts to implement relatively radical reforms in 1981 
and 1995 failed in the first instance due to fiscal prudence in the context of a growing 
economic crisis, and in the second instance because of the possible effects of deep 
core ideologies. The French child benefit system was seen to embody the core 
concerns of party ideologies in relation to the family (see Chapter 6). Any threat to it 
has met with widespread public and political opposition. The fact that the system 
remains in spite of convincing economic arguments to reform or abolish it, suggests 
the underlying ideological (in effect the opposite of scientific) nature of this measure 
in France. 
Perhaps the greatest reforms in French family policy came in relation to child benefits 
and childcare. Early in the study period, an allowance (AP JE) was paid from the first 
child thus reversing the pro-natalist ideological tradition by which payments were 
made from the second child, although this was a one-off payment not, strictly 
speaking, child benefit. The question of payments to the first child in France is 
however open to a number of interpretations. While, traditionally, pro-natalist 
ideological arguments have suggested that payment from the second child encourages 
larger families, it may be argued that the first child constitutes that greatest financial 
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burden. Payments to the first child may also be considered as pro-natalist as they seek 
to assist or encourage couples to have children. These different interpretations blur the 
distinctions between the left and right in France. It may be argued that payments to 
the first child are of greatest benefit to poorer families and therefore are more in line 
with left wing re-distributive aims rather than right wing pro-natalism. 
Later in the study period (from the mid-1980s) childcare policies from the right came 
to dominate the package of support for families through a proliferation of different 
measures that were based on the principle of private family responsibility. Maternity 
leave was also reformed as in the UK and Spain, while fiscal measures were expanded 
to take account of the growing number of cohabiting couples, although tax relief 
relating to the number of children has remained unchanged suggesting the persistence 
of one element of right wing ideology although change can be seen in its inclusion of 
unmarried couples which may reflect France's relatively high rates of cohabitation 
and births outside marriage(see Chapter 5). 
In the UK of the 1980s and 1990s the fundamental nature of social protection and 
state intervention came under increased scrutiny. Child benefits remained universal 
and were paid to mothers, and were subject to minor reforms over the study period. 
Both maternity leave and childcare remained under-developed. Working mothers 
received only limited statutory protection before 1994 and the application of the EU 
pregnant worker's directive. Fiscal measures, in line with neo-liberal ideology, 
underwent the greatest reforms with the Married Man's Allowance being replaced by 
the Married Couple's Allowance. Poorer families were also targeted by fiscal reforms 
which sought to combat the benefit trap by reducing the amount of income tax 
payable on benefits received. This latter development is representative of the 
Conservative government's desire to reduce benefit dependency by making 
employment more economically viable and further encourage the privatisation of the 
family. 
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While the evolution of support measures in France and the UK could largely be 
expected to have undergone incremental change, a more radical shift in support 
measures may have been expected in Spain given the fundamental institutional 
transfonnation of the country after Franco's death because of the very limited nature 
of these measures at the time and the left's desire to address family poverty. However, 
unlike the regulatory measures, material support for families has evolved little in 
Spain since the late 1970s. The same system of universal child benefits which was in 
place at the end of Authoritarianism was maintained and continued to have a 
negligible impact on family budgets in spite of revaluation in the early 1990s. As in 
the UK, working mothers have continued to have little in the way of statutory 
protection, with state provision of childcare remaining undeveloped. Maternity leave, 
again as in the UK, was refonned in line with the EU directive of 1994. The most 
notable support measure in post-Authoritarian Spain is the family related tax relief 
package, which, while representing an implicit family policy measure, has been 
identified as providing greater financial transfers to families than the child benefit 
system. 
IdentifYing trends 
When comparing trends, the distinctions between regulatory and support measures 
reveal different evolutions in family policies across the three countries. If regulatory 
measures are compared, France and the UK appear to be converging over the case 
study period. Both countries had free availability of contraception, parental equality 
was shared by both fathers and mothers, divorce was legal and established and, by 
1981, abortion was freely available in public clinics and hospitals. 
In contrast, abortion and divorce were illegal in Spain into the early/mid 1980s and 
have remained tightly controlled. While contraception and parental authority had been 
refonned in the early days of the Transition, to closely resemble the legislation of 
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France and the UK, the reform of divorce and abortion laws proved far more 
problematic. Despite the legalisation of divorce (1982) and the decriminalisation of 
abortion (1985), both measures are more restrictive in terms of access and cost than in 
France and the UK, with neither the two-tier divorce law nor the complex process of 
seeking the termination of pregnancy the subject of proposed reform by any of the 
parties at the time of writing. However, there is a will on the Spanish left, to pursue 
modernisation which, if combined with increased EU harmonisation of family and 
social policies, may result in greater convergence with France and the UK in the 
future. 
From the perspective of support measures, a number of similarities can be seen 
between the UK and Spain. Neither country has an integrated or explicit family 
policy, and both have demonstrated limited efforts to develop childcare or maternity 
leave. In relation to child benefits, all three countries pay benefits for the first child, 
although it is important to make the distinction between the one-off payment (APJE) 
in France and the universal benefits in the UK and Spain. French fiscal measures are 
distinct from those of both the UK and Spain insofar as they consider family income 
and the number of dependent children. In the UK marriage was the only criteria for 
family-related income tax relief during the study period. In Spain, the complex range 
of tax relief measures has been suggested by Lluis Flaquer33 as having a greater 
impact on family budgets than child benefits, and is a highly implicit and largely 
under-estimated family policy measure. The impact of fiscal measures upon family 
incomes in Spain is, at the time of writing, a significaI\t new area of research in 
Spanish family policy, the findings of which may further understanding not only of 
this topic, but also other family policy measures related to it, notably child benefits 
and childcare provision. 
33 Personal communication, 1999. 
-------
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Overall, even when the slow process of liberalisation of regulatory measures in Spain 
is considered, family policies appear to be converging across the three countries. 
France and the UK are largely similar, at the time of writing, and Spain may only be 
considered as lagging behind the other two countries as a direct result of the relatively 
recent, in historical terms, demise of a far right authoritarian regime. Indeed, moves 
towards social modernisation have been steady throughout the study period and show 
no sign of slowing down at the time of writing. In addition, the growth in the 
privatisation of the family based on neo-liberal economics is also beginning to have 
an impact. 
Comparing changing political ideologies 
The second main focus of the thesis is changing political ideologies as identified from 
the analysis of the election manifestos and the broader political framework of the 
main political parties of France, the UK and Spain. This section therefore focuses 
upon the third and fourth of the seven research questions: To what extent have 
political ideologies relating to the family changed, and to what extent do they 
represent converging! diverging trends across left and right and the countries? 
The case studies revealed how various political parties have aligned themselves with 
the family. This section examines the family as an element of party political ideology 
that crosses both traditional ideological and national boundaries based on the findings 
of the national case study analysis of the manifestos. 
Parties of the right 
One of the central findings of the empirical case studies has been the importance of 
the family in the political ideology of right wing parties in all three countries. Over 
the study period, parties of the right were shown to have defended the family as a 
primary group, the foundation of society. Statements such as the UK Conservative 
party's 'we are the party of the family' sum up this position and this can be seen in 
----- -- ----
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the commonplace occurrence of pro-family statements in the manifestos of all of the 
right wing parties examined (see Table 9.1). 
Parties of the right across the three study countries appear to see themselves as the 
representatives of the family within the political sphere. This 'natural' relationship 
between the right and the family stems from one or more of the following sources for 
each country; 
• first, parties of the right largely seek to maintain social order and continuity, 
the family is seen as embodying social stability and high moral values and is 
therefore a valuable component of society in right wing ideologies. Indeed, the 
survival of the family has been linked with that of the state itself; 
• second, parties of the right are generally associated with the dominant, if not 
official, religion of the country (Catholicism in France and Spain, 
Anglicanism in the UK) and are to some extent influenced by religious 
teachings. In this case however, divergence may be attributable to different 
'official' religions (as demonstrated by the cases of divorce and contraception 
in the UK); 
• third, parties of the right have been generally patriarchalist; 
• fourth, parties of the right are generally associated with pro-natal ism, although 
the UK Conservative party is divergent from its counterpart in France and 
Spain on this point as a result of traditional fears of over-population. It is 
important to note, however, that the Conservative party, rather than focussing 
on the quantity of individuals in society, has been explicit in its pursuit of 
quality through eugenics, as revealed in the 1970s controversy over lone 
parents and social/family breakdown; 
• fifth the right wing parties have presented the family as a private concern that 
embodies the notions of responsibility for care, education, transmission of 
values and support. 
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These five elements of right wing family ideology were also demonstrated as having 
been manifested in the policies; in effect, the Ideological State Apparatuses of the 
authoritarian regimes of France and Spain. Under the Vichy government (1940-44) in 
France. and the Franco regime in Spain (1938-75), family policies became 
increasingly concemed with regulatory measures which had both moral and pro-
natalist aims through the criminalisation of abortion, birth control and divorce, as well 
as measures which placed parental authority firmly in the hands of fathers. In 
addition, support measures also sought to encourage the birth rate through financial 
benefits for large families, as well as limiting mothers' rights and opportunities to find 
employment. 
At the same time as these policies were developed in France, the UK did not have a 
right wing authoritarian government. However, British Conservatism did share similar 
views about abortion and contraception and, most significantly, the role of men and 
women in the family 
The parties of the right have developed their family ideology based upon the themes 
and traditions outlined above. The study of the manifestos helps reveal the extent to 
which these party ideologies have persisted in the study period, and, perhaps more 
significantly, the extent to which the parties are prepared to defend any policies, as 
represented in the financial commitment they may require, or whether the parties 
continue to oppose any policy which conflicts with their ideology. 
The right and regulation 
Chapter 4 showed that regulatory measures, given their inherent normative objectives 
as well as the lesser financial commitment they require, provide an indicator of moral 
beliefs of parties. Table 9.1 shows the four parties of the right examined across the 
three countries. The most significant inclusion in this sample is the French Front 
National, which is the only far-right party in the sample. Neither the UK nor Spain 
has a far right political party which has had any notable impact on political life. While 
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it may be argued that the inclusion of the FN is not appropriate in this comparison 
given the lack of any counterparts in the UK and Spain, its inclusion serves, first, to 
highlight the centrality of the family in right wing ideology, second, to help explain 
the position of the RPRfUDF, and third, to demonstrate the extent to which such an 
ideological position is expressed, if at all, by the right in the UK and Spain. 
The first of the regulatory measures examined in the case studies was abortion, an 
issue which was opposed by the FN in all of its manifestos. The Spanish PPI AP was 
the only other right wing party in the sample to address abortion, opposing it in 1979, 
1986 and 1993. Neither the RPRfUDF nor the Conservatives oppose or indeed, 
mention abortion in the sample. While the FN has openly and vehemently stood 
against abortion, which significantly, in terms of the resistance of its ideology, had 
been fully legalised at the time of publication of all of the FN sample documents. The 
PP/AP has inconsistently opposed abortion, in 1979 before legalisation, and in 1986 
and 1993 after legalisation, perhaps revealing either internal party conflict over this 
issue, or, more probably, reflecting the conflict between the party's ideology (anti-
abortion) and its fear of alienating sectors of the electorate in Spain. 
The opposition to an existing measure by the FN and the pp I AP demonstrates the 
deep core nature of opposition to abortion. Both the FN and the PPI AP have links 
with the Catholic Church and thus oppose abortion on moral grounds. In addition, the 
FN opposes abortion on pro-natalist grounds commensurate with its nationalist/racist 
ideological stance which sees family policy as an Ideological State Apparatus to 
strengthen the French nation and its 'indigenous' people. 
It is perhaps significant that the RPRfUDF does not address abortion in its manifestos. 
This absence can be explained by: 
• first, the RPRfUDF, although a party of the right, was instrumental in the 
development of legalisation of abortion in France before the case study period, 
and thus does not oppose the law; 
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• second, the RPRJUDF as the dominant party of the French right, distinguishes 
itself from the FN and, thus, avoids such a potentially controversial issue. 
However, nor does the RPRJUDF openly support abortion, most significantly in its 
1981 manifesto, which was published during the debate on free abortion within the 
contributory health scheme. By not supporting abortion, the RPRJUDF manifestos 
may represent either the existence of internal party conflict or an attempt to not lose 
potential voters to the FN. 
In the case of the UK, abortion was legalised, as in France, before the study period. 
While this alone may explain the lack of this issue from Conservative manifestos, it 
may also represent a similar position to the RPRlUDF in relation to either internal 
party conflict, or a possible desire not to alienate a portion of its potential support, 
although in the UK no other right wing party provides the same electoral threat as the 
FN in France. 
Although contraception may be closely related to abortion in terms of both moral 
objections or pro-natalism, none of the right wing parties opposed the legalisation of 
contraception, perhaps, again, as a reflection of changing attitudes of the electorate. 
As with abortion, the RPRJUDF and Conservative party do not address the issue 
(Table 9.1). Where contraception is addressed by the PP/AP, it does so in a positive 
way, and presented it as an alternative to abortion, further suggesting that the deep 
core nature of opposition to abortion, which may be seen as one potentially 
controversial position (contraception had been illegal under Franco) is surpassed by 
another. The fact that the PP/ AP suggests alternatives to abortion in manifestos that 
do not address the issue reveals the relative strength of an anti-abortion position in the 
party's ideology. 
In similar terms, the FN's opposition to contraception is not based upon purely moral 
grounds and may represent alternative measures to abortion in the 1997 manifesto. 
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Where opposition to contraception is expressed however the FN further diverges from 
the other parties in this sample. In both 1985 and 1993, the FN opposes the use of 
contraception within the context of its pro-natalistlnationalist ideology, a position 
which is not represented by the other three parties in relation to this measure. 
Table 9.1: Family policy measures and the parties ofthe right 
! 1 2 3 i 4 5 6 I 7 8 9 
RPRlUDF 1981 I I x x x 
1986 i ! x x x x x , , 
1988 I I x 
1993 I x 
1997 I x x 
FN 1985 j x x x x x x x 
1993 ! x x x x ! x 
1997 ' . x I x I X i I 
Conservative 1979 I i x x x I 
1983 ! x i x x 
1987 I i x I 
1992 I 1 x 
1997 ! x i x x x x I x 
PP/AP 1977 I I x I x x 
1979 I x x I x I I x 
1982 x I x x x x 
1986 x I x I x 
1989 i x x 
1993 x x x I X X X X I 
1996 I I x I 
Key: I abortion; 2 contraception; 3 divorce; 4 parental authority; 5 child benefits; 6 
fiscal measures; 7 maternity leave; 8 childcare, 9 pro-family statement 
Divorce is a further issue which has been opposed by the Catholic Church and 
consequently some right wing parties in France and Spain. In the UK a longer 
tradition of divorce may explain the lack of any opposition within Conservative party 
ideology, which has been more concerned with the economic effects of divorce in its 
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manifestos, although the perceived negative social effects of divorce were an , 
ideological concern for the party in the I 990s, especially in the UK. 
While the RPRlUDF made no mention of divorce in their manifestos, the FN 
criticised divorce in the context of both pro-natalist and social arguments which 
supported the nuclear family as the optimum environment for child-rearing, although 
the party did not call for the abolition of divorce, suggesting that any such opposition 
is not related to deep core ideology. In Spain divorce has been highly controversial 
and the PP/AP explicitly opposed the proposed divorce law in its 1979 manifesto. 
After the divorce law was introduced in Spain, however, the PP/AP ceased to oppose 
it, and commented on support for marriage and for divorced mothers. The Spanish 
case thus represents a situation in which the introduction of a policy measure has 
resulted in the abandonment of opposition suggesting the near core nature of divorce 
in PP/AP ideology. 
The question of parental authority has. been shown to be an indicator of gender 
inequality, which was at its most prevalent in the ideology of Franco's Spain. While 
in France and Spain the parental authority debate has been contested in relation. to 
gender issues, the UK stands apart as a case where the lines between the state and the 
individual have become disputed in relation to parental rights. Privatisation of care 
and greater individual responsibility during the 1980s and 1990s in the UK are 
reflected in the Conservative manifestos which support a situation in which the family 
is firmly situated in the private domain, with the state as a last resort for the care of 
children in need. 
In France and Spain, debate has centred on the role of the parents. While the legal 
equality of parents in France was in place before the study period, the FN ideology 
highlights what it termed 'biological differences' between men and women and thus 
sought to maintain an anti-feminist breadwinner model of the family. While the FN 
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does not go so far as suggesting that fathers be given legal authority, its position on 
support measures (such as child benefits) and lack of childcare or maternity leave 
serves to create further inequalities between parents. 
In contrast, the RPRlUDF offers support for equality in the exercising of parental 
authority, although this is only a minor theme (Table 9.1), it is significant as the only 
regulatory theme in the RPRlUDF sample. Parental authority may be considered as 
being far less controversial than abortion, contraception or divorce which may further 
suggest that the lack of an RPRlUDF position on these three issues represents an 
attempt to avoid conflict on potentially deep core issues. It does, however, highlight 
the centrality of the principle of the private responsibility of the family in the 
ideologies of the main right wing parties. 
Perhaps largely as a result of the legacy of Authoritarianism, the PP/AP does not 
address the question of parental authority in the sample other than through vague 
statements in 1982 and 1993 (Table 9.1), which are supportive of gender equality. 
This to be appears a minor concern in the ideology of the Spanish right in spite of the 
significance of this area during the Franco years. 
The right and family support 
Perhaps the most significant result of the content analysis of the right wing parties can 
be seen in column 7 of Table 9.1. None of the right wing parties offers a position 
relating to maternity leave for the whole study period. While this lack of policy 
statement stands as a potentially convergent element of the analysis of the right wing 
party ideologies, there are two possible explanations (below), both of which relate to 
other measures in the study. 
The RPRlUDF stands out in the sample in relation to its commitment to childcare 
policies (Table 9.1). Over the study period, the RPRlUDF has defended women's 
employment and, whilst in government, implemented childcare measures. While the 
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RPRlUDF does not address specific maternity leave measures, its support for 
women's employment suggests a largely egalitarian position which may not require 
reforms to the existing maternity leave measures. Further, the inclusion of such a 
wide-ranging childcare position, combined with support for gender equality contrasts 
sharply with the FN. 
The FN supports neither maternity leave nor childcare measures in the context of its 
argument that mothers should remain at home to rear their children. Any such, 
measures were therefore deemed unnecessary. This position reflects deep core 
ideology not only about the role of the family in society, which is valued for its child 
rearing function, but also about the roles of men and women. The FN clearly sees 
women's primary function as mothers. This ideological position is strongly defended 
throughout the study period in spite, or perhaps because, of growing women's 
employment and increased childcare facilities. 
While the Conservative party's position in relation to maternity leave and childcare 
may appear from the table as similar to that of the FN in France, the lack of such 
measures may be explained by an entirely different political ideology. Any lack of 
childcare or maternity leave in the Conservative manifestos results from the central 
theme of privatisation in Thatcherite and post-Thatcherite ideology. The 
Conservatives do not oppose the principle of maternity leave or childcare, they merely 
see it as a matter of private concern, to be negotiated with the employer in the first 
instance or paid for by parents (de/acto working mothers) in the second. This further 
reflects Conscrvative attitudes towards state intervention in the private sphere as 
opposed to any possible anti-feminist attitudes, although it may be argued that the 
lack of such measures may reflect a negative vision of women's ~ork within the 
ideology of the right. 
The PP/AP's ideological position in relation to maternity leave and childcare may, at 
first, be interpreted as the continuation of anti-ferninism as exemplified by Franco's 
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ideology. While nothing relating to maternity leave is included in the PP/ AP 
manifestos, possible anti-feminist measures (notably the lack of measures to support 
working mothers) relating to the child-rearing role of women are present and are 
similar to FN proposals. That such measures are not developed further than one or 
two sentences may suggest the potential for conflict over this position, notably in the 
context of the legacy of Authoritarianism. 
The family in right wing political ideologies 
The parties of the right have traditionally supported the family as a primary group in 
society with private responsibilities. Often this conception of the family has been 
synonymous with the defence of patriarchy and pro-natalism, although the latter has 
not been a feature of the British right. These themes are reflected both in the 
regulatory and support measures analysed. The FN and pp ideologies have been open 
in their opposition to both abortion and divorce. In addition these parties have done 
little to further the cause of gender equality, indeed the FN has based its anti-feminist 
position upon what it has described as biological truths. The FN has also been explicit 
and steadfast in its defence of the traditional (French) family. The PP's position has 
gradually become liberalised over the study period converging with the RPRlUDF 
and Conservative parties. While originally opposing abortion and divorce, it has 
ceased to do so in its manifestos since legalisation. Equally, the PP has developed 
support for gender equality exemplified in the 1996 manifesto. The theme of the 
depopulation of Spain is maintained in the PP policy pledges, which are made more 
explicit in the I 990s. 
The FN has also weakened its opposition to abortion and divorce over the study 
period, although this only relative to the position expressed by the party in 1985, and 
continues to diverge from the other right wing party ideologies in the study. 
The RPRlUDF manifestos provide an ambiguous picture of the party's ideological 
position in relation to the family. The RPRlUDF does not pursue the same family 
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policy agenda as the FN and makes few clear references to regulatory measures. 
While this may be interpreted as an attempt to avoid controversy, it must be 
remembered that abortion was legalised during an RPRlUDF government. The family 
is clearly valued as with all of the right wing parties, but the 1980s appear to represent 
a period of transition, during which concern with population decline is overtaken by 
the problems of France's economy and policies of fiscal prudence. Family policy 
measures are closely linked with employment creation objectives, as demonstrated by 
the growth in childcare measures which both create employment in the care sector as 
well as assisting mothers to seek paid employment. 
The RPRlUDF's commitment to developing childcare policies stands in contrast to 
the almost complete lack of any such policies in the Conservative party's manifestos. 
Indeed, the Conservative party did little over the study period to either regulate or 
support families in the UK. The most significant policy introduction of the period (the 
Child Support Act) was a clear product of the dominant element of Thatcherite 
ideology: the privatisation of welfare. 
Left wing parties 
The main left wing parties of France, the UK and Spain have had a different impact 
upon the governments of their respective countries. In France, the PS has experienced 
its most consistent period of electoral success during the study. Although the PS did 
not govern France uninterrupted from 1981-97, its presence has been almost constant 
in the presidency. In stark contrast, the Labour party in the UK was in opposition for 
the whole study period, and its influence on family policies is thus limited. The PSOE 
has been the most successful party in the new Spanish Democracy and has had the 
greatest impact upon family policies, although the reforms introduced by the 
Socialists were not as far reaching as may have been expected from a left wing party. 
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The left and regulatory measures 
Family policies and support of the family, have not traditionally been a left wing issue 
indeed all of the left wing parties can be characterised by their commitment to vertical 
redistribution and gender equality rather than the family. 
The PS, however, supported the family in the early 1980s as may be expected in the 
context of French politics and the close relationship between the family and the state. 
The manifesto analysis has, however, revealed a trend which has resulted in the 
complete absence of the family as a theme in the manifestos of the 1990s. 
Similarly, the PSOE has traditionally focussed on the needs of individuals as the 
target of social policies rather than families. However the 1996 manifesto stands out 
from previous ones due to the inclusion of a chapter on the family, thus diverging 
from the PS. In addition to the explicit family focus, the concern with falling fertility 
rates echoes traditional right wing ideological concerns rather than those of Socialist 
ideology. This move towards seemingly right wing family policy objectives by the 
PSOE may also be observed in the Labour party. Throughout the study period the 
Labour party has targeted social policies towards the poor, women and children as 
have the PS and PSOE. However the 1997 manifesto is influenced more by 
Thatcherite ideology than that associated with the traditional Labour party. This is 
demonstrated further when it is compared with the Conservative manifesto of the 
same year. While this may represent the abandonment of traditional left wing 
ideology in the UK, it must be considered in the context of growing cross-party 
convergence/consensus in each national context. 
Not surprisingly the parties of the left have supported the liberalisation of abortion, 
contraception, divorce and equality of parental authority largely in an attempt to 
combat gender discrimination and support women's rights. In spite of this, Spanish 
divorce and abortion legislation (introduced during PSOE government) has remained 
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restrictive. These measures have been identified in Chapter 8 as indicators of the deep 
core nature of political ideologies in relation to these measures in Spain. This is 
further supported by their distinct position in relation to left wing parties in France 
and the VK. Table 9.2 shows the inclusion of the eight family policy measures and 
pro-family statements in the manifestos of the left wing parties. It is clear when the 
manifestos are compared, that the PS in France had largely abandoned family policy 
as an electoral issue after 1981. The evolution of PS ideology has been away from 
family policies and the associated horizontal redistribution, towards individuals and 
vertical redistribution._ This trend corresponds to the results of the Labour party and 
PSOE manifesto analysis with the exception of the 1997 and 1996 manifestos 
respectively. 
Table 9.2: Family policy measures and the left 
I 1 I I 2 3 4 5 6 . 7 1 8 9 
PS i 1981 1 x I x x x x ! x 1 1 
1 1986 I i x 1 
1 1988 x 1 
! 1993 ! I 1 
11997 1 x 1 I 
Labour 1979 i x x 1 i 
1983 x 1 x x x x x 1 x x 
1987 I x x 
1992 I x x X I 
1997 I x x x x 1 x 1 x , x , 
PSOE 1 1977 , x 1 1 
! 1979 x x x 1 I I 
1 1982 x x x I i x 
! 1986 x I x x I I I I 
1 1989 1 x x 1 x X I I I 
1 1993 1 x x x 1 x I 
11996 1 x 1 x 1 x 1 x 1 x 
Key: I abortion; 2 contraception; 3 divorce; 4 parental authority; 5 child benefits; 6 
fiscal measures; 7 maternity leave; 8 childcare; 9 pro-family statement 
-- ---_. -------------
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Diverging visions of the family 
The rea~ons for the divergence between, on the one hand, the PS and, on the other 
hand, Labour and the PSOE in the second half of the 1990s are of central importance 
to the objectives of the thesis and reveal distinct trends which appear to distinguish 
between left wing ideologies across national boundaries. It is interesting to note that 
the development of a family focus has been revealed in relation to the left wing party 
ideologies of the UK and Spain, two countries which do not have a tradition of 
explicit, coherent family policies as has the PS in France. The existence of an 
established family policy structure in France may negate any need on the part of the 
PS to argue for thl: social protection of families, whereas the opposite may be the case 
in the UK and Spain. This is examined in more detail below. 
The minor parties 
While the impact of the minor parties on family policy change is limited due to their, 
often, secondary role in government, their portrayal of the family has revealed some 
significant findings. In terms of their ideologies, the minor parties have changed to a 
far lesser extent than the major parties largely due to the fact that their function in 
opposition is to challenge the status quo. 
The PCF is a clear product of the French national context for ideologies. While the 
PCF is highly interventionist (public), this is commensurate with its communist 
ideological foundation. However, during the early part of the study period, the PCF 
manifestos included references to intervention in the family sphere which may stem 
from the highly legitimated traditions of the family as a primary group in France. 
Later in the study period, this stance is abandoned in favour of policies for 
individuals, thus returning to a more traditional left wing position. 
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The PCE, largely due to the clean slate of Spanish pol itics in the late 1970s, has 
maintained a consistent left wing ideological position bas ed upon public policies for 
individuals. 
Table 9.3: Far left parties 
6 7 I 8 ~ x 2 3 4 5 PCF 1981 x x x x 
1 1986 x I 
1988 x x x 
1 1993 x I 
1 1997 I 
PCE/IU 11977 I I 
1979 x x x x x x I 
1 1982 x x I x 
1986 x x x x x 
1989 x 
1993 x 
hority; 5 child benefits; 6 Key: I abortion; 2 contraception; 3 divorce; 4 parental aut 
fiscal measures; 7 maternity leave;'8 childcare; 9 pro-fami ly statement. 
The ideologies of the centre parties have also had a,very limited impact on policy 
change during the study period with the exception of U CD in Spain. UCD was the· 
first party of government in the new Spanish democrac y and expressed an explicit 
family interventionist stance, although this was based up on the family as a primary 
group for redistribution and support rather than a con tinuation of Franco's pro-
family/anti-feminist ideology. 
Neither the Lib Dems, in the UK, nor the CDS in Spain , have had a notable impact 
upon family policy change. It is interesting to note, howe ver, that the Lib Dems have 
occupied a more traditional left wing position in the U K than the Labour party in 
relation to family policies. In common with the Labour p arty, Lib Dem manifestos of 
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1997 have followed the Conservative obsession with the privatisation of family 
responsibility further suggesting cross-party convergence in the UK. 
Table 9.4: Centre parties 
I 2 3 i 4 5 6 7 8 
Lib Dem 1979 I x I 
1983 i x x x 
1987 I x x x I x 
1992 x 
1997 x I I x x x 
1
1977 x 
1979 x x x x 
CDS 1982 x i I x x x 
1986 I x I x 
1989 I x I 
1993 I I x x I 
Key: I abortion; 2 contraception; 3 divorce; 4 parental authority; 5 child benefits; 6 
fiscal measures; 7 maternity leave; 8 childcare; 9 pro-family statement. 
The parties over time 
9 
x 
x 
x 
This section explores the dynamics of party ideologies and the family over the study 
period and provides further insight into the question: To what extent have party 
political ideologies about the family evolved in terms of left and right and across the 
countries? Figure 9.1 illustrates the direction of change in party ideologies in relation 
to the family and state intervention. The study of the place of the family in party 
political ideologies revealed distinctions between left and right. Figure 9.1 locates 
each of the parties in relation to the four key thematics that have traditionally 
distinguished the parties' ideological representation of family policy measures. The 
four themes are based upon two opposing ideological conceptions: family/individual 
and public/private. These four themes broadly represent the distinguishing 
characteristics of the parties examined in this study. Traditionally, parties of the left 
have targeted family policy measures through public (intervention) policies towards 
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individuals. The right have traditionally sought to provide the framework within 
which the family remains private. 
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Figure 9.1 Dynamic change in the party political ideologies and public 
intervention in the family sphere 
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Clearly the left wing parties have favoured policies that generally seek to target the 
needs of individuals. However, the PS, PSOE and Labour ideologies have all 
occupied positions which have shown some degree of concern with both the family 
and individuals. In the mid 1990s both Labour and the PSOE were more explicit 
about families although the two were distinguished by privatisation and intervention. 
Relative to the national context, the Labour party appears interventionist. The 
inclusion of the cross-national dimension, however, reveals that, in relation to the 
other left wing parties, Labour party ideology in the late 1990s reflects traditional 
right wing concerns, namely a lack of state intervention and general support for the 
family as an important part of society. ,. 
The right wing parties of Spain and the FN have remained relatively static, although 
their positions have become slightly less family-oriented during the 1990s. The far 
left parties have also remained relatively static and in similar positions when 
compared across national boundaries. The RPRfUDF had maintained an element of 
family support but has evolved along similar lines as the Conservative party through 
its pursuit of market-led, economic solutions to perceived family issues. 
Whereas, at the beginning of the case study period there was a clear split between left 
and right, the situation in the 1990s shows cross-party ideological convergence within 
countries and less clear distinctions, notably among those parties who serve in 
government or as the main opposition. These findings support Commaille and 
Martin's (1998: 128) argument that a right/left split no longer sufficiently covers the 
various party political positions in relation to the family either in France or other 
European countries. This this convergence supports the hypothesis that each national 
context embodies a distinct, deep core family ideology, which may result in a national 
'style' of family policy. Within each context there is some cross-party ideological 
conflict but this is limited by the boundaries of the national context for ideology. 
- ----_._---- ------------------------------
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Political ideologies and family policy change: a fluid relationship 
The existence and impact of ideology on family policy change emerges from the 
analysis in the thesis of evolving family policies and party political ideologies in 
France, the UK and Spain. The multi-method approach adopted for the case studies in 
the thesis has made it possible to look beyond abstract theories of ideology, and to 
explore the phenomenon of changing family policies from a new perspective. The 
conclusions of Chapter 2, reviewing the development of family policy study, support 
the view that the possible impact of party political ideology on changing family 
policies has not been sufficiently addressed. It has also revealed the possibility of a 
link, not only between party political ideology and changing family policies, but also 
with research activities. This is in itself an interesting finding of the thesis, which was 
not anticipated in the hypothesis and which merits further study. However, the chapter 
also highlights the value of multi-disciplinary and cross-national methods in the study 
of family policies, methods that have been shown to be valuable for the greater 
understanding of such elusive policies. 
The core theoretical elements of the thesis have been shown to be the source of long-
running debate among authors, and the conclusions of the review of this debate 
demonstrated the need to apply such theoretical work to further empirical study or 
vice versa. While it was shown that no single existing approach sufficiently addressed 
the data set, time span and theoretical approaches in the thesis, it was concluded that a 
combination of these methods provided a framework for empirical analysis. The 
elements of ideology outlined in Chapter 3 made it possible to go some way in 
examining party political ideologies by identifying the function of ideology in the 
relationship between state and citizens through Ideological State Apparatuses. 
Family policies in all three countries were revealed as having undergone considerable 
change since their origins. Changing populations and social attitudes were highlighted 
as key motors to the evolution of family policies. The classification of policy 
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measures as either regulatory or support helped to identify the similarities and 
differences between the family policies of each country as well as the party 
ideologies. 
The national case studies in the thesis demonstrated, through the analysis of election 
manifestos, how each policy measure and the role of families within the state were 
conceptualised within different party political ideologies. Analysis over time also 
helped to demonstrate the extent and nature of the evolution of each party's 
ideological position in relation to each of the eight measures. The national case 
studies concluded that party political ideologies, as present in the manifestos, 
preceded changes in family policies in relation to some measures and thus supported 
the theory of ideology as process. It was, however, also shown that some party 
ideologies changed as a result of the implementation of policy change as suggested in 
the hypothesis (Chapter 1). It is therefore not possible to identify a causal relationship 
between party political ideology and family policy change either way from the 
national case studies and data sources examined. However, the study has revealed 
some possibilities for the further development of this inquiry (presented below). 
Although the main objective of the thesis has been to explore the existence of a 
relationship between party political ideology and family policy change, it did not set 
out to prove that policy change can be explained solely through a focus on party 
ideologies. Rather, the aim was to explore the hypothesis that changing party political 
ideologies play a role in the formation and transformation of family policies in 
addition to other factors, such as economic concerns, population change or influences 
from supra-national sources, for example EU directives or international treaties 
(Hantrais, 1994). Although evidence from the case studies· demonstrates that the 
dynamics of changing party political ideologies and changing family policies are 
indeed linked in term of their evolution, the evidence does not support the causal 
element, as suggested in classical Marxist theories of ideology and the state. This 
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theory when applied to the present study would claim, for example, that that a change 
in party political ideology is a necessary precursor to a change in family policies. 
However, for some issues, the reverse was found to be the case, notably in relation to 
deep core ideologies and regulatory measures in France and Spain (for example 
I 
abortion and divorce). While this phenomenon was anticipated in the hypothesis, it 
may still be argued that such a change only takes place as a result of a political power 
shift (such as a change in parliamentary majority) or external forces (economic 
concerns, population change or influences from supra-national sources) within the 
national context. From the Marxist perspective this would represent a change in the 
control of the means of intellectual production. It would therefore be logical to expect 
a change in opposing party political ideologies on the grounds that, as demonstrated 
in Chapter 3, the function of an ideology is to become those of society (or a polity) as 
a whole. 
In addition, there has been evidence to show that national ideologies may converge 
even further as a result of supra-national policy harmonisation (such as the EU or UN 
directives). When this variable is added, the above findings may point to the end of 
ideology in cross-party political debate in France, the UK and Spain. 
A final conclusion which was not anticipated in the hypothesis, but which is linked 
with the core theme of national contexts for ideologies, brings the discussion back to 
the fundamental subject of this study. The three countries examined in this thesis 
represent what have become widely accepted, in family policy study, as examples of 
'explicit' (France) and 'implicit' (UK and Spain) family policy. While these terms 
have been used descriptively, they have not been fully explained. Through the focus 
on the national context for ideologies, and the concepts of state intervention, it was 
revealed that France had a statist tradition, the UK context was highly suspicious of 
state intervention in private matters and the Spanish context unclear in the era of the 
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recent Transition. Is it therefore a result of each national context and their ideologies 
of state intervention that the labels explicit and implicit have been applied? 
Questions for future research 
While the strict application of the theory of ideology would appear to support the 
above direction of causality, further research than has been possible within the 
limitations of the present thesis is required in order to establish the extent to which 
ideology impacts upon the broader party political context. Exploring the relationship 
between changing party political ideologies and family policies has revealed certain 
limitations to the methods employed in the present study. These elements may help to 
show a way forward for further research into the questions addressed in this thesis. 
The greatest limitations to the present study relate to the analysis of party political 
ideology. As discussed in Chapter 3, the concept of ideology is highly complex and 
has eluded influential scholars for more than two centuries. It was never the intention 
of this study to unravel all of the strands that cross the concept of ideology. This study 
was an attempt to further the study of party political ideology within the study of 
family policies. The case studies have revealed the highly ideological nature of the 
family and family policies, but it is clear that the findings of the research merely 
scratch the surface in this area. While much valuable research relating to questions of 
family policies has been undertaken, as outlined in Chapter 2, very little has been 
published which relates to the specific questions addressed above. In addition, the 
focus on election manifestos has been shown to be oflimited utility to the aims of this 
study (see Chapter 4). While the manifestos represent a consistent and comparable 
corpus for the analysis of expressions of party political ideology, any conclusions 
based thereon must be considered as limited. The rhetorical nature of the manifestos 
both revealed and disguised party ideology in relation to family policy themes. 
However, given the elusive and abstract nature of party political ideologies, any 
source may be open to similar criticism. In the light of these observations, a much 
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wider corpus may provide a more solid foundation for the further analysis of the 
relationship between party political ideology and family policy change. Future 
research in the areas addressed in this thesis may include: 
• Micro studies of specific issues, such as the relationship between neo-natalist 
ideology and the legalisation of abortion in Spain. This approach would allow 
researchers to examine a vast range of sources other than manifcstos (as 
discussed above and in Chapter 4). 
• Cross-national micro-studies. This would allow broader conclusions to be 
drawn about convergence/divergence of ideologies and their impact upon 
policy change. 
• The symbolic value of the term 'family' may be analysed as a theme within 
the ideology of individual parties, again focussing on a variety of source data. 
Any of the above approaches would be expected to address the questions raised in this 
study in greater detail. However, if such studies were to include cross-national 
comparative dimensions, this would make substantial demands upon a lone 
researcher. If these micro-studies were conducted by a team of national researchers, 
employing the same methods and examining comparable data sources, it may be 
envisaged that more substantive and detailed conclusions than have been possible in 
this study would drawn on both the national and cross-national level. 
ANNEX 1: PARTY MANIFESTOS 
Listed below are the party manifestos which were used in this study. 
France 
Front national 
Parti Communiste fran<yais 
Parti Socialist 1981-97 
Rassemblement pour la Republique/Union pour la democratie franc;aise 
UK 
Conservative 
Labour 
Liberal Democrats 
Spain 
Alianza PopularlPartido Popular 
Centro Democnitico y Social 
Izquierda UnidalPartido Comunista de Espaiia 
Union de Centro Democnitico 
Partido Socialista Obrero Espaiiol 
1985-97 
1981-97 
1981-97 
1979-97 
1979-97 
1979-97 
1977-96 
1982-93 
1977-93 
1977-79 
1977-96 
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Annex 2: Personal contacts 
Many of the ideas contained in this thesis were developed as a result of informal 
meetings and discussions in the three countries including: 
Archivists the RPRlUDF (Paris) and the FN (St Cloud). 
Representatives of the Spanish parties assisted in difficult task of finding the electoral 
programmes of the Transition period, many of which had been lost. Individual party 
members were generous in offering me photocopies of their personal archives in order 
to complete the data set. 
Antoine Math of the CNAF in Paris. 
Members of the Groupe des analyses des politiques publiques (GAPP) project 
'Conceptualiser les inten~ts familiaux' 1996-97. 
Lluis Flaquer, Department of Sociology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. 
Celia Valiente, Centro de Estudios Juan March, Madrid. 
Laurie McGarry and the staff of the Pilkington Library, Lougborough University . 
. Ruth Lister of the Department of Social Sciences, Lougborough University 
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